

BROWNSON'S  
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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ART. I. — *The Episcopal Observer*. Boston and Baltimore.  
August, 1845.

THE *Episcopal Observer* does not appear to comprehend what it is it must do, in order to refute the argument urged against Protestants in the article headed *The Church against No-Church*, in our Review for April last. That argument, formally stated, is, — According to the admissions of Protestants themselves, it is not possible to be saved without eliciting an act of faith.\* But it is not possible to elicit an act of faith without the Roman Catholic Church. Therefore, without the Roman Catholic Church, it is not possible to be saved. As Protestants concede the major, it is evident they can set aside the conclusion only by denying the minor, and proving affirmatively that an act of faith *can* be elicited without the Roman Catholic Church.

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\* The impossibility of being saved without *eliciting* faith, that is, without the *act* of faith, assumed here and throughout the whole argument, is, of course, to be restricted to adults, or persons in whom reason is so far developed as to render them morally responsible for their acts. It is true, universally, that it is impossible to be saved without faith, "for without faith it is impossible to please God," Heb. xi. 6, and "he that believeth not shall be condemned," St. Mark, xvi. 16; but it is not universally true that it is impossible to be saved without *eliciting* faith; for infants are saved by the infused *habit* of faith received in the Sacrament of Baptism, without the *act* of faith, of which they are not capable. Nevertheless, restricted to those who have attained to that age in which they become morally responsible for their acts, the assertion in the text is strictly true; and it is only as so restricted we understand it, or wish to have it understood.

The *Episcopal Observer*, however, contends that it will refute us, if it succeed in proving that an act of faith cannot be elicited *with* the Roman Catholic Church. It supposes the argument may be retorted, and the question made to turn on the merits of Catholicity, instead of the merits of Protestantism. But in this the editor labors under a mistake ; for the point at issue is not what is possible *with* Catholicity, but what is possible *without* it. The argument puts Protestantism on the defensive, and requires her to vindicate herself. She cannot retort upon her accuser ; because, even were she to prove her accuser guilty, she would not establish her own innocence.

The Protestant denies the Catholic Church, and does all in his power to destroy her. Be it so. We do not, in our argument, undertake the defence of the Church against him ; but call upon him to establish the sufficiency of Protestantism for salvation. He dare not affirm that salvation is possible without faith. But faith, we tell him, out of the Catholic Church, is not possible. He must deny this, and prove that it is possible out of the Catholic Church, or else admit that in denying the Catholic Church he denies the possibility of faith, and, therefore, of salvation. It avails him nothing, even if he prove that faith is not possible with the Roman Catholic Church ; for, until he proves its possibility without it, he can conclude from the fact that it is not possible with it only that it is not possible at all.

The *Observer* cannot deny this, but it imagines that in an argument with us it can relieve itself of the necessity of proving affirmatively that faith is elicitable without the Church, by adopting the *argumentum ad hominem*. “ Mr. Bröwnson,” it says, p. 325, “ assumes in the outset, as well as we, that an act of faith can be elicited in *some* way. . . . If we shut the mouth of his witness, he must fall back on Protestant ground, or become a faithless infidel.” If we were so disposed, we could concede the *Observer's* premises and deny its conclusion. If faith be possible in *some* way, and not possible on Catholic ground, it must be possible on Protestant ground or on *some other*, we admit. But, for aught the *Observer* shows to the contrary, there may be some other than the Protestant ground on which it is elicitable. Therefore, it does not follow, that, even were it to shut the mouth of our witness, we must either become Protestants or infidels.

But the *Observer* has no right to say that we assume in the

outset that an act of faith can be elicited in some way, and therefore must admit, that, if not elicitable in the way we allege, it must be in some other way ; for we assume no such thing.

We assert in the outset, and we labor throughout the argument to prove, that an act of faith is elicitable in *no* way, but by the authority of the Roman Catholic Church ; and, if in any part of the argument we reason on the assumption of its possibility, it is only on the ground that its possibility is conceded by Protestants in their assumption of the possibility of salvation.

An analysis of the whole argument of the article in question, so far as it bears directly against Protestants, will give us the following :

1. According to the admissions of Protestants, it is not possible to be saved without eliciting an act of faith.

But it is not possible to elicit an act of faith without the Roman Catholic Church. Therefore, without the Roman Catholic Church, it is not possible to be saved.

2. According to the admissions of Protestants themselves, it is possible to elicit an act of faith, since they admit the possibility of salvation, and that salvation is not possible without faith.

But it is not possible to elicit an act of faith without the Roman Catholic Church. Therefore, it must be possible to elicit an act of faith with the Roman Catholic Church.

The major, in both instances, is assumed to be conceded by Protestants. The dispute, then, must turn on the minor ; for, admitting both premises, no one will dream of denying the conclusion. The *Observer*, then, evidently cannot refute us in the way it imagines. The argument with which it proposes to refute us, if we may be allowed to reduce it to form, is, — It is impossible to be saved without eliciting an act of faith, *transeat*, or we concede it. But it is not possible to elicit an act of faith *with* the Roman Catholic Church. Therefore, it is possible to elicit an act of faith, or to be saved, without the Roman Catholic Church.

But this argument is faulty, for the conclusion does not follow from the premises ; because faith, if not elicitable with the Roman Catholic Church, may not be elicitable at all. The *Observer*, in order to refute us, must go a step further, and maintain this argument, namely : — It is impossible to be saved without eliciting an act of faith, *transeat*, or we concede it. But an act of faith *is* elicitable without the Roman Catholic Church. Therefore, it is possible to be saved without the Roman Catholic Church.



This argument, if sustained, would be good against the argument we adduced, because it is its direct negative ; but it would not, after all, be conclusive against Catholicity. The conclusion follows *ad hominem*, not necessarily ; for there may be something besides faith necessary to salvation, and which is attainable only through the Roman Catholic Church. Yet, if sustained, it would unquestionably refute the argument on which we in our essay relied to establish the insufficiency of Protestantism. But the *Observer* does not sustain it ; does not even seriously attempt to sustain it. It merely attempts to retort upon us, and show that it is as difficult to elicit an act of faith on Catholic ground as we allege it is on Protestant ground. We tell it, therefore, again, since what it attempts to prove is not the negative of our proposition, even assuming that it has done all it has attempted, which it of course has not, it has not refuted us, or relieved Protestantism in the least of the very grave objections we urged against it.

We are rather surprised that even the editor of the *Observer*, who, though by no means a theologian or a disciplined reasoner, is yet a man of at least ordinary natural ability, should think of controverting this. He must know that the whole question, as we presented it, turns on the sufficiency or insufficiency of Protestantism to the eliciting of an act of faith, and that, till he has proved its sufficiency, he has proved nothing to his purpose. Protestantism, if good for any thing, must be able to stand on its own merits, and be capable of being sustained, not by the assumed error of some other system, but by its own positive truth. Its advocates show but little confidence in its intrinsic strength, when they refuse to bring forward positive arguments in its defence, and seek to sustain it solely by abusing the Church, calumniating her sovereign Pontiffs, misstating her history, and misrepresenting her teachings. They themselves admit that faith is a condition *sine qua non* of salvation, and therefore must admit, that, if faith be not elicitable on Protestant ground, no man living and dying a Protestant can be saved. Why, then, do they not see the necessity, before all, of establishing the fact that faith is elicitable on their ground ? Why do they so studiously evade the question ? The question is for them a question of the gravest magnitude. Their eternal all is at stake. If they are wrong in assuming that they can have faith as Protestants, as we think we have proved they are, they have and can have no well grounded hopes of salvation. How, then, can they treat

this question with indifference? Can a reasonable being rest satisfied with his condition, so long as he has room to fear that he is out of the way of salvation? Is the eternal destiny of the soul a matter to be trifled with? "What doth it profit, if a man gain the whole world and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" St. Matt. xvi. 26. It may be humiliating to the Protestant to descend from that pinnacle of human pride and self-sufficiency on which his assumptions place him, and consent to receive instructions, as a little child, from the Church against which he has for so long a time protested, — to prostrate himself at the foot of the cross which he has despised, and to be called by a name he has done his best to make a name of reproach; but it is better even to submit, it is better to own that he has been wrong, that he has deceived and been deceived, that he has sinned before God, blasphemed his holy name, and become unworthy to be called a son in his Father's house, than to eat husks with the swine and to lose his own soul for ever. Let the prodigal son come to himself, and ask if he can have life in the "far country" where he has wasted his substance and is perishing with hunger, and he will not refuse to say, "I will arise and return to my Father's house, where there is bread enough and to spare." Would that our Protestant brethren would once seriously reflect on their own position, once seriously ask themselves, in the solitude of their own self-communings, if they have faith, if they can have faith without returning to the bosom of the Church; they would then soon find that where they are they have and can have no foundation on which to build, no ground of hope in God's mercy, or of a share in the heritage of the saints.

In our July number we charged the *Observer* with *ignoring* the position, which we had assumed in the article he was laboring to refute, that what one is required to believe in order to be saved is truth, not falsehood; that is, truth without mixture of error. The editor, in his reply, appears to admit the charge, but labors to justify his neglecting the position, on the ground that it was of no consequence to him. "It was," he says, "of no consequence to us that he (Mr. Brownson) labored long to prove that the 'somewhat' the Christian must believe, in order to be saved, is truth without any mixture of falsehood; for his only object, in getting up his 'exact' theory, was to create a necessity for an 'infallible witness'; and if it

turned out in the end that he could not legitimately authenticate the authority of the witness, it would follow of necessity that there is no such thing as faith, or that illicit processes of reasoning had betrayed Mr. Brownson into a false presentation of its claims." — p. 325. *Therefore*, the position and reasoning were of no consequence in the refutation of our argument!

The *Observer*, in the first place, labors under a mistake in saying, our "only object in getting up the exact theory was to create a necessity for an infallible witness." We merely attempted to show, from the nature of faith itself, and of its object, that without an infallible witness there can be no such thing as faith. The necessity, if we were right in our reasoning, was not of our creating, but in the nature of the case. It was the *Observer's* business, not to *assume* we created or imagined a necessity where none exists, but to *prove* that the necessity we alleged does not exist in fact. We cannot understand how otherwise he was to refute us.

In the second place, the *Observer* distinctly admits, that, if our position and the processes of reasoning we adopted be admitted, it follows of necessity, either that there can be no such thing as faith, or that the infallible witness we contended for, that is, the Roman Catholic Church, must be accepted, — precisely what throughout the whole argument we were laboring to prove. And this is assigned as a reason why, when avowedly attempting to refute us, it was of no consequence to controvert our position, or show the fallacy of our reasoning! You flatter yourself with having "the pleasure" of refuting an opponent. If you grant his position and reasoning, you own you must accept his conclusions; *therefore*, in order to refute him, it is of no consequence to overthrow his position or set aside his reasoning. This would be a novel way, and, by the by, rather an easy way, of refuting an opponent, and no doubt has many attractions for our friend of the *Observer*; yet we would thank him to tell us, *ex professo*, what in an opponent's argument he regards it as necessary to refute in order to refute the argument.

Nevertheless, the editor says he did not entirely overlook the matter; but, all unimportant as it was, had special reference to it in stating one of the points we maintained, which needed looking after, to be, "That, unless the nice *theological* shades of meaning in God's word are appreciated, one cannot be saved." — p. 326. But we complained of him, first,



for omitting, when giving professedly a synopsis of our argument, an important position which we had assumed, and without which the argument would be incomplete and without force ; and, secondly, for ascribing to us a proposition we neither adopted nor implied, and reasoning against it as if it were ours, and giving his readers no means of discovering it to be not ours. These two just causes of complaint, we are sorry to say, he suffers to remain. He has grossly mutilated and misrepresented our argument, and will neither acknowledge his injustice nor afford his readers the means of detecting it.

Our proposition was, simply, that what one is required to believe in order to be a Christian believer, in order to be saved, is truth, not falsehood, truth without any mixture of falsehood ; or, in other terms, — as we elsewhere expressed ourselves, — the word of God in its purity and integrity. The editor of the *Observer* tells his readers that we maintain, “that, unless the nice *theological* shades of meaning in God’s word are *appreciated*, one cannot be saved.” We submit to the candid, nay, even to the uncandid reader, if these two propositions are identical ; if, indeed, there is not a wide difference between them. The first proposition the editor omitted, and substituted for it the second. This was grossly unjust. All his reasoning, professedly against our proposition, was directed solely against the one falsely ascribed to us ; and he seemed to his readers to be refuting us, when he was really only refuting a proposition which he had himself fabricated, and without any authority asserted to be ours. Here was both falsehood and deception, from the guilt of which the editor hardly attempts to clear himself, — whether through simplicity or malice it is not for us to decide.

But let us examine these two propositions. The one the *Observer* ascribes to us evidently makes theology a condition *sine qua non* of salvation. This must be admitted. 1. Because it speaks of the “nice *theological* shades of meaning in God’s word.” The adjective *theological* is necessarily used here to designate the subject of the shades of meaning, and by its proper force determines that subject to be theology. If this had not been the intention of the framer of the proposition, assuming him to have attached some meaning to the words he adopted, he would have omitted the word *theological*, and have written simply, “Unless the nice shades of meaning in God’s,” &c. 2. Because the proposition affirms unless the nice

theological shades of meaning be *appreciated*, &c. Now, faith does not appreciate distinctions or shades of meaning. That which appreciates distinctions or shades of meaning in God's word is science, and that particular science which is called *theology*. To appreciate is to comprehend, and nothing is appreciated that is not comprehended. But faith does not comprehend. Its peculiarity is in believing without comprehending, without appreciating, — in believing the incomprehensible and the inappreciable. Consequently, to affirm that it is necessary to salvation to appreciate all the nice shades of meaning in God's word is to affirm the necessity of theology to salvation. And there can be no doubt that this is what the editor of the *Observer* intended to make his readers believe we did affirm. Whoever looks through his two articles will be perfectly convinced that he means to assert we maintain, that, unless all the nice shades of *theology* are appreciated, unless we have a theology which embraces all the truth there is in God's word, and appreciates all its shades of meaning, and which includes no error in any respect whatever, but is in every conceivable respect the exact truth as it lies in the mind of the Holy Ghost, we cannot be saved. He will not, and dares not, deny that he has represented, and intentionally represented, us as so maintaining.

Now, we deny that our proposition warrants this. What is it we say? That, in order to be saved, one must *believe* truth, not falsehood, truth without any mixture of error, or the word of God in its purity and integrity; and we define faith to be "a theological virtue which consists in believing without doubting, explicitly or *implicitly*, all the truths which Almighty God has revealed, on the veracity of God alone." Is there here one word said about theology? Is there any thing which indicates that we hold it necessary to appreciate the meaning, much more, the nice shades of meaning, there may be in God's word? Yes, one word, says the *Observer*, one word which proves, that, if it spoke of theology, we also spoke of it. — p. 327. We define faith to be a *theological* virtue. We therefore use the word theological as well as the editor of the *Observer*, and speak of theology as much as he did. In reply, we add that we have proved conclusively that he did speak of theology, and not only because he used the term *theological*, but because he spoke of shades of meaning to be *appreciated*. The same word, we are sorry to be obliged to inform him, may have more than one meaning, and be used sometimes in



one sense, and sometimes in another, to be determined by the connection in which it is used. We defined faith to be a *theological* virtue, to designate its immediate object, which is God, and to distinguish it from the moral virtues. This is a strictly proper use of the word, and has not the remotest reference to the science of theology. The *Observer* did not and could not use the word in this sense, for the reasons already assigned, and because it did not wish to distinguish theological shades of meaning from *moral* shades, and could not have so done if it had wished, since shades of meaning have no *moral* character.

We could not have intended to mean by faith the *science* of theology, for we said faith consists in *believing*, and we were careful through our whole article to draw the distinction between *belief* and science. If we had meant theology, instead of faith, we should have been compelled by the principles we laid down to have written, "Faith is a theological virtue which consists in *comprehending* all the *truths*," &c. But as we used the word *believing*, instead of *comprehending*, it is but reasonable to give us credit for meaning what we said, and to conclude that we meant faith when we said so, and not theological science.

And again ; we speak of faith as consisting in believing explicitly or *implicitly*. We did not contend that even an explicit faith in all the truths revealed is necessary to salvation, but admitted that an *implicit* faith might, at least as to some portion of the revealed word, suffice. But in theology, inasmuch as it is a science, all is necessarily explicit, and nothing implicit. It would be absurd to speak of *implicit* science or *implicit* knowledge. But we may speak of implicit faith, since he who believes a proposition believes by implication all it necessarily involves, though he may be far from mentally apprehending it all. He who believes the Church to be an infallible teacher believes *implicitly* all she teaches, though as a matter of fact he actually know but a small portion of what she teaches ; because her infallibility necessarily implies that all she teaches is true. Consequently, since we spoke of believing explicitly or *implicitly*, our words must be understood of faith, and not of theological science.

The *Observer* says that we "define faith as a theological virtue which embraces all the meaning there is in truth, including, of course, its shades of meaning." — p. 327. This is not strictly correct ; for we define it as embracing only the

truths which Almighty God has *revealed*, and there may, for aught we know, be truths he has not revealed. But admitting that we make faith embrace all the meaning and even the shades of meaning in the word of God, what is this to the *Observer's* purpose? To believe explicitly or implicitly all the truths Almighty God has revealed is something very different from *appreciating* them, from noting and appreciating all their nice shades of meaning. To do this last, one must comprehend these truths, know their full significance, which transcends all mortal ability. They have depths of meaning which will excite the wonder and admiration of the saints through eternity. Even the saints in their beatified state will never be able fully to appreciate the meaning of God's word; for it is infinite, even infinitely infinite. Yet it all may be, and is, embraced explicitly or implicitly in the simple faith of the simplest Christian believer. It is evident, therefore, from all these considerations, that we meant by faith, faith as distinguished from theology, and that we did not contend and could not have contended for such a proposition as the editor of the *Observer* has presented to his readers as ours. Will he candidly acknowledge that he has done us injustice, that he has deceived his readers, and claimed to have refuted us, when all he has done is to *ignore* our arguments, and refute a proposition which he himself has invented, and which we should be as ready to reject as he is, and perhaps even more so?

After telling the editor in our July number that we did not expressly or by implication maintain, that, unless all the nice theological shades of meaning in God's word are appreciated, one cannot be saved, and charitably ascribing his misrepresentation to his ignorance of the distinction between faith and theology, we proceeded on the supposition that he probably intended to deny our position, that what one must believe in order to be a Christian believer, in order to be saved, is truth, not falsehood, truth without mixture of error, or the word of God in its purity and integrity, and to maintain as his own thesis the contrary doctrine, namely, in order to be a Christian believer, in order to be saved, it suffices to believe truth *and* falsehood, truth mixed with error, or the mutilated and impure word of God. Assuming this to be his thesis, we proceeded to combat it. In his reply to us he brings it forward again, insists on it, but studiously avoids noticing even one of the very grave objections we urged against it, and does not even

attempt to show us, on divine authority, that in matters of Christian faith it is lawful to believe falsehood, nor deign to inform us how much or how little falsehood it is allowable to mix up with the truth. Why is this? Does the editor still remain of the opinion, that the proper way to refute an argument is to ignore it, or that his word is sufficient authority for believing whatever he may take it into his head to assert?

The editor alleges nothing new in support of the sufficiency of his "mixed" theory. He simply refers to his former argument from the alleged inadequacy of language to serve as the medium of communicating the exact truth. "We showed," he says, "that language being a fallible representative of thought, it must in some instances and to some extent fail to fulfil the end of its use." — p. 326. That the language of the *Observer* fails frequently to serve as the medium of communicating the exact truth, or even the truth at all, we have but too ample evidence; but that this is the fault of language itself, rather than of him who uses it, we are not quite so ready to concede. "Mr. Brownson," it says, "would have convinced a larger circle of intelligent readers, if he could have seriously set himself to work, and have shown why, and how, and when, human language was divested of its garments of fallibility, and clothed with the attributes of *unerring* divinity." — *ib.* It will be time enough for us to show this, when we assert, or when we maintain doctrines which imply, the absolute infallibility of language. The *Observer* must excuse us, if we do not in all cases show a willingness to undertake to maintain the propositions he fabricates for us. We hold ourselves bound to accept every consequence fairly deducible from principles which we acknowledge; but not every consequence the fertile fancy of the editor of the *Observer*, without any authority in any thing we say, chooses to tell his readers is a proposition we are bound to maintain. When he shall have proved from any thing we say or imply, that we hold language is clothed with "the *unerring* attributes of divinity," we will tell him why, how, and when it became clothed with them.

Whether language is adequate to the expression of all the distinctions, all the nice shades of meaning, involved in the revelation Almighty God has made us, we do not inquire; because we have nothing to do, in matters of faith, with distinctions and shades of meaning, and because, when we believe the revelation on competent authority, we necessarily believe all that it involves, whether we recognize or mentally appre-



hend all the distinctions or shades of meaning it involves, or not. Moreover, though we have heard much of the imperfection of language, we have never yet found it so very imperfect as some people pretend. The imperfection, for the most part, we have found to be not so much in language as the representative of thought as in the head of him who uses it. As a general rule, he who thinks with clearness, exactness, and precision may always find language a perfect medium of his thought. But be this as it may, the *Observer* will not deny that language has some capabilities, that in some instances and to some extent it may serve as a perfect representative of thought. If not, we had better shut our mouths, and stop writing, for there are errors, falsehoods, and deceptions enough already in the world, without adding to the number. The simple question is not, whether language be in all cases absolutely infallible, but whether it is adequate to the exact expression of the word of God, so far forth as that word is the object of faith. When I say two and two are four, language is a perfect representative of my thought, because I assert a simple proposition, with one simple sense, in which there are and can be no distinctions, no nice shades of meaning, to be noted or expressed. So is it with the articles of faith, as propounded for our belief. They are, as formal propositions,—the only sense in which we are required to believe them, since their matter is intrinsically incomprehensible and inappreciable, as all admit,—all simple propositions, each having one simple sense, neither more nor less, which he who believes affirms, and he who disbelieves denies. If language, as it unquestionably is, be adequate to express a simple proposition with clearness, exactness, and precision, it is adequate to the clear, exact, and precise expression of the articles of faith, and therefore the necessity of believing the exact truth, or the word of God, in its purity and integrity, cannot be denied on the ground of the imperfection of language.

We have seen, lately, this argument against the necessity of believing the exact truth, drawn from the assumed imperfection of language, insisted on from several quarters, and it appears to be resorted to as the last refuge of those who are determined not to admit the authority of the Catholic Church. But are they aware of the consequences which necessarily follow from their doctrine? The *Observer* expressly teaches that Almighty God himself cannot make us a revelation which shall reach us exempt from error. Then, since Almighty God

chooses to make the revelation, chooses the medium through which he makes it, he must be said to teach the error which *necessarily* accompanies his word, or is *necessarily* mingled with it. But God can teach error in no sense and in no degree whatever, for he is *prima veritas in essendo, in cognoscendo, et in dicendo*. Then, if he cannot make a revelation without necessarily communicating a certain portion of error along with it, be it more or less, he can make us no revelation at all. Hence, the first consequence of the doctrine is **THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DIVINE REVELATION.**

If we assume—as we must, if we assume that God does make us a revelation, and cannot make it exempt from error—that he makes a revelation in which he necessarily mingles error with the truth, we deny his veracity, at least his veracity *in speaking*,—*in dicendo*,—or in making the revelation. Then his veracity cannot be alleged as the sufficient ground for faith. But the veracity of God is the only ground for faith possible, and if it be not sufficient, there is no sufficient ground for faith. Then there is and can be no faith. Hence, the second consequence of the doctrine is **THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF FAITH.**

But, if God makes us a revelation, and does not make it exempt from error, so far forth as the error necessarily mingled with the truth extends, he in making the revelation deceives us, leads us necessarily into error. But to charge God with deception, or to accuse him of leading men into error or falsehood, in any degree whatever, is blasphemy; for it makes him a liar. Hence, the third consequence of the doctrine is **BLASPHEMY**, and they who defend it are material, if not formal, blasphemers. We beg the editor of the *Observer* to attend to this point, and, if not prepared to accept these consequences, as we presume he is not, to show us—not merely *assert*, but *prove*—that they do not necessarily follow from his doctrine. We beg him to answer fairly, logically, candidly, without evasion, subterfuge, declamation, or abuse.

Furthermore, the Holy Ghost probably knows the capabilities of language as well as our friend of the *Observer*, and, since it is repugnant to his veracity to communicate any thing but the exact truth, we may reasonably conclude, that, if there are truths, though we can conceive of none, which he knows language is inadequate to express with exactness, he does not reveal them, or make them a part of the word he propounds for our assent. This, it strikes us, would be more reasonable

than to conclude with the *Observer* that God makes us a revelation mingled with more or less of error.

The editor of the *Observer* would be relieved of many of his embarrassments, if he would take the pains to make himself acquainted with a few of the more ordinary terms and distinctions of theological science. A slight acquaintance with a brief course of systematic theology would save him from many of the grave errors, as well as laughable blunders, which his writings everywhere indicate to the theologian. To write confidently, even flippantly, is not always to write wisely or profoundly. We suspect, after all, that our friend of the *Observer* really supposes that we assert and maintain, consciously or unconsciously, that no one who entertains the least *theological* error, however trifling or insignificant, and whatever his love and earnest strivings for the truth, can be saved; but we assure him that we had hoped, that, in a community where we have been known for years, and where we are not regarded as an absolute dunce, it could never be necessary for us to deny that we maintain any proposition so obviously and so grossly absurd. We are not among those who claim infallibility for the human understanding, nor has our own past experience tended to give us any very lofty notions of its ability, when left to itself, to avoid even great and dangerous errors. Unquestionably, we assert that faith must be infallible, that in matters of faith we must believe the word of God, the whole word of God, and nothing but the word of God; but to our mind there is a wide difference between asserting this and asserting that every or any purely theological error excludes from salvation. Whoever would be saved must believe the true doctrine of the Trinity; but it does not follow from this that he cannot be saved, if he honestly err in the account he renders of the doctrine to philosophy, in the applications he may make of it in the general explanations of science, in the conclusions he may draw from it, or the arguments by which he may attempt to render it less difficult for reason to grasp, — providing that he advance nothing which impugns the doctrine itself as a simple article of faith. The same may be said in regard to all the articles of faith. No error excludes from salvation, unless it be an error in matters strictly of faith. In matters strictly of faith, we of course contend that it is necessary to believe the exact truth; because, *if error be mingled with the word, we cannot believe it at all*. If we believe the word at all, we believe it because it is God's word, on the divine veracity alone.



We have and can have no other ground of belief; and if we do not believe it on this ground alone, our belief is not faith. But we have not, and cannot have, the divine veracity for error; because God does not reveal error, and cannot speak what is not strictly true. If, then, we receive the word only as mingled with error, we do not receive it on the divine veracity; but on some other authority, and therefore on an authority insufficient for faith.

The editor of the *Observer*, strange as it may seem, actually appears to be unaware of the fact that *falsehood is not susceptible of the degree of evidence requisite for faith*; and he evidently reasons as if men might have faith in falsehood as well as in truth. But faith in error or falsehood is impossible. If we mingle error with the word, it must be because the evidence on which we receive the word is indistinguishable from that on which we receive the error we mingle with it. The evidence for the truth is then no higher than the evidence we have for the error. Then the truth is no better evidenced to us than it is possible to evidence falsehood. *But when the truth is no better evidenced than it is possible to evidence falsehood, it is not sufficiently evidenced for faith.* Consequently, when we mingle error with the word, we have no faith in the word itself. We must, then, believe the exact truth, or not have faith.

We told the *Observer* that it must be aware that on the definition which we gave of faith rests nearly the whole of our argument for the necessity of an infallible witness; for, if faith consist in believing without doubting, it is obvious that it is impossible to elicit an act of faith on the authority of a fallible witness. To this the *Observer* replies:—"Is God speaking audibly by his word to the ear, or silently by his spirit in the heart, a fallible witness? Did we not say in our former article that we have in the person of the Holy Ghost what answers Mr. Brownson's theory, a witness and interpreter that cannot err, therefore infallible?"—p. 327.

1. It is fair to infer from this that the editor of the *Observer* means to concede our definition of faith, and that faith is not elicitable without an infallible witness,—two points of some importance in the controversy. He must now prove that he has or can have an infallible witness without the Roman Catholic Church, or admit that without the Roman Catholic Church faith is not elicitable.

2. The witness he alleges is in one sense the very witness we contend for, since we hold the Church to be the witness to the fact of revelation only on the ground that it is the Holy Ghost that witnesses in her testimony. If by the Holy Ghost in person the *Observer* means the Holy Ghost bearing witness through the Church as his organ, we are agreed, and there is no controversy between us ; but if, as is the case, it means the Holy Ghost bearing witness immediately to the individual, we deny the assumption, and put the editor upon his proofs.

3. We cannot entertain the *Observer's* appeal to the personal testimony suggested, for its pages bear unequivocal evidence that its editor does not write under the immediate dictation of the Holy Ghost. The editor is a bold man, but we do not believe that even he dare lay his hand on his heart and solemnly assert that he truly and sincerely believes that he is specially inspired by the Holy Ghost to say what is or is not the word of God.

4. The *Observer* cannot claim, on its own principles, to have an infallible witness, even in case it has the private testimony of the Holy Ghost. The Holy Ghost can be an infallible witness only on condition that he speak to the mind and heart the *exact* truth ; which the *Observer* contends, owing to the fallibility of language, is not possible.

5. Though the *Observer* may have *said* in its former article that it has the infallible testimony of the Holy Ghost to the fact of revelation, we do not recollect that it *proved* that it has or even may have it ; and since it denies to Almighty God the ability to tell the exact truth, it must excuse us if we cannot take its unsupported assertions as conclusive for whatever it may allege. We cannot consent to award it an infallibility which it denies to Almighty God.

6. The editor of the *Observer* has no right to allege the private testimony of the Holy Ghost as the basis of an argument he is publicly urging ; for, according to his own admission, it is a secret of his own bosom, not recognizable by or provable to another. The validity of an argument that rests upon it cannot, therefore, be publicly established ; and we trust it cannot be necessary to prove that an argument, the validity of which cannot be publicly established, is an argument which it is not lawful publicly to urge.

The resort to the private testimony of the Holy Ghost, or what we called *private illumination*, is always exceedingly suspicious, — may, in fact, be always regarded as a mere eva-

sion of a difficulty felt to be unanswerable. It is always a virtual acknowledgment of defeat. The man finds himself condemned by reason, and appeals to unreason, — flattering himself that he will henceforth be secure, because, if he cannot prove that he has the private illumination alleged, you may find it equally difficult to prove that he has it not.

But this miserable subterfuge shall not avail the editor of the *Observer*. He promised himself the “pleasure” of refuting us, and we hold him to his promise. We deny in our argument that faith can be elicited without the Roman Catholic Church. He says it can be, and alleges private inspiration, what he calls the “internal monitor,” as the means by which it is elicitable. His thesis, then, is, Faith is elicitable by the internal monitor, or private testimony of the Holy Ghost, without the Roman Catholic Church. This thesis he must maintain by positive proofs, or yield to his opponent. But he cannot maintain this thesis without proving, 1. That faith is morally as well as metaphysically possible by this private testimony; and 2. That it is possible in the ordinary course of God’s gracious providence.

1. We did not deny that faith is elicitable without the Roman Catholic Church, because it could not have been made elicitable in some other way; but because it has not been. We say expressly, “We do not deny the possibility, on the part of God, of adopting some other method.” — p. 173. The question, then, is not a question of *a priori* reasoning; but a simple question of fact. Before the editor can refute our thesis or maintain his own, he must prove, as a matter of fact, that faith is actually made elicitable without the Roman Catholic Church, and by the private testimony of the Holy Ghost. It is not elicitable by this private testimony, unless we have it. He must, then, in order to prove faith possible by it, prove that we have it, or at least may have it, if we will.

2. The editor must not only prove that we have or may have the private testimony, but that we have or may have it as standing in the ordinary course of God’s gracious providence. For, if it does not stand in the ordinary course of God’s gracious providence, it is a miracle. But we were not discussing what is or is not possible by means of miracles, but what is or is not possible without miracles, — as is evident from the fact, that we were not seeking what is possible on the part of God, but what he has made possible on the part of man. The Church is, indeed, a miracle in relation to the order of nature, inas-



much as it is supernatural ; but standing in the ordinary course of God's gracious providence, we do not call it a miracle, any more than we call that a miracle which stands in the order of God's natural providence, or providence as manifested in the order of nature. If the private testimony stands in the order of grace, as the ordinary method of eliciting faith, it is not to be regarded as a miracle ; but if it do not stand in the order of grace as the ordinary method of eliciting faith, it is a miracle. Hence, the editor of the *Observer* must prove that private illumination is the method Almighty God in the ordinary course of his gracious providence has actually adopted for eliciting faith, or fail to refute our thesis or to sustain his own.

That private illumination is the method actually adopted as the ordinary method of eliciting faith, we deny, 1. Because the faith we are required to have cannot be elicited by it ; 2. Because the method actually adopted is a different method ; and 3. Because faith must be elicited by this different method, or not be the faith on which the question turns.

I. The faith which would be elicitable by means of the private testimony of the Holy Ghost, even assuming that we have or may have it, would be simply faith in a new revelation made specially to the individual. This private testimony must be sufficient, in order to meet the demand, to enable us to say, in all cases, what is and what is not the word of God. But the word must be propounded to the mind, before testimony to the fact that it is God's word can be received. It must be propounded by the Spirit privately illuminating, or by some other authority. If by some other authority, then the sufficiency of private illumination for eliciting faith is denied, and the question comes up as to what this other authority is, and as to what may be its competency. If by the Spirit privately illuminating, then the private illumination propounds as well as evidences the word ; which is the same thing as its revelation. Then whatever the word believed on the authority of the private illumination, it is a new revelation, and, as a formal revelation, independent of every other revelation, and has no connection with any other revelation, either express or implied.

But a new revelation made specially to the individual is not the revelation faith in which we have assumed, on the strength of Protestant admissions, to be essential to salvation, and which we have denied to be elicitable without the Roman Catholic Church ; for we say expressly, in our article on *The*

*Church against No-Church*, — “ But the revelation to which we are seeking a witness is not a new revelation, not a private revelation which Almighty God may see proper to make to individuals, but a revelation already made and propounded for the belief of all men.” — p. 173. Throughout our whole argument we presuppose that a revelation has been made, a historical revelation, a public or catholic revelation, which we call briefly “ the Christian revelation,” and which must be believed, as the condition *sine qua non* of salvation. It is always on the means and conditions of eliciting faith in this, to us, historical revelation that the question turns. Faith in any other revelation, then, although it should embrace materially the same truths as this, would not be the faith in question. Even were it proved that faith in some other revelation is elicitable without the Roman Catholic Church, it would be nothing to the purpose, for it might still be true that faith in this is not possible without it. The faith involved in the controversy is a faith in this formal revelation, already made and completed. But private illumination can give us faith only in a new revelation, a private revelation, made specially to the individual. Therefore, the faith we are required to have, the faith on which the whole question turns, is not elicitable by private illumination, even in case private illumination be assumed as a fact.

II. But the method of private illumination is not the method of eliciting faith actually adopted ; because it is evident from the Holy Scriptures that another method has been adopted. The Holy Scriptures are admissible testimony in the case ; for, in the first place, we adduce them only as simple *historical documents*, and, in the second place, they are held by Protestants, against whom we are reasoning, to be of divine authority. According to these, the method of eliciting faith actually adopted is not by private inspiration, but through the ministry of teachers to whom Jesus Christ committed his revelation, and whom he authorized to teach or propound it. St. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20.

1. The revelation to be believed must be propounded, and with authority. This is evident from the express assertion of St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans. “ How can they believe him of whom they have not heard ? And how shall they hear without a preacher ? And how can they preach, unless they be sent ? ” — x. 14, 15. The obvious sense of this is that faith comes by hearing (verse 17), — the word must be propound-

ed ; that hearing comes by the preacher, — there must be some one to propound the word ; and that the preacher preaches because sent, — he who propounds the word must propound it with authority, or because authorized to propound it ; — for this, in this connection, is unquestionably the meaning of the word *sent*. Therefore, faith is elicitable only on condition that the word is propounded, and propounded with authority, and therefore only on condition that there be pastors and teachers authorized to propound it.

But, on the assumption of private illumination as the authority for saying what is or is not the word of God, the word cannot be authoritatively propounded. To propound is to propound to others, and to propound authoritatively to others is to propound with an authority which is equally an authority for him who propounds and for them to whom he propounds, — an authority which he may adduce, and which they must admit. But private illumination is not such authority. It is not an authority common to both parties, — is not public or catholic ; but private, confined to the bosom of the individual. In the preacher, it is no authority for the hearers ; in the hearers, it is no authority for the preacher. Confined to himself, he cannot adduce it as the reason why they should believe him ; confined to them, he cannot appeal to it, for he cannot know that they have it, and has no right to presume on their having it. Moreover, to assume it in them as the authority would be to transfer the authority from him to them ; and then, if they might be said to *hear* with authority, he could not be said to *propound* with authority. Besides, this would place the one assumed to be the learner above the teacher, and subject him who is assumed to teach to them who, it is assumed, need to be taught, — an absurdity which can find place only in Congregationalism. It would compel the teacher to rely on those he teaches for the authority with which to teach, and to preach not because *sent*, but because *called* ; which would be as if the Son of God came not because sent by the Father, but because called by the sinners for whom he died.

On this ground, it is evident the preacher could not propound the word with authority. But it must be propounded with authority, or faith is not elicitable, as before proved. Therefore, either faith is not elicitable, or there is some other method than that of private illumination by which it is elicitable.

2. Another method than that of private illumination is evidently the method of eliciting faith actually adopted ; because,



on the method actually adopted, it is possible for the preacher to vindicate the word and convince gainsayers. "A bishop must," the holy Apostle tells us, "embracing that faithful word which is according to doctrine, . . . be able to exhort in sound doctrine and convince the gainsayers. For there are many disobedient, vain talkers, seducers, especially they of the circumcision, who must be reproved, who subvert whole houses, teaching things which they ought not for filthy lucre's sake. . . . Wherefore rebuke them sharply, that they may be sound in the faith." — Tit. i. 7–13. But this is impossible, if he have no authority on which to declare what is or is not sound doctrine, but the private illumination of the Holy Ghost. He can convict gainsayers, vain talkers, seducers, only on condition that he has a public or catholic authority for the word, to which they can be compelled to answer, and by which he can vindicate the truth, and refute the error. But private illumination is not a public or catholic authority. It is authority only for the individual who has it. Since, then, the preacher of the word is required to do that which he cannot do without a different authority, it is evident that some other method than private illumination for saying what is or is not the word of God, and therefore for eliciting faith, is the method actually adopted.

There is here a question of no small magnitude, and of the greatest practical importance. The whole land is evidently overrun with infidels and misbelievers. The editor of the *Observer* is as ready to admit this as we are. He finds men, as well as we, denying or perverting the faith. He is at war on all hands with what he regards as error. He is at war with his Puseyite brethren, who he thinks are making shipwreck of the faith; he is virtually, whether he knows it or not, at war with the episcopal constitution of his own church, and contending, substantially, for the Congregationalism in which he was brought up, and which he has never really renounced; nay, he enters the lists against us, and labors with might and main, though without any flattering success, to convict us of error, — to prove the Catholic Church corrupt, as good as no church at all, and that on her authority faith is not possible. But does he not see that all this is pitifully absurd, if he have no authority but private illumination for saying what is or is not the word of God? If we demand of him evidence that he, instead of those he opposes, has the word, what answer has he to return? He cannot appeal to private illumination, for that is a secret of

his own bosom, as he himself admits, and therefore is no authority by which to prove that he is right or others wrong. He must either admit another authority, a catholic or public authority, or close his pages, and shut his mouth. His very attempt to convict us and others of error is a proof that he himself, unless he is capable of grosser inconsistency than even we can believe him, does not rely on private illumination alone, but really believes that he has an authority for faith which is common to him and us.

3. The method of eliciting faith, or the rule of faith, actually adopted, cannot be private illumination, because the method or rule actually adopted presupposes the possibility of HERESY. "The man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid."—Tit. iii. 15. There must be, according to what we have just said, a public or catholic authority for faith, or no one can have the right or the ability to admonish another for heresy; for he must be convicted of heresy before he can be admonished, and he cannot be convicted of heresy on a private authority. Where there is only a private authority for faith, there can be only a private faith. But where there is only a private faith, and no authority to propound a catholic or public faith, there is and can be no heresy; for heresy is not the wilful rejection of the private faith of individuals, but of a public or catholic faith. But there can be heresy. Therefore, there must be a public or catholic faith. Therefore, a public or catholic authority for faith. But private illumination is not such authority. Therefore, there is and must be another authority than that of private illumination.

III. These considerations suffice to establish the fact, that there is another method than that of private illumination actually adopted. We proceed now to prove the third proposition, namely, that faith must be elicited by this other method, or not be the faith on which the question turns.

1. It can be elicited only by this other method. This is evident from the words of the holy Apostle already quoted. Rom. x. 14, 15. Faith comes by hearing, hearing by the preacher, and the preacher preaches because sent. But the text goes further, and asserts not only that faith does come by hearing, but that it can come in no other way; not only that hearing does come by the preacher, but that it cannot come without him; not only that the preacher does preach because

sent, but that he cannot preach unless sent. The preacher evidently cannot be sent, without an authority competent to send him. No authority, not public or catholic, is competent to send him; for the mission, as we have seen, is public or catholic. Therefore, without a public or catholic authority, faith is impossible. Therefore, faith must be elicited by means of a public or catholic authority, or not be the faith in question. Hence St. Augustine says, *Evangelio non crederem, nisi me Ecclesiæ Catholicæ commoveret auctoritas.*

2. This is of itself conclusive; but we add, secondly, that faith must be elicited by this other authority, as is evident from the nature of faith as a theological virtue. According to the definition of faith already given and accepted, at least accepted so far as we have occasion now to insist on it, "faith is a *theological virtue* which consists in believing without doubting, explicitly or implicitly, all the truths God has revealed, *on the veracity of God alone.*" Theological virtues are those whose immediate object is God, and God as transcending the order of nature, and apprehensible only through supernatural revelation; for those virtues which refer to God as their object only mediately, as revealed in the order of nature, and as he is known or may be known by the natural light of reason, are not termed theological virtues, but are simply intellectual and moral. Faith, then, as a theological virtue, is a virtue whose immediate object is God; that is, what in faith we immediately believe is God himself. The matters beside God included in faith are not that which is immediately believed; we believe them only mediately, by God, on his authority,—because we believe him. Thus, charity is a theological virtue, whose immediate object is God; for though it include the love of God *and* of our neighbour, yet the immediate object of our love is God; because we are to love our neighbour not for his own sake, but in and for the sake of God. Thus in hope, as a theological virtue, what we immediately hope is God; and the other things we hope for, such as pardon of our sins, assistance of divine grace, and final perseverance, are hoped only mediately, as pertaining to God, and for the sake of God. In like manner, in faith God is what we immediately believe, and the other truths revealed we believe by him, on his authority.

But faith pertains to the intellect as its subject, and the intellect stands related to its object in the order of truth. Hence the immediate object of faith is God as truth, or as essentially true; as the immediate object of charity is God as good-



ness, or essentially good. God, as truth or as essentially true, is the infinite veracity in being, or, as the theologians say, *prima veritas in essendo*. The immediate object of faith, then, in the last analysis, is God as essentially true, or, in other words, the infinite veracity of God. We must, then, in faith believe *on* the veracity of God ; for if not, we do not believe the veracity of God itself ; and if we do not believe this, our faith, though it may be *intellectual*, is not *theological*.

Hence, were it possible to believe the matters revealed in the word of God on any other authority than the veracity of God revealing them, — say, as our Unitarian friends contend, because they appear reasonable to us, satisfy the wants of the intellect and heart, warm our sensibilities, exalt our imagination, and give us lofty and ennobling views of the worth, capacities, and destiny of the human soul, — our belief would not be theological faith, for it would not necessarily imply belief in the veracity of God. We should not, in such case, necessarily believe God, either as the ultimate truth in being, in knowing, or in speaking, and therefore God would in no sense be the immediate object believed. At best, we should believe God only mediately ; as if in charity we loved our neighbour immediately, for his own sake, we could love God only mediately, that is, for the sake of our neighbour. We must, then, believe solely on the veracity of God ; for it is only by believing *on* the veracity of God, that, in believing, we believe it ; and it is only by believing it, that in believing we believe God as the immediate object of our belief ; and it is only by believing him as the immediate object of our belief, that our faith is *theological*.

But we cannot believe on the veracity of God, unless the authority that propounds the word be his authority ; for it is only on this condition that his veracity can be presented to the mind as the immediate object to be believed. Hence, theological faith is not elicitable, unless God himself propounds the word, and is not elicited unless elicited *because* it is his authority that propounds.

But faith is not only *theological* ; it is a theological *virtue*. As a virtue, it implies an act of the will in obedience to a command. Faith depends on two faculties of the soul, the will and the understanding. It cannot be elicited, unless the will command the intellect to assent to the truth revealed ; because the matter of faith is obscure, intrinsically inevident, and does not of itself *compel* the intellectual assent.

But this act of the will, in order to be a *virtue*, must be not only a command to the intellect to believe, but also itself an act of obedience to the command of God ; and in order to be a *theological* virtue, it must be an act of obedience to the *supernatural* command of God. Consequently, to the integrity of faith it is essential that it be elicited not only by the veracity of God as the ground of assent, but also *in obedience to the authority of God commanding us to believe*. We must believe the word not simply for the sake of believing the truth, but also for the sake of obeying God.

But we cannot obey God, when and where his authority is not present to command ; and we do not elicit faith, when we do not believe in obedience to his authority ; for to believe on any other authority would not be to believe because God commands us to believe. Then faith is not elicitable, unless God himself propound the word by his own authority ; and is not elicited, in fact, unless elicited *in obedience* to his authority. Therefore, faith must be elicited on, and in obedience to, the authority of God propounding the word, or it is not faith.

But faith is a *theological* virtue, and therefore can be elicited only in obedience to the *supernatural* authority of God. Therefore, God must propound the word in a supernatural manner. But the faith to be elicited is not a private faith, but a public or catholic faith, as we have already proved. The authority of God which propounds it must, then, be not only supernatural, but also public or catholic. Faith, as a theological virtue, may be elicited by means of private revelation, and no doubt often was so elicited under the old dispensation, and, for aught we know, is so elicited by individuals under the new. But this, though *theological*, is not at the same time theological and *catholic*, and, moreover, it is miraculous, not in the ordinary course of God's gracious providence, and therefore is not the faith with which we are concerned. But God cannot propound his word with authority in a public or catholic manner, unless he express his authority in a public or catholic manner. Then he must express his authority through some publicly recognizable organ. The authority is not the authority of God as revealed in the natural order, and cognoscible by the natural light of reason ; but supernatural, and therefore can itself be known only as supernaturally revealed. If not revealed, or in some way made intellectually apprehensible as the authority of God, it cannot be obeyed as such. It can be revealed or made intellectually apprehensible only in two ways,

visibly or invisibly. If invisibly, it is not expressed in a public or catholic manner. Then it must be visibly. If visibly, then through the inspiration of private individuals, publicly accredited by miracles and appropriate seals of the divine commission, as under the old law, or by a body of pastors and teachers, that is, the Church, or *Ecclesia docens*, as Catholics hold to be the fact under the new law, or Christian dispensation. For the first mode of visibly expressing the authority of God the *Observer* and its friends will not contend ; they must then admit the second, or deny the elicibility of the faith in question. Therefore, if faith be elicitable at all, it must be elicited in obedience to the authority of God propounding it through a body of pastors and teachers, or, briefly, in obedience to the authority of God expressed through the visible Church teaching. The visible Church teaching is the Roman Catholic Church, as proved in our former article. Therefore, faith is not elicitable without the Roman Catholic Church. Therefore, faith cannot be elicited by private illumination, but must be elicited in obedience to the Roman Catholic Church teaching, or not be the faith required.

But this conclusion does not rest solely on *a priori* reasoning. We establish it as a fact by the testimony of the Holy Scriptures.

1. In our article on *The Church against No-Church*, we proved that our blessed Saviour did institute the Church teaching, and commanded it to teach all nations even unto the consummation of the world. St. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20. But if he commands her to teach all nations, he commands all nations to believe what she teaches ; for the authority to teach necessarily implies the corresponding duty to believe. Then we must believe what the Church teaches, or we do not believe what God commands us to believe ; and *because* she teaches, or else in believing we do not obey God, since her authority is his. Also we must believe what she teaches because she teaches it ; for, as a matter of fact, this is one of the things which she teaches, and therefore not to believe because she teaches would be to disobey the command of God to believe what she teaches. Therefore, we must believe the word as propounded and *because* propounded by the Church, or body of teachers Almighty God has commissioned as the visible organ of his authority, or not have faith.

2. Our blessed Lord says to those he authorizes to teach,



“He that heareth you heareth me ; and he that despiseth you despiseth me ; and he that despiseth me despiseth him that sent me.” St. Luke, x. 16. This proves that the authority of the teachers is the authority of God, or, in other words, that God does express his authority through a visible organ ; for, otherwise, to hear the teachers would not be to hear him. Then, 1. to believe in obedience to the teachers is to believe in obedience to God, — “he that heareth you heareth me.” Then, 2. not to believe in obedience to them is not to believe in obedience to God, — “he that despiseth you despiseth me ; and he that despiseth me despiseth him that sent me.” Therefore, we must believe in obedience to the teachers Almighty God has commissioned, or not believe because God commands us to believe ; and if we do not believe because he commands us to believe, we have not faith, that is, the public or catholic faith on which the question turns. We might easily multiply our proofs from the Holy Scriptures, but these are conclusive.

We have now proved that the method of eliciting faith in the word, actually adopted, is another than private illumination, that it is by a body of teachers, or the Church teaching ; and that faith must be elicited by means of, and in obedience to, the Church teaching, or not be faith. Therefore, private illumination is not and could not have been the method adopted. Appeal may be made to it, but it will not avail ; for such is the nature of the faith which we are commanded to have, that it cannot be elicited unless in obedience to a public or catholic authority propounding the word. We said all this in substance in our article on *The Church against No-Church* ; for we say, —

“But the revelation to which we are seeking a witness is not a new revelation, not a private revelation which Almighty God may see proper to make to individuals, but a revelation already made and propounded for the belief of all men. This is the revelation to be established ; and since your private revelation does not establish this, or if so, only by superseding it and rendering it of no value (for it can prove it even to the individual only by its being seen to be identical with what the individual receives without it), it evidently cannot be the witness we are in pursuit of. And this is the common answer to the alleged private illumination, whatever its form. It is valid only within the bosom of the individual, and can be alleged in support of no common or public faith ; therefore can be no witness in any disputed case. It may be a private benefit, or it may not be. It is a matter not to be spoken of, and a fact never to be used,

when the question concerns any thing but the individual himself. *But the faith we are required to have is a faith propounded to all men, a public faith, which must be sustained by public evidence.*" — Vol. II., p. 173.

The *Observer* should have denied in the outset our assumption, that the faith we are required to have is a public or catholic faith ; or, if not prepared to do this, which, of course, it was not, it should have shown that a private witness may be competent authority for a public or catholic faith. For, till the editor had shown this, and relieved the private witness of the charge we brought against it, private illumination stood convicted of incompetency, and he had no right to introduce it.

But, though what we have said is conclusive against the theory of private inspiration, a theory which a professed Churchman should both fear and be ashamed to urge, — there is still one other consideration, of a more practical character, to which we beg leave to call the attention of the *Observer*. We called its attention to it in our former reply ; but, as it has the happy faculty of overlooking the points in an opponent's argument which are somewhat difficult to refute, we must take the liberty of calling its attention to it again. The editor must be aware that he is not the only one who appeals to private inspiration. Almost every sectary, from Montanus down to the Mormon impostor, not overlooking Luther, Zwingle, Calvin, the Anabaptists, Quakers, Puritans, and Methodists, makes precisely the same appeal. Now, it is certain that some of the sectaries who make this appeal are mistaken, for some of them teach and have taught doctrines contradictory to those taught by others, and doctrines rash, scandalous, and pernicious, — at war with common decency, social order, and domestic peace and virtue. It is necessary, then, to observe the admonition of the holy Apostle : — "Dearly beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits, whether they be of God ; because many false prophets are gone out into the world." — 1 St. John, iv. 1.

But we cannot try the spirits, unless we have some criterion by which to try them. This criterion cannot be the private inspiration, the "internal monitor," as the *Observer* calls it ; because that is what is to be tried, and it would be absurd to talk of trying a spirit by itself. The criterion must be independent of the inward witness, and distinct from it, — a standard or measure by which it may itself be tested or measured. What, then, is this criterion by which we may try the spirits,

and know whether they are of God, or whether they are spirits of error? The answer is at hand. "We are of God. He that knoweth God *heareth us*; and he that is not of God heareth not us. By this we know the spirit of truth and the spirit of error."—1 St. John, iv. 6. The test of the spirit is in the fact that it does or does not *hear* the Apostles. If it hear them, it is of God; if it hear not them, it is a spirit of error. The editor of the *Observer*, then, must prove that he hears the Apostles, before he can have the right to assume that his internal monitor is of God; and if he does not hear them, we have the right to tell him that it is *not* of God, but an error, a delusion.

But how will our friend of the *Observer* prove that he hears the Apostles? Will he answer, as we have often been answered by persons who take his ground, that he hears the Apostles because he holds the Apostolic faith? To hold the Apostolic faith is the same thing as to hear the Apostles. This, then, would be to prove *idem per idem*, which is not allowable. Will he allege that he hears the Apostles, because he holds the faith as contained in the Holy Scriptures? This would be to attempt again to prove *idem per idem*; for, on the assumption, which he must make, that the Scriptures contain the whole revealed word, the faith as contained in them is the same thing as the Apostolic faith, and to hold it is the same thing as to hear the Apostles. But how will he prove that he holds the faith as contained in the Holy Scriptures? By the internal monitor? This is what he says, but this would be to reason in a *vicious* circle; for it would assume the monitor to prove the faith and the faith to prove the monitor. How, then, will he prove that he hears the Apostles?

This is conclusive. The editor of the *Observer* makes, in his reply to us, the internal monitor the witness to the fact of revelation; that is, he proves his doctrine by his private inspiration,—"God speaking audibly by his word to the ear, or silently by his spirit in the heart." But the holy Apostle tells him that he must prove his inspiration by his doctrine, for, if he have not the true doctrine, that is, if he hears not the Apostles, his inspiration is not of God, but is the spirit of error. He and the beloved Apostle of our blessed Lord are diametrically opposed, and, if we are to take the Apostle's authority in preference to his, it must be conceded that the doctrine is not and cannot be proved by the internal monitor.

Let not the editor of the *Observer* reply to us again, that it

is not necessary to prove the witness, that is, the internal monitor. He must prove it, not for others only, but for himself; for, according to the blessed Apostle, he must hear the Apostles, or his internal monitor is of no authority, but is a delusion, the spirit of error. Till he proves it to be of God from the fact that he hears the Apostles, he is bound to regard it as a false witness, or at least a witness not competent to testify. He must, then, prove his inspiration, establish the fact that his witness is of God. How, we ask again, will he do it?

Will he shift his ground, and say that he is in the communion of the Apostolic Church, and hears the Apostles because he hears their legitimate successors, who continue their authority and doctrine? This would be a good answer in our mouth, but not in his; for it abandons private inspiration as the witness to the fact of revelation, and assumes with us the Catholic Church. If he take this ground, he makes communion the test of doctrine, and doctrine the test of the internal monitor, and by so doing condemns himself and the whole Protestant world; he yields the whole principle in debate, and leaves to be settled between us only the simple question of fact, — whether his church or ours be the Apostolic Church; and that his is the Apostolic Church we deny, and he must be a bold man to assert; for, even assuming its identity with the Anglican, which may be questioned, it is obviously schismatic and heretical, and withal only about three hundred years old, as he is well aware, and as we have proved unanswerably, in our essay in reply to the *New York Churchman*, in our Review for October, 1844, entitled, *The Anglican Church Schismatic*; as also in the essay on *The Church against No-Church*, in the number for April last. The editor of the *Observer* is therefore precluded by his own position, by the position of his church, and the very doctrine of private illumination for which he contends, from assuming Catholic ground; and yet it is only by assuming Catholic ground that he can prove his right to follow his internal monitor. Here is the difficulty in which he is placed. He assumes that the inward monitor is its own witness and authority, and therefore may be taken as the witness to the fact of revelation, the authority for saying what is or is not the revelation or word of God. The spirit, he assumes, witnesseth itself, and has no need to be tested by a criterion or standard distinct from itself. Here is his fundamental error, and that of all who contend for either private reason or private inspiration as the witness to the fact of revelation. But, according to the blessed Apostle,



they must prove the spirit by the doctrine, and not the doctrine by the spirit. Hence, no private spirit is of any authority, even to the individual who professes to have it, unless it heareth the Apostles ; and, as we have seen, the proof that it heareth the Apostles is that it gathereth to the Apostolic communion. Hence, we are to take for our principle, The church proves the doctrine, the doctrine the private spirit ; not the private spirit proves the doctrine, and the doctrine the church or communion.

But it is due to the *Observer* to say that it has attempted to answer, in part, one or two of the objections we urged against its private witness. We objected, If private illumination be the witness to the fact of revelation, those not privately illuminated have not the evidence necessary to warrant faith in the revelation. But no blame can attach to a man for not believing what is not sufficiently evidenced to warrant belief. Therefore, those not privately illuminated are not to blame for not believing the revelation Almighty God has made. But whoever does not believe is to blame, for unbelief is admitted to be not merely an effect of sin, but a sin itself. Therefore, there must be, independent of private illumination, sufficient motives of credibility to warrant belief. To the argument the editor does not reply ; he merely alleges, that, if any are not privately illuminated, " the fault is their own. All may have the promptings of the Spirit, if they will. The grace of God which bringeth salvation hath appeared to *all* men teaching," &c. — p. 327. As to the soundness of our own argument, we will here raise no question ; it will suffice to show that the editor of the *Observer* has not refuted it. The position, that it is their own fault if not privately illuminated, is not proved. The illumination is a free gift, not dependent on our will, nor meritable by us. It is not due us in the order of nature, as something which God in our nature promises us. It must, then, be proved that Almighty God has promised it in the order of grace to all who comply with the conditions of its reception which he has instituted ; or we can have no more right to say that it is our own fault if we have it not, than we should have to say it was the fault of the primitive believers that they were not all inspired as apostles and evangelists. But this the editor does not prove.

The fact alleged, that all may have " the promptings of the Spirit, if they will," if admitted, does not prove the assertion ;

for there is a wide disparity between “the promptings of the Spirit” and the private illumination, which is a re-revelation of the whole word of God, and by which one is able to say, infallibly, what is or is not the word of God originally revealed. To prompt is not to illumine, but simply to incite or move to action. But, in point of fact, the promptings of the Spirit are not contingent on our will ; for they must precede the motion of the will as its necessary conditions. The Spirit does not prompt us because we will that it should prompt us, nor because we will what is pleasing to God ; but it prompts and assists us, that we may will what is pleasing to God. To deny this would be to fall into the Pelagian heresy.

The text quoted from St. Paul, Tit. ii. 11, 12, if it proves any thing to the purpose, proves too much. If the editor understands by the word *grace* the private illumination in question, — which, by the way, is not its meaning, — and relies on the fact that it is asserted to have appeared unto *all* men, it proves that all are specially and infallibly inspired, which obviously is not the fact, as he himself admits ; for, if it were, no man could err as to what is and what is not the word to be believed. But, assuming that he so intends to understand the text, we demand his authority for saying that the *grace* spoken of is the private illumination in question. Will he allege the fact, that the grace is said to be *teaching*, &c. ? This will not avail ; because he must prove what it teaches is the word of God we are commanded to believe. But this the text itself does not assert. The text simply asserts that “the grace of God our Saviour hath appeared to all men, instructing us, that, renouncing impiety and worldly desires, we should live soberly, piously, and justly in this present world,” — that is, certain practical duties which presuppose a knowledge of the faith, as already possessed. But waive this. The grace teaches — how ? Through the body of pastors and teachers ? Then the text makes for us. By private illumination ? Where are the proofs ?

We objected, again, to the private witness, that, if this were the witness, the fact whether any one embraces the faith or not could never be known out of the bosom of the individual. The *Observer* replies, that it is not necessary that it should be. If there is to be a public faith, it is necessary, for reasons already assigned ; and, if we may believe the blessed Apostle, according to the order actually adopted, it is necessary to be known, even if there is to be only a private faith ; because private faith must find its authority in the public faith.

The *Observer* asks, p. 327, "How can it be known whether this or that individual will finally be saved?" Whether this or that individual will finally be saved is not necessary to be known; because the fact whether he will or not is not a fact all men are required to believe, as an article of faith. The sneer, that "the Romish Church may devise arbitrary rules by which it may pretend to know who are sound in the faith and who are not, who are going to heaven and who to hell" (p. 328), may do for a writer who feels himself as little bound, in an argument, to tell the truth as to observe the rules of logic; but its force is all in its malice. The Catholic Church claims to be able to say what is sound faith, but not who actually is sound in the faith, any farther than the internal faith is manifested by the external profession and conduct. She claims to be able to say what one must do in order to be saved; but not whether this or that individual will or will not be saved. The doctrine the editor would charge upon the Church belongs to his own Evangelical school. We do not, as Catholics, know whether we deserve love or hatred. We know if we keep the commandments we shall enter into life, and that we can keep them if we will; but whether we do keep them in the sense demanded, or whether we shall persevere unto the end in keeping them, we know not, and cannot know unless by a special revelation. We hope, but take heed lest we fall.

But, if we object to the *Observer's* doctrine of private illumination, we by no means pretend that divine grace even to enlighten the understanding is not essential to the elicitation of faith. Faith is a theological virtue, and no theological virtue is possible by mere natural force. Faith demands the supernatural elevation of the subject as well as the supernatural revelation of the object. It would demand this, even if we were in the integrity of nature, and had suffered no damage from sin. It demands it, then, *a fortiori*, in our actual state; for, in consequence of sin, our will is turned away from God, and our understanding is darkened. We do not love the truth; we are not able to perceive and appreciate the motives of credibility. We have ears, but we hear not; hearts, but we understand not. Let no man dream that by mere natural force, by mere intellectual acuteness, strength, or effort, he can elicit an act of faith. Faith is the gift of God. But what is termed the grace of faith is not an inward revelation of the word, is not needed to propound the word, to supply the defect of evidence, or to

strengthen, in themselves considered, the motives of credibility ; but to incline the will to the truth, and to strengthen the intellect, to remove the scales which blind the eyes of the mind, so as to enable it to see and appreciate the motives of credibility which are already furnished, and which are amply sufficient to warrant the most undoubting belief. These motives are in themselves sufficient to meet the demands of reason, and ought to command our assent, and we have no excuse for not yielding it. When we do not yield it, the fault is ours ; not in the defect of evidence, but in the perversity of our will, which hinders the grace of God from flowing into the understanding, and producing that state of mind in which to believe is easy, and without which to believe is morally impossible. But this gracious assistance, which inclines the will and elevates the understanding, is something very different from the private inspiration or illumination against which we have reasoned. The one merely puts us in the condition to believe a revelation already made and sufficiently accredited ; the other is a new revelation, superseding the external revelation, the external evidence which accredits it, and becoming itself both the word to be believed and the authority on which it is to be believed. The grace we allege to be necessary is everywhere promised us in the Holy Scriptures ; the private illumination we reject is nowhere promised us, and we have no reason to expect it.

We have now replied to all that the editor of the *Observer* has suggested, or that is implied in his suggestions, which has or can have any bearing on the question at issue. We have replied fairly and fully, because we have wished not merely to refute him, but to discuss the general subject, and place it in its true light before our readers. We shall expect a fair and logical reply to what we have said ; and if the editor of the *Observer* do not give a fair and logical reply, we shall not hold ourselves bound to take any notice of what he may allege. It becomes neither him nor us to discuss any subject unfairly, for neither of us can, we should hope, feel any complacency in a victory won at the expense of candor or of truth.

As to the portion of the *Observer's* article which attacks the Catholic Church, since it has no bearing on the real question at issue, we do not hold ourselves bound by the rules of logic to reply to it. The question at issue, we have shown, is not what is possible *with* the Roman Catholic Church, but what is possible *without* it. Should the editor of the *Observer* prove



that faith is not elicitable by means of the Roman Catholic Church, he would not advance a single step in his argument ; he would be no nearer proving that faith can be elicited without it, than when he commenced. To follow him in his attacks on the Church would only be giving him a chance to change the issue, and make the question turn on the merits of Catholicity, and not on the merits of Protestantism, to which we will neither contribute nor consent. He promised to refute our argument, and we hold him to his promise. If he succeeds in proving that he can have the faith required without the Catholic Church, he proves all that it is necessary to prove in order to refute us. If he does not prove this, no matter what else he proves, he does not refute us. When he shall admit that he cannot prove this, and frankly abandon his Protestantism, we will meet all the difficulties he can allege in the way of eliciting faith by means of the Roman Catholic Church. But till then, he has no right to call upon us, nor are we bound by the nature of the question at issue to meet them.

Were it not that we will not consent to divert the discussion from the point we have made, we could easily remove all the difficulties the editor of the *Observer* has suggested ; for they are all founded in mistake as to the actual facts of ecclesiastical history, or misapprehension of Catholic faith and theology. When he speaks of the number of books which a Catholic must read in order to ascertain what he is to believe, he denies the distinction between faith and theology to which we called his attention, and overlooks the distinction between explicit faith and implicit faith, which was recognized in our definition of faith, and which he will find explained in the early part of our present article. The whole Catholic faith may be found in the catechism, and may be learned without any book at all ; for the Catholic Church does not, like Protestantism, make the knowledge of letters the condition *sine qua non* of salvation. Our friend forgot himself, and took up against his own side. It is not necessary to salvation that we believe *explicitly* all the truths Almighty God has revealed, but that we believe them explicitly or *implicitly*. He who believes the Church is from God and infallible, and who is in the disposition of mind and heart to believe whatever she proposes, believes, implicitly at least, the whole revelation of God, and in its "exact sense" ; for, if infallible, the Church can propose it in no other than its exact sense, as " it lies in the mind of the Spirit." \*

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\* To believe something explicitly is to believe it under the proper

The *Observer* asserted that the articles of faith were expressed in the Holy Scriptures in propositions "as clear and as intelligible as language can make them." We denied this, and alleged in support of our denial that the articles of faith are more clearly and definitely expressed in the creed and decisions of the Church, which is evident from the fact that men perpetually dispute as to their meaning as expressed in the Holy Scriptures, while they do not dispute as to their meaning as expressed in the creeds and decisions of the Church. The editor of the *Observer* meets the argument by alleging that there are disputes among Catholics as well as among Protestants. But even if this were true, our argument might still be sound; for it was urged only to prove that the faith as expressed in the Holy Scriptures is not expressed in propositions as clear and as intelligible as language can make them, — which is not disproved by proving that there are disputes among Catholics, but only by proving that these disputes are equal to the disputes among Protestants, and extend to as many

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and particular terms under which it is proposed to us. Thus, he, who believes the Son of God assumed human nature and is God and man, believes explicitly the mystery of the Incarnation; he who believes the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are one God and three persons, believes explicitly the mystery of the Trinity. But to believe something *implicitly* is to believe it in another; either as in a more general principle in which it is contained, or as in the doctrine of the teacher to which it pertains, or as in a shadow or figure, which is known to have significance, although the thing signified is not clearly apprehended. But it must not be inferred from any thing in the text, that belief in this last sense is the only faith that is of necessity as the medium of salvation. It is necessary to believe *explicitly* God as the author of the order of grace, that he will reward the just with beatitude and will punish the wicked, according to the words of the blessed apostle, Heb. xi. 6. "He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek him." Also, as Catholic doctors in general teach, it is necessary to believe explicitly the mysteries of the Incarnation and of the Trinity, for, according to the words of our Blessed Saviour in St. Mark, xvi. 16, "He that believeth not (that is, believeth not the Gospel) shall be condemned"; and in St. John, xiv. 1, "Ye believe in God; believe also in me"; iii. 36, "He that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him"; and, according to the words of St. Peter, Acts iv. 12, "Nor is there salvation in any other. For there is no other name under heaven given to men whereby we must be saved." From these and many other texts which might be adduced, it is evident that explicit faith in the principal or primary doctrine is necessary as the medium of salvation. All we would say is, that the number of articles necessary to be believed with *explicit* faith is very few, and therefore the necessity, save when it concerns establishing truth or overthrowing error, of the long study the *Observer* alleges, does not exist.

points of faith ;—a fact the *Observer* has not proved, and cannot prove. But there are no disputes among Catholics that turn on the meaning of an article of faith. There are disputes among Catholics, we admit, but they are disputes concerning matters which are not of faith, which the Church has not decided. Not one of the instances the *Observer* cites is a dispute concerning an article of faith, but all are disputes on questions on which there is no decision of the Church, or which are not covered by her decisions. The dispute between the Gallicans and Ultramontanes is not, as it supposes, a dispute as to the meaning of a canon. Both parties admit the canon of the Council of Florence, which the editor quotes ; both parties agree as to its meaning ; and dispute only as to questions it does not cover. The question as to the temporal authority or supremacy of the Holy Father is a dispute among doctors, and has nothing to do with faith at all ; *for no article of faith, no decision of the Church, claims temporal supremacy or authority for the successor of St. Peter.* The temporal authority which was possessed by the popes was not possessed by virtue of their office as visible head of the Church, but, if one may so speak, by virtue of what was the common law of Europe ;—because that authority was an integral part of the political order which then obtained. That order has now passed away, and the office which for many ages was filled by the ecclesiastical power is now filled by the money power ; and the part of mediators between the temporal princes, which was played by the Gregories, the Innocents, the Bonifaces, is now played by the Barings, Rothschilds, and Biddles ; whether for the better or for the worse it is not for us to say.

The *Observer* is quite mistaken in saying, that in reference to these disputes we cannot avail ourselves of the distinction between faith and opinion. “ This,” it says, “ is a valid plea for Protestants, but not for Romanists. *We* say that agreement in great fundamental truths is necessary ; and we say, further, that in these vital truths there is between all *orthodox* Protestants a substantial agreement, while they disagree only on those minor topics which are matters of opinion only. But this distinction between faith and opinion, whoever else it may serve, can avail Mr. Brownson nothing ; for he avers that it is necessary to believe the whole revelation as the condition *sine qua non* of salvation, that faith consists in believing *all* the truths God has revealed.” — pp. 332, 333. The distinction between faith and opinion we can avail ourselves of, but not of

such a distinction as the *Observer* points out. The distinction we contend for is a distinction between what is revealed and what is not revealed. What is revealed we hold to be of faith ; what is not revealed is matter of science or of opinion. We can, then, very consistently contend that the whole revelation must be believed, and yet tolerate differences on matters of opinion. But the distinction the *Observer* speaks of is a distinction *in the revealed word itself*, and presupposes one part of revelation is of faith, and another part of minor importance, a matter of opinion only. Of this distinction we do not wish to avail ourselves, for we do not admit that any part of God's word is a matter of opinion only ; and we would thank the *Observer* to tell us by what authority it can say that any thing God has revealed may be rightfully treated as a matter of opinion.

The *Observer* makes it a sin in us, that "opinion has no place in" our "creed." Is that which is held as *opinion* held as one's *creed* ? What is the meaning, in theological language, of *credo* ? If one admits opinion into his creed, what is his creed but an opinion ? The editor of the *Observer* distinguishes between faith and opinion. Does he include in his *creed* any thing not of faith ? Of course not. Why, then, complain of us for not admitting opinion into ours ? But by what authority does he distinguish in God's word what is necessary to be believed, and what is not, and include the former in his creed, and exclude the latter from it ?

The *Observer* says, in these vital truths there is a substantial agreement between all *orthodox* Protestants. This is saying, in other words, that all who do not substantially differ do substantially agree ! Who are *orthodox* Protestants, and by what authority can Protestants say who are or are not orthodox ? The only answer they have to the question, what is orthodoxy and what heterodoxy, is that given by the Protestant student : — "Orthodoxy is *my* doxy, heterodoxy is *your* doxy." Protestants are all orthodox, each in his own estimation ; all heterodox in the estimation of each other. The editor of the *Episcopal Observer*, notwithstanding his airs, has no more right to call himself orthodox than the editors of the *Christian Examiner*, between whom and himself there is a fundamental difference, have to call themselves orthodox. Of all pitiable sights, the Protestant talking of orthodoxy is the pitiablest. The editor of the *Observer* can claim to be less heterodox than his Unitarian brethren, only because he departs



less from the Catholic faith ; and the moment he alleges this, he recognizes the authority of the Catholic Church, which it is his main business to calumniate. It is worthy of note, that Protestants in general feel themselves sound in the faith just in proportion as they find themselves agreeing with the Catholic Church.

The editor of the *Observer* would do well, when he wishes to attack the Church on historical grounds, to be careful to draw his history from authentic sources. If he relies on such authors as Bishop Hopkins, or any authors his own church can furnish, he will be betrayed into many ridiculous mistakes. These Anglican ecclesiastical historians are in all cases unsafe guides, and in no instance, even in matters comparatively indifferent, have we found them worthy of reliance. The position of their pretended church is such that it is not safe for them either to see or to tell the truth.

The editor of the *Observer* would also do well, before attempting to pit council against council, to ascertain what is a council, and that the Catholic predicates infallibility of no council not held to be œcumenical, and of no acts of an œcumenical council not approved by the sovereign Pontiff. Had he known this, he would not have spoken of the *second* council of Ephesus, nor have told us that "the second council of Ephesus, held in 449, condemned Flavianus and sent him into banishment for rejecting the heresy of Eutyches ; and the council of Chalcedon, convened two years after, condemned and banished Dioscorus for maintaining the heresy discarded by Flavianus." — p. 330. For there was no *second* council of Ephesus. The only council of Ephesus was held in 431, before Eutyches had even broached his heresy. Nor was Flavian ever condemned by any council. The mistake of the learned editor arose, probably, from his confounding an illegal and tumultuous assembly, commonly known in history as the Ephesian *Latrocinium*, with an œcumenical council, which it was not, and was never admitted to be. This shows the necessity of studying ecclesiastical history, before attempting to write it.

Protestants frequently allege that council has contradicted council, council has contradicted Pope, and Pope has contradicted Pope and council ; but no instance of such contradiction ever has been or ever can be adduced, for no such instances exist. The instances commonly adduced are all founded in mistake, and are as easily answered as that about Flavianus and Dioscorus. The Protestant either calls that a council

which was not a council, or he mistakes the real question decided, or the actual purport of the decision, in consequence of his general ignorance of Catholic theology and history.

But, as we have intimated, we have no intention of following the *Observer* through his attack on the Church. If he concedes his inability to maintain his own thesis, we will then meet him, or any one else, on the merits of Catholicity. But, till then, we will not consent to be diverted from the main issue we have raised.

In conclusion, we will say, our argument has run out to a greater length than we intended, and to a greater length than the feeble arguments, if arguments they can be called, of the *Observer* really warranted ; but we make no apology to our readers, for we have aimed to give to our remarks a general character, and a fair, full, and final discussion of that branch of the subject to which we have in the main confined ourselves, rather than to effect the comparatively insignificant purpose of refuting the editor of the *Episcopal Observer*.

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## ART. II. — *National Greatness.*

NATIONAL greatness is at all times and in all countries a subject of very deep interest, and one on which it is highly dangerous to entertain false or erroneous views. It is especially so for the American people ; because we have founded a government which rests on popular opinion, and must follow its direction ; and because we entertain very lofty notions of the greatness to which we have already attained, and are disposed to indulge in no little patriotic pride when contemplating what we have done since we became an independent nation, and looking forward to what we are likely to do hereafter.

It is true, that now and then is heard a discordant note in the general harmony of self-glorification ; it is true, that here and there a disappointed, discontented, perhaps ascetic voice, is heard intimating that all is not gold that glisters, that the sparkling eye and blooming cheek do not always indicate sound health and promise long life, and that beneath the festive robes and wreaths of flowers may often, as at Egyptian feasts, be detected the ghastly and grinning features of death ; but, in

general, the great mass of us, from New England's loftiest statesman down to the pettiest Fourth of July orator, loudly applaud ourselves for what we have done, are sure that we have chosen the right path, that we surpass in true wisdom all the nations which have been or now are, and that nothing remains for us but to keep on in the way we have thus far followed, and indulge the most glorious and thrilling anticipations of future greatness and renown.

And have we not the right to do so ? We are merely of yesterday ; and yet, what have we not done ! We have felled the primitive forests, and planted the rose in the wilderness ; we have erected the thronged city, the populous town, the thriving village, where within the memory of the middle-aged man prowled the beast of prey, or curled the smoke of the wigwam. We have intersected a continent with our canals and railways ; we have whitened every ocean with our sails, and filled every port with our ships ; and are rivalling, in the quality, variety, and extent of our manufactures, the more renowned industrial nations of the globe. Our whole population is employed. The hammer of industry rings from morning till night, till far into the night, and we seem to have the Midas gift of turning whatever we touch into gold. Nor have we stopped here. We have dotted the land all over with meetinghouses, school-houses, academies, colleges, and universities, and our whole population goes to school. We have an active press, throwing off daily its million of sheets for our instruction or amusement. We have hospitals, asylums, retreats for the insane, the blind, the deaf, the dumb ; poor-houses for vagrants and paupers ; gaols and penitentiaries for the vicious and criminal. Over all we have a free, pure, economical, and effective government, admirably reconciling the authority of the state with the freedom of the subject ; and withal the priceless blessings of religious liberty, permitting sects the most opposed one to the other to meet as brothers, leaving every man free to worship God, — or not to worship him, — according to the dictates of his own conscience. Have we not a right, then, to applaud ourselves ? Are we not, in fact, a great people ? And is not this a great country ?

So most of us think, feel, say ; and woe to him who should dare think, feel, or say otherwise. And yet, it may be worth our while to subject this estimate which we form of ourselves to a more rigid examination than we seem to have done. If it be well founded, the examination will confirm it ; if not well founded,

the examination will do no harm, — for few of us are prepared to adopt a conclusion unfavorable to national pride and vanity.

That this is a great country, if we speak of the territory, is very true, though not much greater than China, and far less than Russia, and withal a great part of it as yet uncultivated, and no little of it even untrodden by civilized man. But whether we are a great people or not, or whether we have any special ground of self-adulation, is another and a different question ; and a question which will be variously answered, according to the views which are taken of what constitutes true national greatness. Our judgments of the comparative greatness of different nations depend entirely on the standard of greatness we adopt, and by which we judge them. We call a people great or small in proportion as they do or do not conform to our standard of greatness. Vary the standard, and we vary our judgment. The people we called great, when judged by one standard, we may call not great, if judged by a different standard. All, therefore, depends on the standard we adopt. Consequently, in order to determine whether we are really a great people or not, we must first determine what is the true standard of national greatness.

What, then, is true national greatness ? We answer, that nation is greatest in which man may most easily and effectually fulfil the true and proper end of man. The nation, under the point of view we here consider the subject, is in the people. Its greatness must, then, be in the greatness of the people. The people are a collection or aggregation of individuals, and their greatness taken collectively is simply their greatness taken individually. Consequently, the greatness of a nation is the greatness of the individuals that compose it. The question of national greatness resolves itself, therefore, into the question of individual greatness. The greatness of the individual consists in his fulfilling the great ends of his existence, the ends for which Almighty God made him and placed him here. No man is truly great who neglects life's great ends, nor can one be said in truth to approach greatness any farther than he fulfils them.

In order, then, to determine in what true national greatness consists, we must determine in what consists true individual greatness ; and in order to determine in what true individual greatness consists, we must determine what is the true end of man ; that is, what is the end to which Almighty God has appointed man, and which he is while here to labor to secure. What, then, is the end of man ? For what has our Maker



placed us here ? To what has he bidden us aspire ? Were we placed here merely to be born and to die, — to live for a moment, continue our species, toil, suffer, drop into the grave to rot, and be no more for ever ? If this be our end, true greatness will consist in living for this life only, and in being great in that which pertains to this life. The greatest man will be he who succeeds best in amassing the goods of this world, in securing its honors and luxuries, or simply in multiplying for himself the means of sensual enjoyment. In a word, the greatest man will be he who most abounds in wealth and luxury.

We mean not to say, that, in point of fact, wealth and luxury, worldly honors and sensual gratifications, are the chief goods of even this life ; but simply that they would be, if this were our only life, if our destiny were a destiny to be accomplished in this world. It is because this world is not our home, because we are merely travellers through it, and our destination is a world beyond it, that the life of justice and sanctity yields us even here our truest and most substantial pleasure. But confine man to this life, let it be true that he has no destiny beyond it, and nothing could, relatively to him, be called great or good, not included under the heads of wealth and luxury. Nothing could be counted or conceived of as of the least value to him that does not directly or indirectly minister to his sensual enjoyment. No infidel moralist has ever been able, without going out of his own system, or want of system, to conceive of any thing higher, nobler, more valuable, than sensual pleasure.

But this life is not our only life, and our destiny is not accomplished here. The grave is not our final doom ; this world is not our home ; we were not created for this world alone ; and there is for us a life beyond this life. But even this, if we stop with it, does not answer our question. We may conceive of a future life as the simple continuation of our present natural life, and such the future life is conceived to be by not a few among us, who nevertheless flatter themselves that they are firm believers in the life and immortality brought to light through the Gospel. Every being may be said to have a natural destiny or end, which its nature is fitted and intended to gain. The Creator, in creating a being with a given nature, has given that being a pledge of the means and conditions of fulfilling it, of attaining to its natural end. Man has evidently been created with a nature that does not and cannot find its complete fulfilment in this life. He has a natural capacity for more than is

actually attainable here. In this capacity he has the promise or pledge of his Maker that he shall live again. The promises of God cannot fail. Man therefore must and will live again. But this is only the pledge, so to speak, of a natural immortality, and reveals to us only a natural destiny. It is only a continuation of our natural life in another world. The end we are to labor for, and the means we are to adopt to gain it, must be precisely what they would be in case our life were to terminate at the grave. Our future life being still a natural life, what is wisest and best for that portion we are now living would be wisest and best for that portion we are hereafter to live. Hence, what is wisest and best for time would be wisest and best for eternity.

Hence it is that we find so many who, though professing belief in a future life, judge all things as if this life were our only life. They look to the future life only as the continuation of the present, and expect from it only the completion of their natural destiny. They agree in all their moral judgments, in all their estimates of the worth of things or of actions, with those who believe in no future life at all. They profess to hope for a future life, but live only for time; because their future life is to be only a continuation of time. Hence they say, as we ourselves were for years accustomed to say, He who lives wisely for time lives wisely for eternity; create a heaven here, and you will have done your best to secure your title to a heaven hereafter.

Hence it is that the morality of many who profess to be Christians is the same which is adopted and defended by infidels. This is so obviously the case, that we not unfrequently find men who call themselves Christians commending downright unbelievers in Christianity as good moral men, and who see no reason why the morality of the infidel should not be the same in kind as the morality of the Christian. Hence it is supposed that morality may be taught in our schools, without teaching any peculiar or distinctive doctrine of Christianity. Morality, we are told, is independent of religion, and not a few regard it as sufficient without religion. So common has this mode of thinking and speaking become amongst us, that we heard the other day a tolerably intelligent Catholic, who would by no means admit himself to be deficient in the understanding or practice of his Catholic duties, say, that, if a man were only a good moral man, he did not care what was his distinctive religious belief. Many who go farther, and contend that

religion is necessary to morality, contend for its necessity only as a sort of police establishment. It is necessary, because the natural sanctions of the moral law are not quite sufficient to secure obedience, and religion must be called in by its hopes and fears to strengthen them.

Now all this is perfectly consistent and right, if it be true that man has only a natural destiny. We ought, in such a case, to judge all things which concern us precisely as if this were our only life. Religion could be of no value farther than it strengthened the police, kept people from picking one another's pockets or cutting one another's throats. But man's destiny is not natural, but supernatural. Almighty God created him with a specific nature, but not for an end in the order of that nature, or to be attained by its simple fulfilment. He created him to his own image and likeness, but appointed him to a supernatural destiny, — to an end above what is attainable by the fulfilment of his nature, — to an end not promised in his nature, and which is not bestowed as the reward of fulfilling it. This end is to know and love God; but in a sense far higher than we can know and love him by our natural powers, and as he is now beheld through a glass darkly, or seen dimly through the medium of his works, as we see the cause in the effect. It is to see him face to face, and to know and love him with a knowledge and love the same in kind, though not in degree, with which God knows and loves himself; — this is the end for which man was intended, and which it is made his duty and his high privilege to seek. But this end surpasses the utmost capacity of our nature, and requires not only a supernatural revelation of God, but the supernatural elevation of our nature itself. It consists in our being made partakers of the divine nature in an ineffable sense, and in a sense above that in which we partake of it in being created after the image and likeness of God. Hence, St. Peter says, "By whom [Jesus Christ] he hath given us very great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of his divine nature." — 2 St. Pet. i. 4. So also St. John: — "We are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know, that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; because *we shall see him as he is.*" — 1 St. John, iii. 2.

This fact in these times is overlooked. Men have wished to rationalize the Gospel, to find a philosophic basis for the mysteries of faith. In attempting this, they have labored to bring the whole of divine revelation within the domain of rea-

son, and have been led to exclude, as no part of it, whatever they found themselves unable to bring within that domain. Reason is necessarily restricted to the order of nature, and can in no instance, of itself, go out of that order. Hence, revelation has come very widely to be regarded as only a republication of the natural law, as at best only a running commentary on it, designed simply to explain the natural order, and not to reveal any thing above it. Men who claim to be Christians, and even ministers of the Gospel, everywhere abound, who have no faith in the supernatural order, scarcely a conception of it. We spent nearly two hours the other day trying to enable a Protestant minister, and he by no means a weak or ignorant one, even to conceive of the supernatural; but in vain. So perverted had his mind become by the false theologies of modern times, that he could attach no meaning to the assertion, "There is a supernatural order." He could use the word *supernatural*, but it had no meaning for his mind not within the order of nature. Thousands are in the same sad condition. To them nature is all, and all is nature. Indeed, the word nature itself has no definite meaning for them. If a man by a word raise the dead, it is natural; if Moses smite the rock and living waters gush forth, it is natural, —all by a natural power, a natural law. Travelling in the same direction, they lose themselves in a wilderness of absurdities. Natural laws cease to be laws imposed on nature, laws she must obey, and from which she cannot withdraw herself, and become forces, agents, creators. It is not strange, then, that they lose sight of the supernatural destiny of man, and look only for a natural destiny, to be obtained not as a reward for obedience to grace, but as the natural consequence of the cultivation or development of our natural powers. Read the writings of the celebrated Dr. Channing, or of the school which he founded or to which he was attached, and you shall never find a single recognition of the supernatural order, properly so called, — any allusion to a supernatural destiny. The highest end you will find presented is that to which we may attain by the unfolding of our higher nature, of our natural sentiments of love and reverence. The school goes so far as to contend that our nature is susceptible of an unbounded good, and that our natural sentiments of love and reverence are capable of an infinite expansion. Yet these are *rational* Christians, and they boast of their reason! They talk of the absurdities of Catholic theology, and see no absurdity in suppos-



ing that a finite nature may be infinitely expanded, or that a nature can be something more than it is without any thing *supernatural*.

But this by the way. The true end for which man is to live is the supernatural end to which we are appointed, the beatitude which God hath promised to all that love and serve him here. His true end is not the fulfilment of nature, but what the Sacred Scriptures term "eternal life"; and "This is life eternal, that they may know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." — St. John, xvii. 3. We cannot know God, without loving him. Hence we say, the end of man is to know and love God. But to know him intuitively, as he knows himself; for we are to see him as he is, — not as he appears through the medium of his works, but as he is in himself. We cannot thus know him naturally, for thus to know him exceeds the power of the highest possible created intelligence. We must be *like him*, before we can see him as he is, — be made, in a supernatural sense, partakers of his divine nature. To know him intuitively as he is in himself is, however, the glorious destiny to which we are appointed, and to which we may attain, if we will. A more glorious destiny we cannot desire. In it we possess God himself, who is the sovereign good. Even here we find our highest good in knowing the truth and loving goodness, dim as is our view of the one, and feeble as is our hold of the other. What must it be, then, when we come to behold, by the light of glory, our God face to face, with no cloud intervening to obscure his infinite beauty, no distance between us and his ineffable love? Well may it be said, "Eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard; nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive what our God hath prepared for them that love him." He will reward them with no inferior, no created good; but will give them himself, will himself be their portion for ever.

But this supernatural destiny, since it is supernatural, is not naturally attainable. We may cultivate all our natural powers, we may fill up the highest and broadest capacities of our nature, realize the highest ideal, and yet be infinitely, — we use the word in its strict sense, — *infinitely* below it. It is not attained to by "self-culture," by the development and exercise of our highest natural powers, including even the boasted sentiments of love and reverence. It is nothing that is due, or ever can be due, to our nature. It is a gift, and can be obtained only as bestowed. But it will be bestowed only on the

obedient, and is bestowed as the reward of obedience. Our destiny is eternal life, and the condition of obtaining it is obedience. Obedience is not, as some of the sects teach, the end for which we were made. We were made not that we might obey God, but that we might possess God; and we obey him as the condition of possessing him.

Obedience consists in fulfilling this law, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself." — St. Luke, x. 27. This law requires us to love God supremely and exclusively. It is not enough that we love God more than we love any thing else, but we must love only him, and our neighbour and ourselves only in him and for the sake of him; otherwise we do not love him with the *whole* heart, soul, strength, and mind. But even this is not all. No love of which we are naturally capable is the fulfilling of this law, is that charity without which we are as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. The end is supernatural, and, if the end be supernatural, the means must be supernatural; for there must be some proportion between the means and the end, and between natural means and a supernatural end there is no proportion. Man by his natural strength, even if he had never sinned, could not keep the law of charity in that sense in which obedience has the promise of eternal life. The obedience itself must be supernatural, and therefore is not possible, unless our nature be elevated, *supernaturalized*, by divine grace, by which our acts have a supernatural character, and a supernatural merit.

We may say, then, that Almighty God has appointed us to a supernatural end, that he has made that end attainable only by perfect obedience, and the obedience possible only by means of supernatural grace. The end for which we are intended and the means of obtaining it are both in the supernatural order, in what is called the *ORDER OF GRACE*, not in the order of nature. We must live not in and for the order of nature, but in and for the order of grace. Then, our chief attention is to be directed to the means, influences, ministries, disciplines by which we are lifted out of the order of nature, and placed in the order of grace, on the plane of our destiny. These are dispensed, exercised, enjoined by our blessed Saviour through his Holy Church, which he has established for the purpose, and which represents to us and for us the supernatural order. God through the Church does not merely reveal to us the end for

which he intended us, and the means of obtaining it, but also dispenses the helps we need in our weakness to lift us out of the order of nature and to sustain us in the order of grace ; and it is only through her ministries and disciplines that, in the ordinary course of his gracious providence, he does or will grant them, or, if he in some sense grant them, that they prove effectual. Then the indispensable conditions of obedience by which we obtain the end for which we were intended cannot be possessed but by submission to the Church, and observing whatever she proposes or commands. When we do this, and freely coöperate with the grace given to all men, we are just, and are placed in that state in which obedience merits eternal life.

We can now answer the question we have asked, namely, In what consists true greatness ? We began by assuming that true greatness consists in living for the end for which our Maker intended us. This end we now see is supernatural, and obtainable only by supernatural means. True greatness must consist in living for this supernatural end, and in yielding the supernatural obedience by which alone it is to be obtained. It evidently, then, consists in nothing natural, but in being lifted out of nature and placed in the order of grace, as we have said, on the plane of our destiny. The least in the order of grace is infinitely superior to the greatest in the order of nature. True greatness is, simply, in that supernatural justice and sanctity in which man was originally constituted, which he lost by sin, which is restored by grace, and by which we are made heirs of the promises, and translated into the number of those to whom our blessed Lord himself will give a crown of life.

This answer is not ours, but the answer which Almighty God himself gives us in his revelation. Tried by the rule implied in this answer, not a few of the world's judgments must be reversed. At one stroke we must cut from the roll of great men the immense majority of those the world delights to honor, and holds up to the reverence and emulation of our youth. Renowned princes, statesmen, heroes, poets, philosophers, scholars, authors, must lose their rank, and sink below that of ordinary men. Your Goethes, Byrons, Shelleys, Scotts, Bulwers, Victor Hugos, Balzacs, Eugene Sues, George Sands, Kants, Hegels, Cousins, shrink into insignificance before the simplest Christian who has given his heart to God. What are

your Alexanders, Hannibals, Cæsars, Napoleons, before a St. Gregory, a St. Bernard, a St. Francis, a St. Ignatius, a St. Xavier, a St. Charles ? your Dukes of Wellington before your St. Patricks, St. Ninians, St. Columbas, or countless hosts of those whose names are unheard on earth, and known only in the Lamb's book of life ? The saints are the only true nobility. No man is great but as he is good, but as he lives in the order of grace, and loves God above all things and with his whole heart and soul, and his neighbour as himself in and for the sake of God.

We have now a standard of greatness by which we can determine who is and who is not great, and by which we may determine the real value of things and conditions. Am I poor ? What if I am ? Does my poverty interfere with my obedience ? does it or can it debar me from obtaining that justice and sanctity in which alone is true worth, true greatness, all that it does not belittle me to crave ? Am I unknown, held in no repute, despised ? What of all this, if I am known and honored of God ? What is it to me that I am despised by men, if I am owned by the King immortal and invisible, who with his own hand will bestow upon me a crown of life incorruptible and eternal in heaven ? Talk of human respectability, of one's standing in society, of the honors one receives from the state or the mob ! What is all this to him who is in the communion of the saints and martyrs of all ages and climes, who listen to his prayers, and bear them as sweet incense up before the throne of the living God ? Am I rich, am I honored, have I praise of men, do the crowd run after me, the wise and venerable listen when I speak ? What of all this, if I am poor in the grace of God, have no honor in heaven, no assurance of the reward set before me, — if, when I die, I go to hell, while the poor beggar that lay at my gate is borne by the convoy of angels to Abraham's bosom ?

As of the individual, so of the nation. In like manner as justice and sanctity constitute the greatness of the individual, so do they constitute the greatness of the nation. "Justice exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people." The great nation is the holy nation, rich in true obedience, and carried away by a divine passion for God and all holy things. Suppose your nation does increase in wealth, in luxury, in refinement ; suppose it does fell the primeval forest and enlarge its borders, multiply its manufactures, extend its commerce, and make all climes pour their riches into its lap ; what then ? Does



it follow that such a nation is great, is glorious, and has reason to applaud herself for her achievements and to exult over the poor and simple ? “ Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord.” Where is it written, Blessed is the nation whose God is Mammon, and whose worship is Thrift ? Where are the nations who forgot the Lord, who put their trust in their ships, their traffic, their wealth, and luxuries ? Where is that ancient Tyre, “ whose merchants were princes, and her traders the nobles of the earth ” ? Where are all the nations of the old world, once renowned for their extended commerce, the richness of their stuffs, and the variety of their manufactures ? They have passed away like the morning vapor, and a few solitary ruins alone remain to point the traveller to the seats of their world-renowned idolatry.

Taking the principles we have established, we can easily answer the question, whether we are or are not a great people, — whether the path we are pursuing leads to true national greatness, or whether it leads from it. Are we as a people intent on gaining the end for which our Maker designed us ? Are we remarkable for our humble observance of the precepts of the Gospel ? Are we diligent to yield that obedience to which is promised eternal life ? Far, very far, from it. We are a proud, loud-boasting, and vain-boasting people. Our god is mammon, and our righteousness is thrift. Is it not so ? To what do we point as proofs of our greatness ? Is it not to our industrial achievements, our railroads, canals, steamboats, commerce, manufactures, — material wealth and splendor ? But where are our moral achievements, the monuments of our enlightened zeal for God, and humble devotion to his will ? Religion we have in name, in form, in many forms and many strange forms ; but where is the deep, all-pervading, all-active conviction that this world is not our home, that it is but an inn in which we may lodge for a night, but in which we may not, must not, dwell ? Alas ! the dominant passion of our country is worldly wealth and worldly distinction. We see it in the general pursuits of the people ; we hear it in the almost universal tone of conversation ; and we see it distinctly in the general scramble for wealth, in our demoralizing political contentions, and the all-devouring greediness for place and plunder.

If we look at the great political questions which agitate the public mind, we shall perceive that they are all questions concerning wealth, the means of facilitating its acquisition, of making it pass, or preventing it from passing, from the few to the

many, or from the many to the few. Such are your bank questions, your tariff questions, your land-distribution questions. If you go beyond these, they are questions of the honors and emoluments of office. Not a pert upstart among us who has made his maiden caucus speech, but regards himself as qualified for any office in the gift of the people, from that of village constable up to that of president of the United States, and feels that he suffers great wrong, and adds another striking example of neglected merit, if not rewarded for his disinterested and patriotic exertions by some snug place with a fat salary. Scarcely a man seems contented to remain in private life, to live in obscurity, unheeded by his countrymen, in all humility and fidelity laboring to discharge his duty to his God, and to win the prize of eternal glory. We love the praise of men more than the praise of God ; the low and transitory goods of time more than the high and permanent goods of eternity. If we are poor, we are discontented, we regard ourselves as most miserable, and rail against Providence, who permits inequalities to obtain among brethren. No one is contented with his lot in life. We are all ill-at-ease. We would all be what we are not, and have what we have not. And yet, with admirable simplicity, we ask, Are we not a great people ?

Nearly all the action of the American people, collectively or individually, has reference solely to the affairs of time. Government sinks with us into a joint-stock concern for the practice of thrift. It has no divine authority, no high and solemn moral mission. In education even, the same low and earthly view obtains. We educate for time. We seek to fit our children for getting on, as we call it, in the world, — to make them sharp, bold, enterprising, and successful business men. We teach them, indeed, that knowledge is power, — but power to outstrip their fellows in the pursuit of worldly goods. We teach them, indeed, that sloth is a mortal sin, — but sloth in the affairs of time and sense, not sloth in regard to our spiritual duties. We teach them to respect public opinion, to strive to be respectable, to be honored among men ; rarely, and almost always ineffectually, to respect the law of God, to seek honor of God, and to despise that of men. Hence, they grow up timid time-servers, trimmers, moral cowards, afraid to say their souls are their own, to avow their honest convictions, if their convictions chance to be unpopular, or to follow God in the faith and worship he has ordained, if not held in repute, or if embraced only by the poor, the simple, of whom the world

makes no account. To make a sacrifice for Christ, to give up all, houses, lands, wife and children, for God, that we may have treasure in heaven, strikes us as something wholly uncalled for, as folly, as madness, worthy only of the dark ages of monkish ignorance and barbarity. To a worldly end conspire all our education, science, literature, and art. Whatever cannot be pressed into the service of man as a creature of time and sense is by the immense majority of us condemned as useless and mischievous.

That we measure all things by the standard of this life and this world is evinced by the judgments we pass on other nations. In judging others, we always judge ourselves. Tell us what nation you place highest in the scale of nations, and you tell us what are your own views of what constitutes true national greatness. We, as a people, very generally count highest in the scale of contemporary nations those in which the national energy displays itself most exclusively in an industrial direction, and which are most successful in multiplying wealth and luxury. Since the great events in the sixteenth century, which out of courtesy we must call the Reformation, although it was any thing but a reformation, there has sprung up a new social order, not known in the Middle Ages, and not yet universally adopted in Catholic countries. The whole tendency of this order is in an industrial direction. It places this world before the other, time before eternity, the body before the soul, the praise of men before the praise of God. It esteems the riches of this world more than the riches of divine grace, and bids us strive to live, not in the order of grace, but in the order of nature. Under this order the great aim is to be rich, independent, well off in time; to be distinguished, held in high repute one by another. We reverse the maxim of the Gospel, and say, Be not anxious for the soul, take no heed to the worship of God, nor to obedience to his laws; but seek first to get on well in this world, look to the main chance, get rich, — honestly, of course, if you can, but get rich, — be distinguished, and then the kingdom of God and his justice will be added unto you; or if not, — it will be no great matter.

Under this order, astonishing industrial triumphs have been achieved. Man has made the sea and the land his tributaries, the winds his messengers, and flames of fire his ministers. Banking-houses, exchanges, cotton-mills, docks, and wharves supplant the old cathedral, the abbey, and the way-side chapel. It is only such nations as stand highest in this order that we

call great. If, by an excess of modesty, we place any nation above our own, it is Great Britain. In our estimation, no nation has surpassed her in the wisdom of her policy, none equals her in true national greatness and prosperity. In worldly power, in worldly wealth, in vast industrial enterprises, in wonderful productive facilities and energies, she unquestionably stands at this moment unrivalled ; but tried by the standard of greatness we have adopted, there are few, if any, nations on the globe that can rank far below her. What, in fact, are her national characteristics ? We grant her people have been brave, are bold, enterprising, industrious, ingenious ; but as a nation she is proud, arrogant, worldly, hypocritical. Her church establishment is a mockery, and her coffers are filled with the plunder of almost every people. The sun never sets upon her empire, and visits no people that does not curse her dominion. She is gorged with spoils, and drunken with the blood of the poor, the weak, the defenceless.

Nay, with all her wealth, with all her productive power, with all her devotion to the interests of time and sense, the condition of the great mass of her population, even in reference to this life alone, is far below what it was before she started on her new career, and compares unfavorably with that of the mass of the populations in most Catholic countries even now. The lower orders in Spain and Italy, over whose sad condition we shed so much — ink, are, even as to their physical comforts, altogether superior to the lower classes in Great Britain. An Italian or Spanish peasant has a personal freedom, an elevation of mind, a dignity of soul and of manners, that you shall in vain look for in an English operative. He feels that he is a man, that there is something of nobility attaching to every soul, since our blessed Lord assumed human nature and died to redeem it. He has at least the free use of his limbs, and free access to the blessed light and air of heaven, and is not imprisoned in a Union Workhouse. And say what you will of Popish ignorance and superstition, the worship of Our Lady and the Saints is at least not more degrading than the worship of the gin-shop. We have seen it recently stated, on what purports to be good authority, that in England every sixth person is a pauper, and large masses of the people, it has been proved by parliamentary commissions, grow up without any religious instruction, and live in a manner as gross and brutish as that of the South Sea Islanders, — many having never heard even the name of their Maker, except when blasphemed.



There are immense estates, immense wealth, boundless luxury for the few, and the most squalid poverty and frightful distress for the many. The soil of England, which a hundred and fifty years back had at least some two hundred and forty thousand proprietors, has now less than thirty thousand. The increase of pauperism has kept pace with this concentration of the soil in the hands of fewer and fewer proprietors. Such is the tendency of your boasted industrial order in Great Britain. But in Italy, poor degraded Italy, which our *Christian Alliances* are about to visit with their benign countenances, the highest statements we have seen make the number of paupers, not one out of every six as in England, but only one out of every twenty-five; and the provisions for education are so ample, especially in the Ecclesiastical States, that the poorest father may give his son, free of expense, the best university education in the world. Yet we weep over Italy, and glorify Great Britain.

If there be any truth in the principles we have laid down, — principles which rest not on our authority, but on the authority of God, — a nation is not to be accounted great in proportion to its worldly wealth and splendor; and if there be any truth in history or experience, a nation, in directing its chief attention to these, to the growth of material wealth and power, not only cannot attain to true greatness, but must inevitably fail to secure even the temporal well-being, for any great length of time, of the great mass of its population. We are beginning ourselves to experience, and we shall experience more and more, the truth of these assertions. Here the people make the laws. But, in making the laws, they of necessity follow their dominant passion. The laws in a democracy are always true exponents of the character, the tastes, habits, and passions of the people. The dominant passion of our people at the present moment is the acquisition of material wealth, either for its own sake, or for sake of the ease, independence, and distinction it is supposed to be able to secure. Take any ten thousand men at random, and ask them what they most desire of government, and they will answer you, if they answer you honestly, — Such laws as will facilitate the acquisition of wealth. The facilitating of the acquisition of wealth is at the bottom of every question which has any bearing on our elections. Let these men vote, and they will vote for such laws as they believe will most effectually secure this end. But suppose such laws to be enacted, how many out of the ten thousand will be in a condi-

tion to take advantage of them ? Certainly, not more than one in a hundred. There will be, then, nine thousand and nine hundred men joining with one hundred to enact laws which in their operation are for the exclusive benefit of the one hundred. The whole action, the inevitable action, of every popular government, *where wealth is the dominant passion of the people*, is to foster the continued growth of inequality of property. The tendency of all laws passed, if passed by the many, will be to concentrate the property in the hands of the few, because each one who aids in passing them hopes that his will be the hands in which it is to be concentrated ;—at least, such will be the tendency, till matters become so bad that the many in their madness and desperation are driven to attempt the insane remedy of agrarian laws. When, under our new system of industry, which allows little personal intercourse between landlord and tenant, proprietor and operative, which connects the operative simply with the mill and the overseer, the concentration of property in a few hands becomes general, it involves the most fatal results. We see in England only half the evil it would produce with us ; because there, save in the manufacturing districts, some elements of the old feudal system still remain to mitigate it. But here the evil would have no mitigation. We should have an aristocracy indeed, but one without a single quality that makes an aristocracy even endurable. An aristocracy not based on high birth or on sanctity is always intolerable. But the new order is at war with high birth, generous breeding, and is plebeian in its spirit and tendency. It is supported, commended, on the ground of its alleged popular tendencies, and its hostility to whatever remains of the old feudal order. Its direct and inevitable tendency is to substitute the cotton-mill for the old baronial castle, and your “Plugsons of St. Dorothy of Undershot,” as Carlyle calls them, for the well-born, the well-bred, and the really noble,—men who have risen from the gutter without a single virtue or a single generous quality, solely by their success in tasking the industry of others, and in getting by means of their business operations a controlling influence in the industrial world. These “Plugsons ” become our chiefs, our nobles, whose names head subscription papers, and who are seen figuring as presidents of banks, and other moneyed corporations, of lyceum and railroad meetings and conventions. The great mass sink to mere machines, doomed to tend on other machines. It is to this miserable result that leads the path we

have hitherto pursued, and are now pursuing. We have not yet reached the goal ; we have not seen the worst ; but are driving on towards the worst with more than Jehu speed. We have in full operation all the causes which necessarily produce the state of degradation implied ; and which will produce it, with all its attendant evils, much sooner, perhaps, than even the greatest croakers among us apprehend.\*

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\* We say not that this is the necessary result of popular government, as such ; for it is not, save when and where the dominant passion of the people is for the goods of this life. Where the people are truly religious, where they live not for time but for eternity, and are bent on laying up treasures not on earth but in heaven, no such result from popular government would or could follow. But the popular tendency of modern governments has been in nearly all cases the offspring, not of religion, but of the want of it. The new order is the result of the decay of religious faith, of rebellion against the spiritual government Almighty God has instituted, and of a growing devotion to the goods of time and sense. The aim of all our modern popular movements has been to depress the spiritual order and to elevate the material. Men lose sight of the end for which they were intended, cease to have reference in their aspirations and conduct to the things which are invisible and eternal, and come to place their affections wholly on this world and the things which pertain to it. In no instance have they broken away from the old social order for the sake of heaven ; but in all instances for the sake of earth. They have demanded a new and better social order, not as more favorable to obtaining the end for which Almighty God intended them, but as likely to yield more earthly delight and satisfaction. Hence, popular government, or the tendency to popular government, wherever we see it, is an evidence of the worldly-mindedness of the people, of their decaying faith and growing infidelity. Consequently, as a matter of fact, wherever we find a popular government, we may regard the fatal results we have pointed out as inevitable, unless arrested by the operation of some cause foreign to that operating in the people and government.

Yet, if the people, or the great majority of them, were truly Christian, if the dominant spirit or passion of the nation were for heaven as our true destiny, and to gain heaven in the way and by the means Almighty God himself has ordained, we see no reason why popular government would not work well, and deserve all the eulogiums it has ever received. Certainly we are not among those who would distrust it. It is only the godless republic we fear ; it is only where the people are wedded to this world, where they do not own the Lord, do not believe, do not feel in their souls, that this world is not their home, that we are here only to prepare for another and a better world, that we are to walk here by faith, not by sight, and live by promise and not by fruition, that we doubt the democratic tendency. Democracy with the Church would be a good form of government, if not indeed the best of all possible forms ; without the Church, it is the worst, as our own experience as a people, if we continue as we have been going on, will soon demonstrate to all who have eyes to see or hearts to understand.

If, then, we speak of the fatal results of popular government, it must be

But this is not all. In all the great industrial nations, so called, or where the new order prevails, and especially with us, the great mass of the people are ill-at-ease. They belong in more senses than one to the "movement party." Rarely do you find one contented with his lot, or satisfied to remain in the social position in which he was born. The absurd notions of equality which have been propagated turn all heads, and make every one feel that he ought to occupy the first rank. No one is willing to occupy a subordinate station. We are all equal, and, therefore, all would be first. The poor man cannot content himself in his poverty to serve God where he is, and count himself as living well, if living for God. No; he must be another; he must be rich; he must stand as high socially as his neighbour. So he puts off his spiritual duties, neglects the goods he might obtain, and risks every thing in trying to be what he is not, and in striving to win what when won would be worse than useless. No one seems to remember, none seem to believe, that "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven"; that "Better is the poor man that walketh in simplicity, than a rich man that is perverse in his lips and unwise"; or that "Better is a dry morsel with joy, than a house full of victims with strife." We look with pity and contempt on those who show no ambition to rise in the world. We regard it as a "lower deep" in the degradation of the Austrian or Italian peasant, that he is contented to live and die a peasant. We regard him who neglects an opportunity to rise in the world, to acquire wealth or distinction, as wanting in the proper spirit of a man. Hence, everywhere strife and contention; everywhere rivalry, competition, envy, jealousy, heart-burnings, efforts to rise, pull down, keep

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understood of popular government not in itself considered, but where the people are not Christian, where they have not the Christian faith living and active, or, as we have said, where the dominant passion of the people, as with us, is for worldly wealth and distinctions. The fault is not in the form of the government, but in the spirit of the people. Were the people what they should be, the government would be all we could wish. But no popular government can be wiser and better than the people, rarely so wise and good as the general average. It is not the government that needs changing or reforming, but the people from whom it emanates. If our politicians would bear this in mind, and seek to secure better governmental results by increasing the intelligence and virtue of the people, instead of studying merely to ascertain and conform to the popular will as it is, they would render us some service, and would not deserve the very general reprobation which they now receive from the wise and good.



down; — at all events, to be ourselves at the top. And what avails all this uneasiness and discontent? What avails all this struggle, uproar, and confusion? Does it make us happier here? Does it help us obtain the end for which our Maker intended us? No, no. What, then, does it all prove, but that we make a false estimate of life, — that we place greatness, whether national or individual, in that in which it is not, and in which it cannot be?

It is sometimes asked, what is to be the fate of this republic? If we continue on as we are, it is easy to foresee what it will be. We shall be what were Tyre, and Sidon, and Carthage, and what they are now. It is written, that “the wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God.” — Psalm ix. 18. And, say what we will, we as a people do forget God. We have, it is true, our meetinghouses, and places where we assemble on Sundays; and we call ourselves by the name of Christ, to take away our reproach. But the exchange is our temple, and mammon is our god. We are an idolatrous people, and pay our devotion to the meanest of all the spirits that “kept not their first estate.” For an idolatrous people there is no good, no hope; because every people that forsaketh the living God shall sooner or later be blotted out. The Lord God hath said it, and it is not for us to reverse his decrees. We must put away our idolatry, return from our groves and “high places” to the Temple we have deserted; for there is no good for nations, any more than for individuals, but in loving God and keeping his commandments.

This conclusion, doubtless, is not remarkable for its novelty. It is, we own, but the old story which is constantly repeated by those the world heeds not. But truth is old, not new, and our good rarely comes from novelties. We have followed after new things long enough. We have sought out many inventions; we have followed the suggestions of a lying spirit, and been deceived wellnigh to our ruin. It is now the part of wisdom to retrace our steps, to return to the old things we have left behind, from which we have wandered so long and so far, seeking rest and finding none. Nay, if we want novelty, we may find it in the old paths so long deserted; for to the greater part of us the old is newer than the new.

We mean not, in what we have said, to condemn industry, nor even wealth, in their place, and when pursued with reference solely to God. We believe voluntary poverty for the sake of God is highly meritorious; but a man may also be rich without sin, although riches are a temptation and a snare,

and he who has them not is more blessed than he who has them. What we have meant to condemn is the worldly spirit, is the tendency to make wealth and luxury, or the goods of this life, ends for which we may live and labor. This is always sin, as it is always folly and madness. We may make our industry and wealth meritorious, by pursuing them for the sake of God, and using what we acquire according to the law of charity. We are to seek first, as the end of our exertions, the kingdom of God and his justice, and all else we need will be added unto us. But all are not required to seek this in the same mode. There are diversities of gifts and callings. Some are called to follow the evangelical counsel to forsake houses and lands, wife and children, for Christ's sake. These do nobly, and have the promise of a hundred-fold in this world, and of eternal life in the world to come. Others are called to serve God as pastors and teachers, by ruling the Church, feeding the flock, instructing the ignorant, strengthening the weak, reclaiming the erring, comforting the sorrowing, and befriending the friendless ; others by exercising authority in the state, watching over the public weal, executing the laws, and maintaining justice between man and man ; others, again, by industrial efforts, by the production and exchange of the necessities and conveniences of life. Each to his calling ; and each in his calling may, if he will, serve God, and gain the salvation of his own soul. But whatever the calling, it must be pursued for the sake of God, in the spirit of humble obedience ; and whatever the act performed, it must be referred to God, who is our ultimate end, as he is our first beginning.

We have spoken freely, and not flatteringly, of our countrymen ; and yet we have not spoken without feeling an American heart beating in our bosom. A great people in the higher and truer sense we are not. That we have in the industrial order achieved much, and that as to our simple material condition we compare favorably with any other people, we are far from questioning. That in education, so far as it tends to prepare us for success in this world, we have done much, we freely admit ; and that, as a people, we are by no means deficient in natural acuteness, strength, or activity of mind, or wanting in the ordinary regard for the general welfare of one another, we are far from asserting. Compared with other nations, we have undoubtedly no special cause for national mortification, though less cause for pride and vanity than we commonly imagine. Yet we know no reason why a man should blush before the native of any other country to be called an

American. It is not between us and other nations that we have been instituting a comparison. We have compared our nation not with others ; but have sought to measure it by the standard of greatness furnished us in our holy religion, — the only standard by which it becomes us to try ourselves. Tried by that standard, we are indeed most shamefully wanting, and should blush and hang our heads.

In saying this, we do not feel that we forfeit the character of a true patriot. We may be wrong, but we have always held that the worst citizen of a republic is he who flatters the people, assures them they are wise and virtuous, can do no wrong, and have the right, irrespective of the laws of God, to do whatever they will. We have never believed that we must consult the will of the people as the rule of our faith or of our practice. We have believed it the duty of every citizen to do all in his power not to conform to public opinion, but to set it right whenever he has good authority for believing it wrong. We are not to do what will please the people, but to do what we can to influence the people to will what is pleasing to God. Such has been our belief ever since we commenced addressing the public in speech or in writing, and such is our belief now, and probably will be as long as we live. It is too late for us now to turn courtier or demagogue. If this is a fault in us, there is no lack of aspirants to public favor to atone for it. We love our country. We are resolved to do all we can to sustain her institutions ; but we are not of those who have great facility in shouting Democracy, and praising the dear people. We see evil tendencies at work ; we see the golden, or rather *paper*, age of demagogues advancing, and we tremble for our country. To us, the direction things are taking seems likely to prove disastrous. We raise our voice, feeble though it be, and unheeded as we fear it will be, to contribute our mite to stay the advancing tide of ruin. We have raised it with a patriot's love, and with a patriot's grief ; but with the Christian's hope. Bad as appearances are, a good God as well as a just God watches over us, and we dare not distrust his mercy. It may be he will have mercy on our nation ; that he will yet make ours the chosen land of his abode ; that he will in very deed be our God, and we shall be his people. We would not see our experiment in behalf of popular freedom fail ; we would see it succeed. It will not fail, it will succeed, if we return to God, put our trust in him, and live for the end to which he has appointed us.

ART III. — *Dangers of Jesuit Instruction. A Sermon preached at the Second Presbyterian Church in St. Louis, September 25, 1845. By Rev. WM. S. POTTS, D. D.* 8vo. pp. 21.

THE author of this sermon, we presume, from its doctrine and tone, is a Presbyterian minister, and most likely pastor of the church at which it was preached. We know nothing of him except what the sermon itself tells us. From that we gather that he stands high in his own estimation, has some earnestness and zeal, but is rather deficient in theological and historical knowledge, as well as in the meekness and sweetness of the Christian temper.

The sermon is from Eph. vi. 4, — “Bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord,” or, as the Catholic version has it, “in the discipline and correction of the Lord”; and is designed to set forth the solemn obligations of Christian parents to give their children a truly Christian education, and to point out one remarkable instance in which they violate these obligations.

“The text,” he says, “is an apostolic precept given to those who hold in the Church of Christ the important and responsible relation of parents. The Church, consequently, requires, in every case in which the Sacrament of Baptism is administered to a child, that the parents bring themselves under a solemn obligation to ‘endeavour, by all the means of God’s appointment, to bring up their child in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.’

“As in the administration of this Sacrament in the case of an adult, he gives himself up unto God, through Jesus Christ, to walk in newness of life; so parents, in presenting their children, make a formal surrender of them to God, and obligate themselves, as guardians and instructors appointed for the express purpose, to bring them up as God’s sons and daughters. For their diligence and faithfulness in the discharge of this duty every parent is to answer, first, to the Church officers, whose duty it is to see to the fulfilment of the vows publicly made in the Church, and secondly, to the great Judge of quick and dead. Hence arises the double duty, that officers should see to it that the Church is fully instructed in reference to the nature of this covenant engagement, and that parents carefully consider the meaning of the vow that rests upon ‘hem.’ — p. 3.

The inquiry might arise here, Who are these “Church offi-



cers" ? and, especially, who is to see to it that they rightly instruct, or do not misinstruct, the Church ? The Church officers instruct the Church ; but who instructs and appoints the Church officers ? The earth stands on the turtle ; but what does the turtle stand on ? If the sermon reaches a second edition, we hope the author will condescend to enlighten us on this point.

The explanation of the precept of the text, though it overlooks the immediate sense intended by the blessed Apostle, is well enough. The general duty of Christian parents to educate their children in a Christian manner is set forth with tolerable clearness. It is a solemn duty, and one which it is to be deeply lamented parents too often and too fatally neglect. The parent who brings his child to the Sacrament of Baptism incurs a solemn obligation to do all in his power to bring him up in a truly Christian manner ; and if he do not, and the child through that neglect be lost, terrible will be the account he will one day be called upon to settle with his Maker and his Judge. But the main design, and much the larger part, of this sermon is devoted to pointing "out one of the instances in which parents violate this command."

"The case," the author says, "to which I allude, is the indifference manifested by Christian parents to the characters, morals, and religious sentiments of the instructors of their children. Many parents act upon the principle, that it is of no importance what may be the morals or sentiments entertained by a teacher, provided there is no immorality exhibited before the pupils, and no attempt to inculcate sentiments deemed erroneous. But no opinion could be more untrue, or more practically dangerous. The Scripture declaration, as a man 'thinketh in his heart so is he,' will be found true. His teachings and example will be insensibly influenced by the doctrines he holds, and there will occur a thousand ways in which the pupil will distinctly comprehend the views and feelings of the preceptor ; and these views will not have the less influence, from the fact that he makes no direct effort to impress them upon the pupil's mind. A direct effort of this kind would put the learner on his guard ; but the other plan allays all fear, and the poison silently and imperceptibly works. The child is subjected five sevenths of his time to this influence, and the remaining portion to a different influence ; no wonder, then, that the poison has gained so fast, that errors are fixed beyond remedy in the mind before the parent is aware that they exist at all. Hence, every one soliciting at your hands the post of instructor of your children should be willing to submit his opinions and life to the most rigid scrutiny,

before he asks that so important a trust should be confided to him.”  
— pp. 6, 7.

The principle laid down here we regard as a sound one. We should find it extremely difficult to bring ourselves to intrust the education of our children to instructors we held to be unsound in the faith. There is no torture we would not endure sooner than trust them to the care of Presbyterian teachers, even in matters but remotely connected with faith and morals. We agree entirely with Dr. Potts in the principle he lays down, and are quite certain, that, if the Americans generally would adopt it, and act upon it, there would soon be an end of that monopoly of education throughout the United States, which has hitherto been enjoyed by Presbyterians and the Calvinistic Congregationalists. The great majority of the American people are anti-Calvinistic, and if they were not shamefully indifferent to the doctrines entertained by those they employ as instructors, we should not see, as is even yet the fact, the greater part of our colleges, academies, and literary institutions under Calvinistic control.

But, if we agree with Dr. Potts in the principle he lays down, we are far from agreeing with him in the application he makes of it. From the fact, that parents are bound to bring up their children in the discipline and correction of the Lord, he infers that they are bound not to intrust them to Catholic instructors. But this is a plain *non sequitur*; for none but Catholic instructors do, or can, impart a truly Christian education. He would also infer from the same premises that Christian parents can in conscience employ none but Presbyterian educators; which is another *non sequitur*. Educators cannot impart what they have not; and Presbyterians must be Christians, before they can give a Christian education. That they are not Christians now, we have the right to say; since, in a recent act of their general assembly, asserting the invalidity of Catholic baptism, they have *unchristened* themselves. Men are made Christians in the Sacrament of Baptism. The Presbyterians have no baptism but that which they derived from the Catholic Church, and their title to the Christian name rests on the validity of that baptism. They have declared that baptism invalid. Consequently, according to their own declaration, they have always been, and are, a set of unbaptized — *Presbyterians*, and therefore completely out of the pale of Christendom. Evidently, then, if Christian parents are bound to give their children a Christian education, they must not employ Presbyterian instructors.

Dr. Potts asserts that Catholic individuals and ecclesiastical orders are at the doors of Protestants, "asking Christian parents to commit their children to their hands to be educated, and, of course, — for this is the parent's vow, — to be trained up for God." — p. 7. This, if so, is no doubt horrible, and not to be tolerated ; for we suppose Protestants are not at liberty to refuse the request. But we are inclined to think he labors under a slight mistake. We are sure that Catholics do not solicit Protestants to intrust them with the education of their children. We establish schools for our own children, that we may discharge the duty the preacher is laboring to enforce ; and it can be no sin in us to request Catholic parents to send their children to Catholic schools. We do not request Protestants to send their children to our schools ; we are not particularly desirous of receiving them, and some of our colleges will not receive them at all. It is a favor we confer on Protestants, when we admit their sons and daughters into our schools, for which they should thank us, both for their own sake and their children's sake, not abuse us.

We think also the preacher is ungenerous in objecting to our schools because they furnish education at "reduced prices." This objection comes with an ill grace from the party that claims to be the especial friends of education, and the founders of free schools. That our schools give a better education and at less expense than Protestant schools we do not question ; for our instructors are for the most part vowed to poverty, and devoted to the work of education not for the love of money, but for the love of God. Education is with them a religious vocation. They are men and women dead to the world, and alive only to God, and no doubt they have special graces from Almighty God for the work to which he calls them. They are thus enabled to educate better than Protestants can, whatever their zeal, diligence, learning, or natural ability ; and, as they have no expensive families or position to maintain, they can educate much cheaper than Protestants can. This sufficiently accounts for the excellence and cheapness of our schools, and for their ability to compete more than successfully, wherever established, with Protestant schools. But this surely implies no fault on our part, and can be no ground for condemning us or our schools.

But the reduced prices at which our schools furnish education is not the only objection the preacher brings against them. He thinks the Christian parent cannot send his children to our

schools, because Catholic instructors are not sound in the faith. He proceeds, therefore, to set forth wherein Catholics have not the essential Christian faith. If Catholics do not hold the essential truths of the Christian religion, parents undoubtedly cannot with a safe conscience commit their children to their care. No parent can safely trust his children to an infidel or a misbelieving instructor. So far, we agree with Dr. Potts. But this question as to the orthodoxy of Catholics is a somewhat delicate question. It is simply, Does the Catholic Church hold and teach the true Christian faith ?

Now, it is undeniable that we cannot decide this question, unless we have some standard or criterion of orthodoxy. What is this criterion ? By what standard does the zealous Doctor propose to try the Catholic faith ? By the Bible ? Well, by the Bible as he understands it, or as Catholics understand it ? If as Catholics understand it, then he must concede the orthodoxy of Catholicity ; for the Catholic faith is authorized by the Catholic understanding of the Bible. But will he say, as he himself understands it ? But whence does it follow that Dr. Potts, who preaches at the Second Presbyterian Church in St. Louis, understands the Bible better than the Catholic ? Why, are we to say that the Catholic faith is heterodox, because it does not agree with his understanding of the word of God ? Is he infallible ? Does he pretend it ? Then how settle the question, whether his or the Catholic's understanding of the Bible be the true understanding ?

“ But take the Bible itself ; neither your understanding of it, nor mine, — but the Bible, the precious Bible, the very word of God itself.”

With all my heart. But the Bible is nothing to us, unless we attach some meaning to it ; and if we attach a false meaning to it, then what we take to be the Bible is not the Bible. We do not take the Bible, unless we take it in God's sense, — in the sense intended by the Holy Ghost, who dictated it. How shall we ascertain this sense ?

But the good Doctor is troubled with no questionings of this sort. The earth rests on the turtle, and it does not occur to him to ask what the turtle stands on. We should not be over-curious, and no Christian ever allows himself to ask impertinent questions. So he tacitly assumes his own infallibility, that the turtle stands on his own feet, — for what else should a turtle stand on ? — and proceeds to try the Catholic faith.



“ Our first inquiry is into the doctrines held by these teachers ; that is, by the Papal Church. The Christian parent, lying under a solemn vow, must know whether the instructor of his child holds the essential truths of the Christian religion. It has been generally the opinion of Protestants that Roman Catholics were not wrong in those doctrines that are fundamental in the Christian faith, but that their great error consisted in the load of trumpery, such as the worship of the Virgin Mary, and of saints and relics ; the doctrines of purgatory, penance, and auricular confession ; of transubstantiation, and the adoration of the bread ; which, being wrought into the way of salvation as revealed, served to cloud the mind, and, in most cases, entirely mislead the worshipper from the true objects of faith. This opinion has risen from the circumstance, that Rome held the same symbols of faith with the Protestant Churches, as the Apostles’ and Athanasian creeds. But these formularies of doctrine are so brief, that without explanation it is impossible to know what is the faith held by those professing to embrace them. The Apostles’ creed may be adopted by every description of errorists professing to receive the Bible ; and the same is true of the creed of Athanasius, with the single exception of Arians, whose error it was designed to detect. Hence, the opinion of Protestants referred to was manifestly made up on insufficient evidence.” — pp. 7, 8.

This is a beautiful extract. So Protestants have hitherto been mistaken as to the real character of the Church. Well, there is some comfort in that. If they have heretofore erred, it is certain they are not infallible, and may therefore err again. Drowning men will catch at straws. So, since it is admitted Protestants may err, we will conclude it is *barely* possible they do err, when they deny that the Church believes and teaches “ the essential truths of the Christian religion.”

But the question of the criterion or standard still comes up. By what authority does our Presbyterian friend distinguish between the essential truths of the Christian religion, and the “ trumpery ” with which they are loaded ? This question continually haunts us, and, like Banquo’s ghost, “ will not down at the bidding.” We are even anxious to cast off all “ trumpery ” ; but you must prove to us that what you require us to cast off is trumpery, before we can consent to cast it off. What is the authority for saying this or that is trumpery ? The Bible ? That answer will not suffice ; because the moment that is introduced, the question comes up, What is the true sense of the Bible ? How determine that ? By private judgment ? But I have private judgment as well as you. If I am required

to submit my private judgment to yours, the right of private judgment is denied, and then you are as badly off as I. Moreover, our private judgments clash. You call some things trumpery which I revere as sacred. If the right of private judgment is admitted, you cannot be required to submit your private judgment to mine, nor I mine to yours. Where is the umpire to decide between us? The Presbyterian General Assembly? But, at the very worst, the authority of the Catholic Church is equal to the authority of the Presbyterian Assembly; why, then, shall I submit to the Assembly rather than to the Church? As a prudent man, how can I do so? Your Assembly is quite young and inexperienced. It represents a sect born only the other day, and which includes at best only a small portion—a very small portion—of those who profess to be Christians, and they no prodigies for their intelligence or their amiability. Who has given them authority to teach? What, in fact, is their authority, making all you can of it, before the Catholic Church, which now embraces, and which has embraced from the times of the Apostles, the overwhelming majority of all who profess, or have professed, the Christian religion, and from which you have pilfered all the Christianity you have? To exchange the authority of the Catholic Church for that of the Presbyterian Church would be like Glaucus exchanging his golden armor for the brazen armor of Diomed. Sure we are we should get only *brass* in return. No, no, most excellent Doctor, we cannot make so foolish an exchange. You must bring me higher authority than that of the Presbyterian Assembly, especially since it has *unchristened* itself, before its decision will suffice for determining what are the essential truths of the Christian religion, and what is mere “trumpery.”

For our part, we shrink from calling the devotion Catholics pay to the blessed Virgin and the saints by so harsh a word as “trumpery.” To brand with that name the uniform practice of the great mass of professed Christians for eighteen centuries, including the greatest, best, and holiest men and women that have ever lived, requires, to say the least, very respectable authority, and is not to be done lightly. Dr. Potts knows perfectly well that Catholics pay supreme worship to God alone, and that they are strictly forbidden by their religion to give that to a creature which is due only to God. We honor the blessed Virgin, we admit; for the angel Gabriel honored her, when he saluted her “full of grace”; for God himself honored her, when he chose to become her son, and to

love and obey her as his mother ; and we cannot believe it wrong for us to honor whom God and his holy angels honor. Dr. Potts, doubtless, professes to believe that Jesus Christ was both God and man, two distinct natures in one person, — that he was truly born of the Virgin Mary, and that she was literally and truly his mother, as much so as any woman is the mother of her son. If so, he must believe that she is still his mother, and that our blessed Lord still loves and honors her as such. If she is still his mother, if he still loves and honors her, he cannot regard it as “trumpery” that we, too, love and honor her. Would our Presbyterian friend regard it as a slight to himself, if such were our esteem for him that we loved and honored his mother for his sake ? Would he regard our disrespect of his mother as a proof of our love and esteem of him ? If he is not a bad son, he would be more offended at our want of respect to his mother than at our want of respect for himself, and would resent it quicker and more deeply. Was our blessed Lord not a good son ? Why, then, tell us it is “trumpery” for us to honor his Virgin Mother ? Alas ! how little does our Presbyterian minister know of the sublime mystery of the Incarnation ! How much does he lose by his ignorance of the exquisite tenderness and grace of that devotion which Catholics pay to the Mother of our Lord ; who by the Holy Ghost declared that henceforth all nations should call her “Blessed” ! St. Luke, i. 48.

Nor are we willing to regard it as “trumpery” to honor the saints. We have always supposed that the saints have honor in heaven, that God himself loves and honors every saint ; that to be loved and honored of God is included in the reward of sanctity. May I not love and honor whom God loves and honors ? If we love God, will not our hearts overflow with love to all that are dear to God ? And who are dearer to God than the saints who have washed their robes white in the blood of the Lamb, who have borne the cross here below, fought the good fight, won the victory, and now sing their triumph in songs of benediction and joy before the throne of God himself ? May we publicly assemble to honor the memory of the statesman, the patriot, and the hero, stained, perhaps, with a thousand vices and crimes ; and yet must not honor the saint whose life was fragrant with divine grace, and whose footsteps have hallowed the earth ? Or is our crime in the fact, that we believe the saint still lives, and that there is a blessed communion of saints, including the saints above and the saints below,

binding us all together as one body, united to God as the soul? May we request the suffrages of those we love, who are still in the flesh, and not the suffrages of those who are released from their bondage, and are now in the very presence of God? Has the departed saint lost a portion of his faculties, or has his heart become callous to the wants of those for whom, when he was in the flesh, he would willingly die? O, call not the devotion we pay to the saints, the interest we beg in their prayers, "trumpery"! You know not what you say; and may the saints pray God to forgive you for blaspheming him in them!

We do not worship "relics." We regard and honor them for what they represent, or the worth to which they are related. They are memorials we value and treasure up. Has Dr. Potts never a memorial of a dear friend, now departed, with which he would not willingly part? Is that picture of his ever honored mother, which the pious son preserves with so much care, or that locket, which was her mother's, the pious daughter prizes so highly, mere trumpery? The New Englander makes his pilgrimage to the rock on which our forefathers landed, and the descendants of the Pilgrims, when erecting in the old town of Plymouth *Pilgrim Hall*, place a fragment of that rock in its walls. The patriot feels rich in the cane, snuff-box, or paper-cutter, made from the wood of "Old Ironsides," and we saw but a few days since that the representative of our government in Peru had sent to the National Institute at Washington a fragment of the flag of Pizarro, together with one or two other valued relics. We go into our State House, and we see old muskets, swords, a headless drum, and other curious relics of the earlier Indian wars or of the Revolution, preserved with great care. All this is proper, and is commended by even the sternest of the Puritan race. But it is all "trumpery" to preserve with respect the relics of a saint of God, one whose presence blessed the race of men, and who has been crowned in heaven! We may preserve with affectionate care the coat of Washington, or visit with reverential feeling the room where Voltaire penned his blasphemy, or the bed where he slept after having reviled the religion of God; but it is all "trumpery," if the pious Christian preserves the sacred tunic worn by his Lord when he tabernacled with men, or finds his devotion quickened on beholding it. It is only the relics of those dear to God, who followed him in humility and all fidelity, who, by his grace, won immortal vic-

tories over the world, the flesh, and the devil, who came off more than conquerors through him who loved them ; it is only the sacred relics of such as these it is offensive to God that we should preserve, or “trumpery” that we should respect for the sake of the worth to which they are related. The lover may wear the picture of his mistress next his heart, and poets will sing his praise, and romancers immortalize him ; but if I wear next to mine the image of the Virgin Mother of my God, whose heart was transfixed with a sword of grief, as she saw her divine Son suffer and die that I might have life and joy, it is all “trumpery.” You may fill your houses and grounds with statues of heathen gods and goddesses, naked dancing-girls, and wild bacchantes, or hang round your rooms the pictures of bandits, cut-throats, and villains ; but if I place in my study, or the Church places upon her altar, the image of the Crucifixion, or if in my devotions I kneel before the cross, or the image of the Queen of Saints, it is all “trumpery,” besotted superstition, debasing idolatry ! O miserable Protestantism, thou wert born of contradictions ; thou stealest away the brains and petrifiest the hearts of thy votaries ! The fatal cup of Circe wrought not more frightful transformations in the companions of Ulysses, than thou dost in those who drink from thine.

The doctrines of purgatory, penance, and transubstantiation we pass over for the present ; but the charge, that Catholics adore “the bread,” even Dr. Potts must be aware is not true, — not true, even if it were possible for us to be mistaken in the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. We do not adore the bread, for we do not believe there is any bread there. What we adore is not what we see with our eyes, what we detect with any of our senses, but our blessed Lord himself, whom we believe to be, not *represented*, but *concealed* under the appearance of bread and wine. Our adoration is intended for God, for the Incarnate God, — is directed to him, and is adoration of him, even if he be not present in the manner we believe. Yet it is not strange that Protestants, who regard themselves as the more enlightened portion of mankind, since they believe Jesus Christ is *represented* by a piece of bread, should suppose that Catholics must believe him to *be* bread ; for to believe him to be bread is, after all, not so far removed from believing that bread represents him as some may imagine.

But here is another curious extract.



"The Papal system of doctrine was never settled until the Council of Trent, which closed its sessions in 1564. Previous to this, Councils had dealt very much in formularies, and they had defined and changed, affirmed and condemned, in so many different ways, that it was no very unusual thing for that to be rank heresy in one section of the Church that was orthodox in another, and opinions of every shade and hue were held by different teachers in that communion. The Protestant controversy compelled Rome to settle her faith, and the great and last General Council convened at Trent in 1545 for this purpose. Their decrees, having been confirmed by the Pope, according to the doctrine of that Church, are infallible and unalterable." — p. 8.

This is easily said, but not easily proved. That heresies have arisen in the Church, both before Luther and since, nobody denies ; but that they have ever been permitted in the Church by any portion of the Church is not true. The faith of the Church is always and everywhere the same, and never have individuals in one age or one country been authorized to hold what in another age or country has been counted heretical. No doubt, Protestantism would delight to find that the Church had contradicted herself ; but this, though often asserted, has never been made out, and never can be. The faith of the Church is that which the Church through her pastors teaches authoritatively, or commands her children to believe ; and she always and everywhere has commanded one and the same faith. It is in vain Protestants assert the contrary. They have never succeeded, and never can succeed, in adducing a single instance which impugns this statement. The holy Council of Trent made not the least alteration in the faith. It simply defined it more fully on certain points than it had been before, repeated several former definitions which had been controverted, and condemned the new heresies which had arisen. To say that the Catholic faith was not settled till the Council closed its sessions, in 1556, betrays either an ignorance or a recklessness which is by no means creditable to him who says so.

But here is something worse yet.

"It has been thought by Protestants, that, if there was one doctrine held by the Papal Church that was entirely free from error, it was that of the Trinity. Yet, in the Catechism of the Council of Trent, we find the following explanations on this subject: — 'Let him, however, who by the divine bounty believes these truths, constantly beseech and implore God, and the Father, who made all

things out of nothing, and orders all things sweetly; who gave us power to become the sons of God, and who made known to us the mystery of the Trinity, that, admitted, one day, into the eternal tabernacles, he may be worthy to see how great is the fecundity of the Father, who, contemplating and understanding himself, begot the Son like and equal to himself; how a *love of charity* in both, entirely the same and equal, *which is the Holy Ghost*, proceeding from the Father and the Son, connects the begetting and the begotten by an eternal and indissoluble bond; and that thus the essence of the Trinity is one, and the distinction of the three persons perfect.'—p. 27. So that a love of charity, proceeding from the Father and the Son, is, in the Romish notion, the Holy Ghost.

"Concerning the eternal generation of the Son the same Catechism gives us the following as an illustration:—'As the mind, in some sort looking into and understanding itself, forms an image of itself, which theologians express by the term "word"; so God, as far, however, as we may compare human things to divine, understanding himself, begets the eternal word.'—p. 36. So far as this illustration teaches any thing, it is, that the Son of God is a representation of an idea in the mind of God.

"On the manner of Christ's birth we have this remarkable instruction from the same source:—'As the rays of the sun penetrate, without breaking or injuring in the least, the substance of glass; after a like, but more incomprehensible manner, did Jesus Christ come forth from his mother's womb without injury to her maternal virginity, which, immaculate and perpetual, forms the just theme of our eulogy.'—p. 40. The humanity of Christ is here denied. He is not the seed of the woman, and no more a descendant from Adam than was the angel that wrestled with Jacob at Peniel. Now, whatever may be said of the orthodoxy of Rome, and the correctness of her teachings in other things, there can be but one opinion amongst Protestants concerning these views of her authorized standard; that the doctrines of the Trinity and the humanity of Christ, as we hold them, are denied."—pp. 8, 9.

The objection to the first extract is, that the Holy Ghost is said to be the "love of charity," *charitatis amor*,—but why this is objectionable the preacher does not tell us, and we do not know. The Father loves the Son with an eternal and infinite love, and the Son loves the Father with an eternal and infinite love, and from their mutual love *proceeds* infinite and Eternal Love, which is the Holy Ghost. This love is termed *amor charitatis*, because theologians distinguish several kinds of love; and the highest, purest, and most perfect love is what they term the "love of charity." The word charity does not, as our learned preacher seems to imagine, express

the object of the love, but its quality, and determines the love in question to be that love which is termed charity, not some other kind of love, as, for instance, *amor concupiscentiæ*, or *amor amicitiae*. The Catechism merely terms the Holy Ghost, in plain English, Charity, or most perfect love, proceeding from the charity or most perfect love of the Father for the Son, and of the Son for the Father. This is the worst that can be made of it. But what is there objectionable in this? Does not the Apostle St. John (1 St. John, iv. 16) say, *Deus charitas est*, or, as the Protestant version has it, "God is love"? If the blessed Apostle calls God charity, or love, why may not the Catechism call the Holy Ghost, who is God, also charity or love?

Does our Presbyterian minister fancy that he sees in the assertion, *charitatis amor qui Spiritus Sanctus est*, an attack on the personality, or, indeed, the substantiality, of the Holy Ghost? He must bear in mind, first, that, in the sentence he quotes, the Catechism is not defining nor even giving a general statement of the Mystery of the Holy Trinity; but in the paragraph from which it is taken is giving a caution against subtle speculations concerning this mystery, teaching that the words in which it is expressed are to be religiously observed, and admonishing us to pray diligently that we may be found worthy at last, when admitted into the eternal tabernacles, to see and understand what here we must believe on the authority of God, without seeking too curiously to ascertain how or why it is that God exists in unity of essence and trinity of persons. And in the second place, he must bear in mind that the doctrine of the Trinity, as it is to be received by faith, the Catechism here presupposes, because it had in the previous sections given a clear, distinct, and precise statement of it. We quote from the paragraph but one preceding the one from which the author takes his extract.

"Tres enim sunt in una divinitate personæ: Patris, qui à nullo genitus est; Filii, qui ante omnia sæcula à Patre genitus est; Spiritus sancti, qui itidem ab æterno ex Patre et Filio procedit. Atqui Pater est in una divinitatis substantia prima persona, qui cum unigenito Filio suo et Spiritu sancto unus est Deus, unus est Dominus, non in unius singularitate personæ, sed in unius Trinitate substantiæ. Jam verò hæ tres personæ, cùm in iis quidquid dissimile, aut dispar cogitare nefas sit, suis tantummodò proprietatibus distincte intelliguntur. Pater siquidem ingenus est; Filius à Patre genitus; Spiritus sanctus ab utroque procedit. Atque ita

trium personarum eandem essentiam, eandem substantiam confitemur; ut in confessione veræ sempiternæque Deitatis, et in personis proprietatem, et in essentia unitatem, et in Trinitate æqualitatem piè et sanctè colendam credamus." — Art. I. 12.

If this does not satisfy the worthy preacher, the fault must be in himself.

The second extract is not fairly made. The Catechism of the Council of Trent is designed mainly to guide, direct, and assist pastors in the instruction of their flocks. It not only lays down what is of faith, but suggests the explanations which theologians adopt to enable the mind to conceive them with less difficulty. This is the case in the paragraph from which Dr. Potts quotes a part of a sentence. We quote the whole paragraph.

"Ex omnibus autem, quæ ad indicandum modum rationemque æternæ generationis similitudines afferuntur, illa proprius ad rem videtur accedere, quæ ab animi nostri cogitatione sumitur, quamobrem Sanctus Joannes Filium ejus, (1 Joan. i. 1,) Verbum appellat. Ut enim mens nostra, se ipsam quodammodo intelligens, sui effingit imaginem quam Verbum Theologi dixerunt; ita Deus, quantum tamen divinis humana conferri possunt, seipsum intelligens, verbum æternum generat; *etsi præstat contemplari, quod fides proponit, et sincerâ mente Jesum Christum verum Deum et verum hominem credere et confiteri, genitum quidem, ut Deum, ante omnium sæculorum ætates, ex Patre; ut hominem verò natum in tempore ex matre Maria Virgine.*" \* — Art. II. 15.

There is here no occasion for comment. The idle objection of the preacher is not worth answering.

The third objection will vanish, the moment the preacher shall learn to distinguish between *conception* and *parturition*. The illustration is brought to enable us to conceive the possibility of the birth of our Lord without damage to the virginity of his mother, not to teach the silly heresy the sagacious Doc-

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\* "But of all those things which are made use of as similitudes to show the manner and way of his eternal generation, that seems to come nearest the matter which is taken from the thought of our mind; wherefore St. John calls the Son his Word. For, as our mind, in some manner understanding itself, forms an image of itself, which theologians call Word, so God (as far as human things may be compared with divine), understanding himself, generates his eternal Word; nevertheless it is better to contemplate what faith proposes, and with a sincere heart to believe and confess that Jesus Christ is true God and true man, begotten indeed, as God, of the Father, before all ages and generations, but, as man, born in time, of his mother the Virgin Mary."

tor deduces from it. The passage we have just quoted proves that the Church teaches the humanity no less than the divinity of our Saviour, as might well be inferred from the fact, that we call the blessed Virgin the mother of God, and as such delight to honor her.

If the Doctor has any doubts as to the soundness of our faith in the respects in which he seeks to impugn it, we refer him to the Athanasian creed, which he knows is authoritative for all Catholics, and which, with due deference to him, we must believe is express, not only against Arians, as he alleges, but against all who impugn the doctrine of the Trinity or that of the Incarnation. Did he ever read it? Has he ever found a Socinian, a Unitarian, or a Sabellian that could subscribe to it? Nay, what standard has he himself for the doctrine of the Trinity, but the Nicene and Athanasian creeds? And what evidence can he give that even he himself holds the true doctrine of the Trinity, but the fact, that he holds it as the Catholic Church has defined and still defines it?

The next objection the preacher makes to the Catholic Church is to her "rule of faith,"—that is, he objects that she does not adopt the Protestant rule of faith. The Protestant rule of faith is "the Bible alone." We deny it. The Bible alone is not and never can be the Protestant's rule of faith. The pretensions of Protestants in this respect are arrant nonsense or rank hypocrisy, with which they humbug themselves or seek to humbug others. Where in the Bible alone does this Presbyterian Doctor find his doctrine of infant baptism? his obligation or his right to keep the first day of the week, instead of the seventh, as the Sabbath day? nay, his doctrine of the Trinity itself? Separate the Bible from the commentary on it furnished by the belief and practice of the Church in all ages, leave merely the naked text, with grammar and lexicon, and there is not a man living who can maintain any consistent system of doctrines from it without doing violence to its letter and its spirit. It would be a book of riddles, and no one could make any thing out of it, except here and there a portion of it. If Protestants take the Bible alone, why do they differ so among themselves? why have they so many commentators? and why is it that those born and brought up Presbyterians, as a general rule, find the Bible teaching Presbyterianism, and those brought up Unitarians find it teaching Unitarianism? Every sect has its traditions, and by these it, consciously or unconsciously, interprets the Bible. It cannot avoid doing so, even if it would.



But what authority has the Protestant for asserting that the Bible alone is the rule of faith ? He must establish his rule, and from the Bible itself, or he has no right to assume it. This he has never yet done, and this he never can do ; for the Bible nowhere professes to be the rule of faith. It commands us to hear the Church, and assumes throughout that the Church is the ultimate authority in controversies concerning faith. Moreover, the Bible alone is not and cannot be the rule of faith. A rule of faith is that by which controversies concerning faith may be decided. But the Bible alone cannot decide controversies ; for it is, in itself considered, a dead letter, and cannot speak till made to speak by some living authority, and because nearly all the controversies which arise are controversies concerning what is the faith as contained in it.

Our Presbyterian friend is quite indignant that the Church receives as canonical certain books which he is pleased to term apocryphal. Will he tell us on what authority he denies the canonicity of these books ? Is not, even humanly speaking, the authority of the Council of Trent equal to any authority he can bring against it ? We do not recollect any Protestant synod that has ever assembled, more respectable for their numbers, their learning, their ability, or their piety, than were the fathers of the Council of Trent. These decided, as the Church had previously decided and held, that the books in question were canonical ; and the preacher must bring us an authority higher than theirs for saying they are not, before we shall be convinced they are not rightfully included in the sacred canon. He admits that the Presbyterian Church is fallible, and he can say no more of the Catholic Church. If his Church is fallible, it may err as to the canon as well as respecting other matters. Her authority, then, can never be a sufficient motive for setting aside the authority of the Catholic Church. How will he, then, prove to us, that in this very matter he himself is not the party in error ?

The Church, it seems, errs not only in her rule of faith, but in her faith itself, especially in her doctrine of justification. She teaches concerning justification a doctrine which is different from the Protestant doctrine. Admitted. What then ? Why, then, she is wrong. We beg your pardon. Before you can say we are wrong because we differ from you, you must prove that you are right ; for, till then, it may be that you are wrong because you differ from us. But “ the doctrine of justification by faith has ever been the peculiarly cherished doc-

trine of Protestants." — p. 10. Granted. But Protestants are fallible, and may have cherished with peculiar affection a falsehood. But "Luther pronounced it the doctrine by which the Church stands or falls." — *ib.* But Luther also said that all who entertain the views of the Eucharist taught by the Sacramentarians, which views the author of the sermon before us entertains, when they die, go straight to hell. Was Luther right in this? No? Then Luther was fallible. Then he may have erred in this doctrine of justification. Then how do you know he did not? By what criterion do you determine when Luther taught truth and when falsehood? From the Bible? But Luther had the Bible as well as you; and how know you that you understand the Bible better than he did? We also have the Bible, and we say the Bible is against you both; and how will you determine that your interpretations of Bible doctrine are better than ours? Do you say our Church is fallible? We deny it; but admit it, and even then it is as good as yours, for yours is not infallible.

But this is not all. Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone is rejected by many Protestants themselves. Swedenborg sends Luther to hell for teaching it; the Unitarians, Universalists, Quakers, some Anglicans, the Genevans, the majority of the French Protestants, and a great part of the German Protestants, virtually, if not avowedly, reject it. It is hardly true to say of any Protestant sect, at the present day, that it really holds it as it was taught by Luther and his brother innovators. Dr. Potts ought in justice to convert his Protestant brethren to this doctrine, before making it a ground of accusation against the Church that she does not teach it. If she were to accept it, she would gain nothing, for she would still be arraigned by Protestants, who, with Bible in hand, would undertake to convict her of accepting a false doctrine.

Moreover, the doctrine in question is a very bad doctrine. As originally set forth by the Reformers, it is, Believe firmly that God remits your sins for Christ's sake, and you are justified, without any respect to a moral change which may be effected in you. The justified man, morally considered, or considered in relation to his actual intrinsic character, is just as much of a sinner as he was before justification. The only difference between the justified and the unjustified is, that the sins of the former are not imputed, while the sins of the latter are. Thus you may sin as much as you please, but so long as you believe firmly that God remits your sins for

Christ's sake, not one of the sins you commit will be imputed to you, or reckoned as sin. This was Luther's doctrine, and hence, when a young man asks him his advice as to the best manner of resisting the temptations of the Devil, tells him to drink, get drunk, to sin lustily and spite the Devil. But to justify signifies to make just, and no man destitute of justice is justified. The error of the Protestants is in placing justification in the simple remission of sin. Sin may be remitted, and yet the man want justice. Consequently the remission is not alone justification. God is a God of truth, and can call no man just who is not just. But we will let another speak for us in this matter.

“ ‘Justification’ is that action or operation of Divine Grace on the soul by which a man passes from the state of sin ; from an enemy, becomes a friend of God, agreeable in the Divine sight, and an heir to eternal life. This act of transition from the one state to the other, with its operating causes, is called ‘justification.’ From the circumstance of its being a spiritual and interior operation, it is evident that it affords an opportunity for theological subtleties to those who would make use of it ; and, at the same time, renders it difficult to expose the error which those subtleties may be employed to foster. The Church, therefore, has always preserved her ancient and orthodox teaching under the form of sound words, which heresy has ever betrayed itself by refusing to adopt.

“ Thus, in both communions, justification is acknowledged to be, as to its efficient source, from, and through, and by Jesus Christ alone. But in the Catholic system, this justification, occurring in the modes of the Saviour's appointment, is not only the imputation, but also the interior application, of the justice of Christ, by which guilt is destroyed, pardon bestowed, and the soul replenished by the inherent grace and charity of the Holy Spirit.

“ According to the Protestant principle, justification is when a man believes with a firm and certain faith or conviction in his own mind that the justice of Christ is ‘imputed’ to him. This is that ‘faith alone’ by which they profess to be saved. The sacraments, for them, have no other end or efficacy, except as signs to awaken this individual and personal faith, so called, and as tokens of communion. Neither is it that any intrinsic or interior operation takes place in the soul by this, in which she is changed, by a transition from the state of sin, now remitted and destroyed, to a state of justice wrought for her and in her, by the application of the merits and infusion of the grace of Christ. No ; this is the Catholic doctrine. But, according to the Protestant principle, no such change takes place. According to that principle, the impious man is not made just, even by the adoption of God, or the merits

of Christ. But, leaving him in his injustice, it is conceived that his sins are no longer imputed to him, but that the justice of Christ is imputed to him. Thus, a criminal is under guilt and condemnation ; but, in consideration of a powerful and innocent intercessor, the chief magistrate pardons him. It is only by a certain fiction of thought and language that such a person can be considered innocent ; or that his intrinsic guilt can be conceived of as still existing, but as imputed to the one who interceded for him, and the justice of that intercessor imputed to him. Such is the exact likeness of justification, as taught in the theology of Protestantism. But it is to be observed that the sphere which is assigned as the seat of this species of fiction is the mind of God himself ! The sinner is not intrinsically or really justified in this system ; but we are told that God, on account of the merits of Christ, is pleased to regard and 'repute' him as such ; that is, God 'reputes' him to be what, in reality, he knows him not to be !

"St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, speaks of the faith of Abraham as having been reputed to him unto justice. And Luther, to meet the exigencies of his case, seized on the letter of this passage, and distorted its spirit and meaning. God had made rich promises to Abraham and his posterity. The hope of this promise was in his son Isaac. And God, to try the faith of his servant, directed Abraham to immolate this, his only son, as a sacrifice to his name.

"Such an order, under such circumstances, was calculated to throw deep and impenetrable mystery over the previous promises treasured up in the mind of the patriarch. Nevertheless, he falters not in his confidence, but obeys without a moment's hesitation. He sinks all the apprehensions arising from the suggestions of flesh and blood, and, in the simplicity of his confidence, prepares to execute what had been commanded. And it is only when his hand is uplifted to strike, that God manifests his acceptance of the will, which, however, embraced the work itself, that he is no longer permitted to execute.

"Such was the faith of Abraham. But it is evident that it embraced the works, and that, so far as obedience, will, intention, purpose, and even feelings, were concerned, Abraham had already completed the sacrifice. Thus, the same Apostle writes in the Epistle to the Hebrews, ii. 17, 'By faith Abraham, when he was tried, *offered Isaac* ; and he that had received the promises *offered up* his only begotten son.'

"As, however, the outward immolation was not actually or physically consummated, Luther was pleased to exclude it altogether from the faith of Abraham, contrary to the express words of St. Paul himself. The error of Luther has been incorporated, with but slight modifications, into the theology of all the other Protestant

denominations. Hence the doctrine of salvation by 'faith alone.' By faith, to use their own phraseology, the sinner 'seizes' on the merits of Christ, — by believing firmly that they are 'imputed' to him. It is not that by this he is made just or innocent, but God is pleased to *declare*, to *suppose*, to *repute*, — let us say it with reverence, — to *imagine* him as such. It is all God's work; he has not the smallest share in it; and thence the seductive boast of the system, that thus 'all the glory returns to God, and nothing to man.' Under the same plea, good works were decried as hindrances, rather than helps, in the matter of justification. It was supposed, indeed, that, by a necessary consequence, they would appear in the life of the believer, as the fruit and evidence of his faith. But even then they could be of no advantage to the soul. Neither could sin, except that of unbelief alone, defeat its salvation. To such a point of insanity did Luther carry his doctrine on this subject, that he declares, that, 'if adultery could be committed in faith, it would not be a sin.' 'Si in fide fieri posset adulterium, peccatum non esset.' — *Luth. Disput. t. 1. p. 523.* \*

This is sufficient, and far more to the purpose than any thing we could ourselves say, and shows conclusively that Catholics "depend for salvation on the merits of Christ alone." These merits obtain for us not only the grace of forgiveness, but also the grace of justification, whereby our works are rendered meritorious. They are the source and ground of our merit, and without them we could merit nothing. Thus, in our act of Hope, we say, "O my God! relying on thy goodness and promises, I hope to obtain forgiveness for my sins, and life everlasting, through the merits of Jesus Christ, my only Lord and Redeemer."

The author of the sermon makes further quotations from the Council of Trent, which, he says, teach that "all true righteousness is at first imparted, then increased, and afterwards restored if lost," by the holy Sacraments (p. 11). Well, what then?

"These quotations are sufficient to show the groundwork of the Papal plan of salvation; *the Sacraments by their own power confer grace; thus the believer is regenerated by baptism, united to Christ by the Eucharist, is then able to keep the whole law, and deserves heaven for his good works.* A plan that is the very opposite of Christ's, as revealed in the word of God. And if salvation is only

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\* Rt. Rev. John Hughes, D. D., Bishop of New York. From the Introduction to "An Inquiry into the Merits of the Reformed Doctrine of 'Imputation,' as contrasted with those of 'Catholic Imputation.'" By Vanbrugh Livingston." New York. 1843.



found by embracing Christ's plan, then the Papal system, so far from teaching the essential truths of salvation, teaches a system that will inevitably destroy the soul. If the question is asked, Are there not true Christians in that Church? My answer is, I think so; but they are the children of God, not *because* of the teachings of that Church, but *notwithstanding* those teachings. They are those, who, from the word of God, have gathered the system of Christ, and hold a plan of faith the opposite of that of Rome, whilst they still continue in her communion, instead of obeying God's command, 'Come out of her, my people.' — p. 12.

"The Sacraments confer grace by their own power"; but what is their own power? Simply the power of God, who instituted them. He is himself the *causa efficiens* operating in the Sacrament. Is it contrary to Christianity to look upon God as conferring grace? "The believer is regenerated by Baptism." Very well. Is it contrary to Christianity to assert that the individual is regenerated by the Holy Ghost in the Sacrament of Baptism? If we asserted that the water used in baptism, or the words pronounced by the administrator, regenerated, as efficient causes, the recipient, we should doubtless contradict the "plan of salvation." But we see no contradiction in saying that one is regenerated in baptism by the Holy Ghost operating in it. If any one should have called the burning bush that Moses saw God, he would have been wrong, and yet he might have said God was in the bush. The Sacraments are instrumental causes of grace, but God is himself the efficient cause. "We merit heaven by our good works." Granted, if be understood good works wrought in us by grace, or by us through grace; otherwise, we deny it. The merit comes through the grace, which itself comes through the merits of Christ, and therefore it is only through the merits of Christ that we do or can merit heaven. The merit itself is of grace, not of nature. Nothing we are naturally able to do does or can merit eternal life. Our Saviour says, "Without me ye can do nothing." We do not merit the grace; that is freely bestowed in reward of the merits of Jesus Christ, and it is only through that grace working effectually in and through us that we are enabled to merit everlasting life.

Our liberal Presbyterian minister, we are gratified to perceive, thinks there may, after all, be some Christians in the Catholic Church. We are much obliged to him, and shall be still more obliged to him when he proves that there can be good Christians out of the Catholic Church. He asks us to

come out of her. Well, where shall we go, if we leave her ? Into the Presbyterian communion, and offend by so doing the immense majority of the Protestant world ? When all Protestants will agree as to what is the true Church of Christ, the true Christian faith, and " Gospel ordinances," we will consider the question of leaving the Church, but till then we cannot entertain it. We have had disputation and vexation enough for our short life, and we cannot consent to come out of the Church, unless we know where and to what we are to come. As matters now stand, we should, if we joined the Presbyterians, be assured by five hundred other sects that we were wrong. And the Scriptures also say something about the dog returning to his vomit, and the sow to her wallowing in the mire. We have been a Presbyterian once.

The preacher (p. 13) speaks of the " idolatrous services " of the Catholic Church. We answered this charge of idolatry in our last Review, and have no occasion to say any thing in addition to what we then said. The charge is as silly as it is false. Yet one cannot but be grieved at the ignorance or the malice that makes it, and at the fatal effect it has in keeping the great mass of Protestants from the way of life.

After these charges, the preacher proceeds to sketch the history of the Jesuits, and to show what an intriguing and dangerous set of mortals they are. We have no room to follow him through this part of his discourse. He falls, of course, into almost as many errors as he makes assertions. But we must leave them for the present. In the mean time we cannot forbear expressing our full conviction that the Society of Jesus is under the special guidance of Almighty God, and that he will avenge himself on its persecutors. France warred against the Jesuits and expelled them ; she had her reward ; — Spain warred against the Jesuits and expelled them ; she is now reaping her reward. We want no better proof of the sanctity and utility of the Order than the fact, that Protestants, infidels, and tyrants are everywhere opposed to it. It is remarkable now what dread the word *Jesuit* inspires. Who are the Jesuits ? Simple priests vowed to poverty, devoted chiefly to educational and missionary labors, without power or influence, save what is in their faith, talents, learning, zeal, and sanctity. When such men inspire terror, the just may take courage, and thank God that we have them. The Order is unquestionably one of the most efficient instruments in the hands of God for recalling the erring, confirming the wavering, converting the

unbelieving, and of consolidating the empire of our Lord in the hearts and lives of men, and hence the hostility it everywhere has encountered and still encounters. Hence the nations rage and the people devise vain things against it ; hence the wicked foam at the mouth and gnash their teeth, and kings and princes conspire against it. In vain. "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me ? It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks." The Lord knoweth how to defend his own. This Order is dear to him, and for the sake of its saints and martyrs he will protect it and crown it with new honors.

To hear people talk, one would think half the world were Jesuits. They swarm everywhere. One cannot turn over a leaf, but a Jesuit will start up. They are omnipresent. They are omnipotent. They are at the bottom of all movements, — of every intrigue, every outbreak. Nobody is safe. Yet the Order counts in all less than five thousand members, dispersed on missions among infidels, or employed in the quiet and simple business of education. It is strange that such a small company of men should create so much terror and alarm. Alas, "conscience makes cowards of us all."

Dr. Potts tells us, "The children in the Ecclesiastical States are kept in ignorance." — p. 13. The population of the Ecclesiastical States is about two and a half millions. In these States there are seven universities ; and in the city of Rome, with a population of a hundred and fifty thousand, there are for the children of the poorer and middle classes at least three hundred and eighty schools, the greater part of them supported by private munificence. To assert that the Church holds that "ignorance is the mother of devotion" (*ib.*) betrays more ignorance than malice. If it were so, we should have fewer Protestants in the world. The Church undoubtedly holds that there may be false learning, false philosophy, deceitful, vain, that puffs up, makes its possessors wise in their own conceit, indocile, and unwilling to bow in meekness and humility to the word of God ; and such learning and philosophy she unquestionably does not encourage ; for she holds and teaches what her invisible Spouse has said, that "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." But real knowledge, but true learning, that knowledge and learning which make "wise unto salvation," she does her best to impart and diffuse. Would that we could say as much of her calumniators.

For ourselves, we do not suffer ourselves to be humbugged

by the cry about education. Give us the right sort of education, and the more of it the better ; give us the wrong sort, and the less of it the better. Our people are a reading people ; better that they could not read than that they should read the miserable trash the press is now sending forth. We have lived long enough to learn that not every "whitened heap yonder" is to be taken as so much flour. Immense danger may lurk under specious names. We are, as we have always been, the friends of education, but not of bad education, or of an education which educates for earth instead of heaven, for the devil instead of God.

The author of the sermon thinks the aim of the Jesuits in this country is, by the education of youth, to counterwork Protestantism (p. 17). What ! is the Doctor afraid of education ? Is Protestantism not proof against light ? We thought it was the boast of its friends that it was born of the advanced intelligence of the human race, and had the capacity to expand and adapt itself to every change of the human intellect. A moment ago, the Doctor upbraided us with our love of ignorance, accused us of not educating our children ; and now he is afraid, if we educate, it will be all up with Protestantism. Really, it is a hard thing to please a Presbyterian Doctor of Divinity.

"They [the Jesuits] will involve this land in troubles and conflicts." — *ib.* The truth never yet was preached, but it produced troubles and conflicts. Our blessed Lord himself said, "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth." No doubt, if the Gospel is preached here truly, faithfully, boldly, by its earnest and devoted missionaries, the wicked will be offended, and the devil will do his best to stir up troubles and conflicts. But we would rather have war than peace with error, with sin, with the world, with the flesh, with the devil. If Dr. Potts would not, then all we have to say is, that he does not appear to agree with our Lord and his Apostles.

But they will gain an influence which they will turn to the ruin of liberty (*ib.*). But we thought one of the principal charges against the Jesuits was, that they were the enemies of crowned heads, and king-killers. If so, they must be ultrarepublicans. In monarchical governments they are dreaded as enemies of the monarchy, in republics as the enemies of popular liberty ! This is singular. We have before us the *Remonstrance for the Divine Right of Kings*, written by the English Solomon, the learned King Jamie, in which he labors

to prove that the Catholic Church is at war with kingly government, and for that reason ought not to be tolerated. Our American Calvinists, men who began here by founding a theocracy, or rather a *minister-ocracy*, and made church-membership the condition of citizenship, are now terribly alarmed lest the Jesuits shall overthrow democracy and set up a king. When our Calvinistic brethren shall show that they have some regard for any other liberty than the liberty of governing, we will listen to their fears on this head. We are Americans as well as they, love our country as much, and have as much at stake as any one of them ; for, in becoming a Catholic, we did not cease to be a man, a citizen, or a patriot ; and we are as well convinced as we are that we are now writing, that the preservation and wholesome working of our democratic institutions depend on the general prevalence among our people of the Catholic religion. We say this not merely as the Catholic convert, but as the citizen who has not wholly neglected political and philosophical studies.

But it seems that "the character of the instruction imparted in our schools has nothing in it giving them a peculiar claim to popular favor, unless it be their prices."—p. 18. Perhaps the Doctor is not a competent judge. It is possible, also, that he is not acquainted with all the names the order has produced since its restoration, for we could mention some of the names which are at least "above mediocrity." As educators, the French University seems to stand in awe of them. The Doctor would do well to become acquainted with their schools, before undertaking to discuss their merits. Perhaps, were he to do so, he would not hazard the assertion, that "a graduate of one of these universities is not qualified to enter the junior class at Princeton, Yale, or any of the more respectable Protestant colleges of our land." The regular course of studies in our Jesuits' colleges is as thorough, as extensive, and of as high an order, as that of the best Protestant colleges, and those who take the regular and full course will have, on graduating, no occasion to regard themselves as inferior to the graduates of Protestant universities. University education in this country, whether by Catholics or Protestants, is, however, we are willing to admit, far from being what it should be. The characteristic of our people is to "go ahead." We are impatient, averse to long, slow, and toilsome labor. What we cannot do quickly we will not do at all. We will not spend the time necessary to become thorough scholars ; consequently



the whole scholarship of the country, with a few individual exceptions, is limited and superficial. The Jesuits cannot at once overcome this. Their education becomes necessarily in some degree *Americanized*, and is, no doubt, less thorough than it is generally abroad, or than it will be here when their colleges have had time to become more thoroughly established and are more liberally supported.

But be this as it may, the Jesuits' colleges are admirably adapted to the present wants of the Catholic population. They suit us very well, and whether they suit Protestants or not is a matter of small moment. We ourselves have four sons in the colleges of the Jesuits, and, in placing them there, we feel that we are discharging our duty as a father to them, and as a citizen to the country. We rest easy, for we feel they are where they will be trained up in the way they should go ; where their faith and morals will be cared for, which with us is the great thing. It is more especially for the moral and religious training which our children will receive from the good fathers that we esteem these colleges. Science, literature, the most varied and profound scholastic attainments, are worse than useless, where coupled with heresy, infidelity, or impiety.

As to the female schools under the charge of the Ursulines, the Sisters of Charity, of the Visitation, the Sacred Heart, &c., we want no better proof of their excellence than the simple fact, that Protestants, notwithstanding their prejudices against the religious orders, send, and are eager to send, their daughters to them, and feel that they are safe so long as under the more than maternal care of the good sisters. That it is not the price that induces Protestant parents to send their daughters to our schools is evident from the fact, that the project for a sort of female university, started by some good Protestant ladies, at Cincinnati, if we have not been misinformed, cannot be got under way for the want of scholars, notwithstanding the expense for the pupil is to be merely nominal. The institute has funds in abundance, ladies who are pledged to instruct gratuitously, and nothing is wanting but scholars. Unhappily, these cannot be got for either love or money.

The disparaging terms in which Dr. Potts speaks of the instruction imparted by the sisters are natural enough from a Presbyterian minister, but may be refuted at any time by a few minutes' conversation with a young lady educated in one of our female academies. There is something in the very atmosphere of the Catholic schools that gives an inexpressible charm

to the female character, which we have never found in a Protestant, not brought up in some degree under Catholic influence. There is a purity, a delicacy, a sweetness, a gentleness, a grace, a dignity, about a Catholic lady, that you shall look in vain for in a purely Protestant lady, however high-born or well-bred. It is only in the Catholic lady that woman appears in all her loveliness, worth, and glory. It is Catholicity that has wrought out woman's emancipation, elevated her from her former menial condition, rescued her from the harem of the voluptuary, and made her the companion, and not unfrequently more than the companion, of man. Every Catholic daughter has a model of excellence in the Blessed Virgin, and not in vain from earliest infancy is she taught to lisp *Ave Maria, gratia plena, Dominus tecum; benedicta tu in mulieribus*; for the Holy Mother rains grace and sweetness on all who devote themselves to her honor and implore her protection.

The association with those who honor the Blessed Virgin, see in her the model of every female grace and every female virtue, and whom she honors with her special protection, is not without its chastening and hallowing influence, and the loveliest and the noblest Protestant ladies we have ever known are those who have been educated in Catholic schools. The good sisters have nothing to fear from the aspersions of Dr. Potts. Their pupils will speak for them, and constitute their defence. Yet, if Protestants do not like our schools, all we have to say is, let them go and institute better ones, — if they can.

But enough. We have lingered too long upon this not very remarkable sermon; but as we have done little else than to make it the thread on which to string some observations, perhaps not wholly uncalled for nor inappropriate to the time and country, we hope we shall be forgiven. The Church may be assailed, will be assailed; but we know it is founded on a rock, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. It is now firmly established in this country, and persecution will but cause it to thrive. Our countrymen may be grieved that it is so; but it is useless for them to kick against the decrees of Almighty God. They have had an open field and fair play for Protestantism. Here Protestantism has had free scope, has reigned without a rival, and proved what she could do, and that her best is evil; for the very good she boasts is not hers. A new day is dawning on this chosen land; a new chapter is about to open in our history, — and the Church to assume her rightful position and influence. Ours shall yet be-

come consecrated ground, and here the kingdom of God's dear Son shall be established. Our hills and valleys shall yet echo to the convent-bell. The cross shall be planted throughout the length and breadth of our land, and our happy sons and daughters shall drive away fear, shall drive away evil from our borders, with the echoes of their matin and vesper hymns. No matter who writes, who declaims, who intrigues, who is alarmed, or what leagues are formed, this is to be a Catholic country ; and from Maine to Georgia, from the broad Atlantic to broader Pacific, the "clean Sacrifice" is to be offered daily for quick and dead.

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ART. IV. — *Methodist Quarterly Review for July, 1845.*

Art. VII. *Brownson's Quarterly Review, No. V. 1845.*

THE *Methodist Quarterly Review* for July, 1844, contained a paper on the literary policy of the Church of Rome ; the avowed purpose of which was "to exhibit the proofs that the Church of Rome has ever waged a deadly warfare upon the liberty of the press, and upon literature ; and that her expurgatory and prohibitory policy has been continued to the present hour ; not only against the truth of revelation, but equally against the truth in nature and in science, — both learning and religion having been the doomed victims of her perennial despotism." To this paper, so far as concerned hostility to the press, literature, and science, we replied in our *Review* for last January. To this reply of ours the article before us is a rejoinder, attempting to make good the original charges, notwithstanding what we alleged against them.

In our reply we retorted the charge of unfriendliness to literature upon the Methodists themselves, who, we said, had originally manifested a great contempt for human science and learning, and cannot, in this country at least, boast of having made a single permanent contribution either to literature or science. The *Review* thinks this charge is not true, for one Mr. Elliot has written "A Delineation of Roman Catholicism," which has even been republished in England. We confess, when we wrote, we had not heard of this work, and we have not yet seen it ; but we will engage beforehand that it is nothing

but a tissue of falsehood, misrepresentation, ignorance, impudence, sophistry, and malice; in the main, a mere repetition of what Protestants have been constantly repeating from the first, and which has been refuted time and again. We are always safe in saying this of any work written by a Protestant against Catholicity, and, *a fortiori*, of a work written by a Methodist. Yet if the author or Reviewer will send us a copy of the work, and we find on actual examination that we are mistaken as to its real character, we will make all necessary retractions.

We stated that "the Methodist press is, if we are rightly informed, under the strict surveillance of the bishops and elders." The Reviewer says we are wrongly informed, for the bishops and elders have no power over it whatever. Yet he tells us the editors and agents are appointed by the Conferences, and are aided by the advice of a council (p 458). The Conferences are composed of "bishops and elders." The bishops and elders, then, appoint the editors and agents, and we presume also the council of advice. We should think this were exercising *some* power over the press. Furthermore, in the intervals of the General Conference, these editors and agents are accountable, the Reviewer tells us, for their *official* conduct, "to the book committee, who have power, after due forms of trial and conviction, to *displace* them for malpractice." — p. 459. The book committee must be appointed by the particular Conferences, or by the General Conference, and in either case by the bishops and elders. The bishops and elders, then, through the book committee, exercise a strict surveillance over the Methodist press. The point on which we were intent was, that the Methodist press is not free, and we find, by the Reviewer's own admissions, it is less free than we had supposed. There is a power which appoints the editors and agents, furnishes them a council of advice, and then there is a tribunal to which they are accountable, before which they can be tried and convicted, and which has power to *displace* them for malpractice; that is, should they publish what their masters disapprove. Surely, this is subjecting the press to a very stringent control, and we must still retain our opinion that the charge against the Catholic Church of hostility to a free press comes with an ill grace from a Methodist.

We stated, also, that "the Methodist people generally have great scruples about purchasing books, even of their own de-

nomination, when not published by their own book society." The Reviewer says this is not true. We know from our own knowledge that it *was* true a few years since to some extent, and we know, and the Reviewer admits, that the Methodist elders do "urge their people to patronize their publishing establishments." — p. 459. It seems, however, we were wrong in speaking of their "book society," for they have no book society, but a "book concern." We acknowledge our mistake. The simple fact is, the Methodist denomination is itself, properly speaking, a huge society, and this society carries on a large book concern, and seeks as far as possible to monopolize the whole publishing business of its members.

We denied that the Catholic Church has ever been hostile to the liberty of the press, and asserted that the Reviewer had not adduced a single fact in proof of his charge. In the article before us, he appears to think we were wrong in this ; for he adduced some extracts from the encyclical letter of the Holy Father, bearing date August 16 (15), 1832, which goes far at least to prove it. We had, and now have, that letter before us, but it does not sustain the charge we denied. The Reviewer misquotes and perverts the sense of the passages he professes to give. The Holy Father does not declare, "Liberty of conscience is an absurd and erroneous opinion, or rather a mad conceit," as the Reviewer asserts ; but that the opinion, that liberty is to be asserted and maintained for the conscience of each one, is absurd and erroneous, or rather a madness. *Atque ex hoc putidissimo indifferentismi fonte absurda illa fluit ac erronea sententia, seu potius deliramentum, asserendam esse ac vindicandam cuilibet libertatem conscientia.* What is condemned is not liberty of conscience, rightly understood, but that false view of the liberty of conscience which releases conscience from all obligation to conform to the truth, and which makes the conscience of each the sovereign arbiter in all cases whatsoever. Conscience is free, has all its rights, when subjected only to the will of God ; but that its freedom demands that it must in no instance be restrained, — that the individual, under plea of conscience, must be free to conform or not conform to the law of God, — free to run into any and every excess of error and delusion, to subvert all religious, social, and domestic order, is indeed an absurd and erroneous opinion, a real delusion, which every right-minded man must condemn. That the Holy Catholic Church does not allow liberty of conscience in this sense, which is not liberty,



but license, we have never denied, and trust we never shall. The Church leaves the conscience all the liberty, that is, all the rights, it has by the law of God. If the Reviewer is not satisfied with this, he must bring his complaint against his Maker, not against the Church.

In fact, this notion of the unbounded license of conscience no man in his sober senses can undertake to defend. We remember to have read some years ago, in one of the Protestant missionary journals, of a pious Protestant convert among the heathen, who, on her dying bed, having but a poor appetite, thought she might, perhaps, eat the *little finger of a very young child, if nicely cooked!* This her conscience permitted. Was the liberty of her conscience to be respected? The conscience of the Anabaptists required them to run naked through the streets, and that of the early Quakers required them, especially the women, to go naked into the religious assemblies and prophesy. Was their conscience to be respected at the expense of public decency? There is, or at least was two or three years ago, a new religious sect in Western New York, who reject marriage, allow promiscuous sexual intercourse, and practise various obscene and filthy rites which we dare not name. Is the liberty of their conscience to be respected? There was, too, Matthias, the famous New York prophet, whose queer conscience commanded him to claim his neighbour's property and his neighbour's wife as his own. Was the liberty of his conscience to be allowed? We have a friend who is conscientiously opposed to paying taxes to the government. Shall the government respect his conscience, and exempt him from the payment of taxes? We have another friend who believes it decidedly wrong to use money. So, when he steps on board the steamboat at New York for Boston, he insists on having a free passage, because his conscience will not let him pay for it. Shall he go scot-free through the world? One man is conscientiously opposed to the observance of Sunday; do you respect the liberty of his conscience? Another is opposed to the employment of chaplains by legislative assemblies; do you respect his liberty of conscience? Not at all.

It is evident from what we have advanced, that some bounds are, and must be, set to the license of conscience, — that there must be somewhere a limit beyond which the plea of conscience is not to be entertained. But where is this limit? Where are these bounds? Who shall determine? The individual for himself? No; for that would be to leave con-

science without any restraint whatever ; because *conscience is each man's own judgment of what the law of God commands or permits*. If you leave the individual to determine for himself, you leave conscience without law. You must, too, respect the determination of one as much as that of another. Individuals as such are all equal, and you have no right to prefer the judgment of one to that of another. The judgment of the Libbeyite of Western New York, of Matthias, the prophet, of the anti-Sabbatarian, of the anti-chaplainite, must be held as respectable as your own. This, then, will not do. If any bounds are to be set to conscience, it must be by an authority above the individual, and which may command the individual, and enforce its commands on the individual.

What is this authority ? The civil government ? We deny it ; for the civil government, except as the executive of the commands of a more ultimate authority than its own, has no right to meddle with conscience. Shall it be the authority of some one of the sects ? Which one ? Why one rather than another ? Of all the sects combined ? That is impossible ; because one will insist that the law of God allows a latitude to conscience which another denies, and their agreement is out of the question. But waive this ; we still say no ; because the sects are all, taken singly or together, by their own confession, fallible, and may, therefore, misjudge, allow what the law of God prohibits, and forbid what the law of God permits. Moreover, conscience is accountable only to God, and to subject it to any fallible authority is intolerable tyranny. If, then, there be not on earth an authority through which Almighty God speaks, and interprets infallibly his own law, you have and can have no authority for restraining the licentiousness of conscience. But, if you have such authority, whatever restraints it imposes on conscience will be restraints imposed by the law of God, and therefore restraints perfectly compatible with the liberty of conscience. The authority of the Catholic Church is such authority, and therefore her control of conscience is not, and never can be, an attack on the liberty of conscience. It leaves it all the freedom Almighty God gives it, and that is all it has a right to demand.

The same or similar remarks may be made in reference to the freedom of opinion. The unrestricted freedom of opinion is no more permitted by the law of God than is the unrestricted freedom of conscience. The Holy Father condemns not the liberty of opinion, properly so called, but the *immoderata*

*libertas opinionum*, that is, the licentiousness of opinions. If there be any truth in Christianity, the mind is as accountable to God as the body, and licentiousness of mental action is as reprehensible as the licentiousness of bodily action. We are as accountable for our opinions as we are for our deeds. Else what means the confession we all make, that "we have sinned in *thought*, word, and deed"? If there is no law to which the mind is accountable, there can be no sin in thought, for sin is the transgression of the law; and where there is no law, there is, and can be, no transgression of the law. If there be a law to which the mind is accountable, then are we bound to conform to it, and are not free to do what it prohibits. Then the liberty of mind, of thought, of opinion, as well as the liberty of conscience, has its limits. And is it not so? Is there a Christian who dares assert that we are free to think and form opinions which are repugnant to the law of God? No; and we dare tell even this godless generation, let it declaim as grandiloquently as it pleases about the inalienable rights of the freeborn mind, that the mind has no rights but what Almighty God gives it, and we have no right to think what he forbids. We are bound to submit our very thoughts and imaginations to his divine law.

We say the same as to freedom of speech. We may sin in *word* as well as in *deed*. Speech, then, is subjected to the law of God; and the liberty of speech is only the liberty to say that which the law of God permits. We shall be called to account before God for our words, as well as for our thoughts and deeds. There is, then, a limit beyond which the liberty of speech does not and cannot extend. To prohibit beyond that limit is not to abridge the freedom of speech, nor to make war upon it; because, beyond that limit, Almighty God has given man no freedom of speech.

The principle here asserted is applicable to the press. The press is nothing but public speech, and its liberty must be subject to all the restrictions to which the law of God subjects thought and speech in general. The press has no liberty to publish what is contrary to the law of God, and when it is forbidden to publish what is contrary to the law of God, its license is indeed restrained, but its liberty is left untouched. We are not ignorant that this question of the press is a delicate question, and one on which it is impossible to speak as a Christian man should speak, without giving to the ill-natured and wicked an opportunity to pervert your meaning, and make the great

mass of the people believe you mean what you do not mean. But it is a question that presses home upon every parent, every citizen, not to say every Christian. The licentiousness of the press at home and abroad has become so great as to threaten all that is dear and sacred. Every thing venerable, every thing sacred in religion, in the state, in the family, is attacked with remorseless fury. Our youth grow pale over publications which pervert their understandings, extinguish every virtuous sentiment, and excite to terrible activity every evil propensity. Respectable booksellers keep, if not on their counters, at least on their back shelves, books which the Christian father or mother would be filled with horror to see in the hands of a son or a daughter. And those mischievous works are sent out at a price that places them within the reach of even the poorest. The infection becomes universal. No rank, no age, no sex, no condition, escapes it. Is this a time to talk of the blessings of a free press? Books are companions, and bad books are bad companions, the very worst species of companions. They are made by the base and remorseless the vehicles of corrupting the innocent and unsuspecting. The licentious and designing have only to send a selection from the cheap publications of the day before them, and the way is prepared for them to follow. They have, too, books of all kinds, adapted to all dispositions. Our homes are no longer sacred. Corruption steals in by our very firesides, and we close our eyes and ears, lest we discover it in those nearest and dearest to our hearts. Will you tell us this is the inevitable consequence of a free press, and that, if you touch the freedom of the press, you take away the palladium of our liberty? Liberty! What is liberty, where the moral health of the people is gone, where virtue ceases to exist, and your community is nothing but a mass of rottenness?

Some restraint on the licentiousness of the press is unquestionably necessary. This the Methodist Reviewer admits, p. 464, in admitting that Protestant sects make the reading of books "of an irreligious tendency" a matter of discipline. What restraint is necessary, or by whom it shall be imposed, is another question. Religion is the only basis of morals, and it is idle to expect good morals where there is no religion. Every book which attacks religion, which tends to undermine faith in divine revelation, or which gives a false view of the dogmas of faith, is a bad book, an irreligious book, and repugnant to good morals, — a book no man has the right to pro-

duce, no press to publish. No restraint on the licentiousness of the press will be effectual which does not extend to all books which tend to undermine or corrupt the faith of the people in the one only true religion. But who shall impose such a restraint? Evidently no authority is competent to impose such a restraint but an authority which is competent to say *infallibly* what is and what is not the true religion. This cannot, as we said in the case of freedom of thought, be the civil authority, for the civil authority is not infallible; and, moreover, has no jurisdiction in the case, since its jurisdiction does not extend to spiritual matters. It might misjudge and suppress good books, under pretence of suppressing bad books; and through its control of the press it would consolidate its tyranny and screen its oppressions from animadversion. Nor can it be the authority of any one of the sects, nor of all the sects combined; because the sects are all by their own confession fallible, and may err as to what is the proper degree of restraint, may permit books which ought not to be permitted, and suppress books which the well-being of individuals and of society requires to be published.

In this state of things, what is to be done? Do not answer us with Milton and Jefferson, that "error is harmless where reason is free to combat it." No such thing. "Error," says the Chinese proverb, "will travel over half the globe, while truth is pulling on her boots." The doctrine of the harmlessness of error assumes two things which are not true; first, that the mass of mankind are capable, *in all cases*, of distinguishing between truth and error; and, secondly, that they have no natural inclinations or prejudices which warp their judgments and lead them to prefer the error to the truth. If the first were true, we should not find men equally great, wise, and good, embracing opposite doctrines; the second is contradicted by all experience. No matter how free reason may be, no error ever yet was harmless, or ever can be harmless. Error puts on a thousand disguises, appears in a thousand specious shapes, corrupts the simple, the young, the unsuspecting, does the mischief before reason detects her and exposes her in her true character. What capacity to distinguish between truth and error have the mass of our youth of either sex, who in hotels, steamboats, and elsewhere, pore over the prurient pages of Byron, of Moore, of Eugene Sue, George Sand, and Paul de Kock? We repeat it, *some* restraint is necessary. That it is difficult to say, as matters are with us,



what restraint is practicable, or by whom the restraint should be imposed, is undoubtedly true. For ourselves, we see no way of disposing of the question, but to leave to the state the power to suppress such publications as are grossly and palpably immoral and blasphemous, and to each denomination such supervision over the reading of its members as it judges proper. This is as far as the Church goes or ever has gone. She never restrains the liberty of the press, but seeks to restrain its licentiousness, or to guard against its licentiousness by exercising a careful supervision over the reading of her children. This she does by examining from time to time the books which are published, and placing in the index such as are hurtful, dangerous, or unprofitable.

If the Reviewer attends to what we have here advanced, he will understand why we denied, in the most positive terms, that he had, notwithstanding his quotations from the encyclical letter of the Holy Father, adduced a single fact in proof of his assertion, that the Church of Rome is hostile to a free press. The "execrable liberty of booksellers" the Holy Father condemns is not the legitimate freedom of the press, but its license. We do not war against freedom when we war against license. Liberty is freedom to do whatever is permitted by the law of God, that is, whatever Almighty God gives us the right to do; license is freedom to do what the law of God does not permit, what Almighty God does not give us the right to do. Liberty is violated only when one's rights are denied or abridged. But in forbidding a man to do what the law of God gives him no right to do, we do not deny or abridge any one of his rights; therefore do not violate his liberty. The government does not violate the liberty of the subject when it commands him not to steal or to murder, or when it imprisons the thief or hangs the murderer; for no man has the right to steal or to murder.

But the Holy Father in his encyclical letter goes no farther in principle than our Protestant countrymen go. We read, but a short time since, in one of our city newspapers, that the grand jury of this county had made inquiries concerning the conduct of our booksellers, and threatened to present some of our *respectable* booksellers, in case they should not speedily clear their shops of certain infamous and immoral publications. Even while we are writing, the Rev. Mr. Kirk, the commander-in-chief of the *Christian Alliance*, and his friends, are denouncing in the city of New York the cheap publications of the

day, and declaring they must be suppressed. What is this but making war on the "liberty of booksellers"?

The main fact, however, on which the Reviewer relied for proofs of the hostility of the Church of Rome to the freedom of the press was "the expurgatory and prohibitory indexes." We have stated that these indexes are a mere matter of discipline. The Church examines the books published, and places in the index those she forbids or cannot recommend her children to read. She publishes the index for the guidance of all her children throughout the world. But in this she does no more than the Reviewer admits the Methodists themselves do. He admits the Methodists make the reading of books of "an irreligious tendency" a matter of discipline, and goes so far as to admit by implication, that the author who publishes a book "that would injure the morals of [the] community, and subvert the whole social compact," (p. 465,) may be visited with legal penalties. This is going full as far as the Church goes, even admitting that she goes as far as the Reviewer contends. The only thing, then, he can complain of is that she publishes beforehand what books she holds to be of an irreligious tendency, that the faithful may know the law before being summoned to answer for its breach.

But it appears that the Church puts in the index certain books which the Reviewer does not regard as of an irreligious tendency. If she prohibited only "such books as Paine's *Age of Reason*, Volney's *Ruins*, &c., no one would have cause to complain" (p. 463); but she goes farther, and claps in the index some of the admired *chefs-d'œuvre* of Protestantism. This is, no doubt, provoking to our Protestant friends. But we suppose the Methodists claim the right to determine the books the reading of which shall or shall not be made a matter of discipline in the case of a Methodist; will the Reviewer, then, tell us why the Church has less right to determine what is suitable reading for a Catholic? Will the Methodist ask the Church what a Methodist may read? Of course not. Why, then, shall the Church be required to ask the Methodists what a Catholic may or may not read? The judgment of the Church, on any hypothesis, is as respectable as the judgment of the Methodists, and we are not aware of her having ever condemned a book which, even in our private judgment, did not in some way or other tend to undermine faith or morals. Protestant books are rarely suitable reading for Christian men or women.

In our reply to the Reviewer, we said, “The Catholic regards no act of the Church, even of the highest dignitaries of the Church, as infallible, unless the act of the whole Church. There are only two ways in which the Church is assumed to act as the whole Church, — that is, in a universal council, or, what is the same thing, the unanimous or morally unanimous consent of all the bishops or pastors of the Church, or through the Pope, deciding *ex cathedra* as the representative of the Church; and a man may be a Catholic without believing the decision of the Pope, unless assented to by the body of bishops, is to be regarded as infallible. But we, for ourselves, hold the decisions of the Pope, when he represents or decides for the Church universal, are infallible.”

The Reviewer contends that in this we do not state the Catholic doctrine correctly. “Mr. B.,” he says, “is but a novice in Romanism. . . . We heard Bishop England preach upon the peculiar dogmas of Rome in the Cathedral in Baltimore, in 1840, and he asserted that infallibility was lodged in the Church collectively. He said a bishop might err, a council might err, and the Pope might err; but the whole Church could not err.” — p. 466.

Our own statement is substantially correct. It was written some months before we became a Catholic, and we should use somewhat different terms were we to write it now, yet we should not alter its sense. The only objection we make to it is, that we seem to resolve the assent of the bishops dispersed abroad and congregated in council into one and the same mode of expressing the assent of the Church. This is not correct. They are two different modes. We should therefore have said there are *three* ways, instead of only two, in which the Church is assumed to act as the whole Church. This, however, is a mere formal correction, and does not affect at all the substance of the statement.

We pay, as we are in duty bound, great respect to any assertion concerning the Catholic faith made by so eminent a prelate as the late Bishop of Charleston. But we may be permitted to doubt if he ever used the precise language ascribed to him. We had on a certain occasion, as the Reviewer will remember, full proof that our Methodist friend could not well trust his own eyes; and we have no assurance that his ears are better than his eyes. But if the Bishop actually used the language ascribed to him, he used it in a sense different from the one the Reviewer imagines. He may have said a single

bishōp can err, for that nobody denies ; but that all can, or any considerable number can, in what pertains to faith and morals, no Catholic can assert or admit. If he said a council might err, he meant a particular council, that is, a provincial or national council, not an œcumenical council ; for every Catholic holds as an article of faith the infallibility of œcumenical councils. He may have said the Pope can err in matters of administration, acting on misinformation or as a private doctor ; but, if he said he might err as visible head of the Church, when deciding for the whole Church, *ex cathedra*, a question of faith or morals, he uttered a private opinion, which few Catholics share with him. The difficulty the Reviewer has conjured up is one which has no real existence. The sense of the Church is easily ascertained on any point of faith or morals.

“ Upon Mr. B.’s theory,” says the Reviewer, “ all we would have to do would be to consult the ‘ Holy Father ’ at Rome, and implicitly submit to his decisions.” — p. 466. Not on *our* theory, but on the Catholic theory, for we have no theories of our own. Certainly, when the Pope decides, we submit, for we recognize his right to decide, and we believe his decisions are infallible. “ But,” continues the Reviewer, “ when the decisions of one Pope contradict those of another, and especially when the same Pope decides different ways at different times, it is a little difficult to determine which is right, or to see the signs of infallibility anywhere.” — *ib.* Unquestionably. But we deny the supposition. One Pope has never in his decisions contradicted those of another, and no Pope has ever decided different ways at different times. Protestants make the assertion, but why do they not adduce the instances, at least one instance, of such contradiction? Show us from ecclesiastical history one single well authenticated instance of such contradiction, and we are for ever silent. Bring forward, then, the instance, or never again make the assertion.

The Reviewer tries to be quite witty in relation to the degree of liberty which, according to the view we gave, Catholics must enjoy, which he defines to be the “ liberty to hold and teach what his Holiness the Pope says they may.” But wit is not our friend’s forte. Nevertheless, we have no objection to his definition. Liberty to hold and teach what the Sovereign Pontiff says we may is all the liberty we ask ; for it is liberty to hold and teach the word of God in its purity and integrity, — “ the faith once delivered to the saints,” —

which is all the liberty Almighty God allows to any man. The Reviewer, we presume, holds that he is amenable to law, and that he is at liberty to do only what the law permits. Why should not we ridicule him for this? Has he yet to learn that law is the basis of liberty, and that where there is no sovereign authority there is no law? Liberty is not in being free of all law, but in being held only to the law. We believe the Church, and the Pope as visible head of the Church, is the organ through which Almighty God promulgates the law. Consequently, in our own estimation at least, in submitting to the Pope, we find, instead of losing, our liberty. At any rate, we have all the liberty we want. We know from experience what Protestant liberty is. We know all that it has to attract, but we never conceived of true liberty till we became a Catholic. In the absolute surrender of ourselves to Jesus Christ, in becoming his *slaves*, we become true freemen. "If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed." It is idle, so far as we are concerned, to sneer at us for our submission to the Pope. Call us slaves, if you will, you will not move us. We know your slavery and our freedom. We ask no other freedom than that of absolute obedience to God in his Church; and you, if you knew any thing of the glorious Gospel of Him whose name you bear, "to take away your reproach," would also ask no other. Did not St. Paul glory in being the *slave* of Jesus Christ?

But it seems, after all, that we mistook in our reply the thesis of the Reviewer. He did not mean to say that Rome had produced no literary men, or that she had really warred upon literature as such, but only upon "every species of literature which could not be made tributary to her hierarchy."—p. 468. All we have to say in our defence is that we took the author's thesis according to his own formal and official statement of it. If he stated his design to be to prove one thing, but really attempted only to prove another thing, that was not our fault. If men will write without method, in a loose, declamatory style, paying no attention to the relation there may or may not be between their positions and their proofs, their premises and conclusions, they must be answerable for the consequences. The Reviewer stated positively that his design, among other things, was, "to exhibit the proofs that the Church of Rome had ever waged a deadly war upon literature." The proposition here set forth we denied, and we asserted that the Reviewer had not adduced a single fact in proof of it. In this we



were right. Whether he had or had not proved something else, and some things not at all to his own credit, we neither asserted nor denied.

But take his thesis as amended, we are ready to meet it. Fairly translated, it means that the Church of Rome has never encouraged, but has done her best to discourage, every species of literature not consistent or at war with the religion of Jesus Christ, as she had received the authority and the command to hold and teach it. So understood, we are far from controverting the thesis of the Reviewer. If the Church has so done, it is only another proof of her fidelity to her sacred trust. We hold religion before literature and science, and are barbarian enough to say that we have not the least conceivable respect for any literature or science not directly or indirectly enlisted in the service of religion, or, if you prefer, in the service of the Roman Catholic Church. Infidel literature, or science pressed into the service of infidelity, or even into the service of mammon, we grant, has no attractions for us, and, in our judgment, contributes nothing not really injurious to the best interests of mankind. If the Reviewer thinks differently, we thank God the Church does not think with him. What benefit to mankind does the reviewer think has accrued from the writings of Hobbes, Tindal, Collins, Morgan, Mandeville, Voltaire, Rousseau, Helvetius, D'Holbach, Dupuis, Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy, Goethe, Schiller, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Heine, Eichhorn, Gesenius, Paulus, Strauss, Feurbach, Godwin, Byron, Shelley, Bulwer, Victor Hugo, De Balzac, George Sand, Paul de Kock, Eugene Sue, and hundreds and hundreds of others we might mention had we room? Genius, talent, learning, are never respectable, unless enlisted in the cause of religion, unless they bow low at the foot of the cross, and lay their offerings on the altar of the crucified God. Is the Reviewer prepared to deny this? If not, let him say no more against the expurgatory and prohibitory indexes of the Church. The Church was not instituted to foster literature or science, but to train men up for God. Yet she has never ceased to honor men of science, to patronize men of literature, and of every species of literature, when they did not seek to abuse their gifts and prostitute their genius, ability, and acquirements to the injury of religion, to the corrupting of men's minds and hearts, to leading them into doubt and darkness to their everlasting ruin. This was all that she had a right to do, and all that could be asked of her. If the Church

in her relations with literary and scientific men has erred at all, it has been in the fostering care she has extended to them, and in the leniency with which she has viewed their aberrations. She has always proved herself a kind, affectionate, and forbearing mother to them.

The Reviewer abandons the case of Virgil, Bishop of Salzburg, which he had before adduced as proving the hostility of the Church to science, but holds on to the case of Galileo. He makes two points against us. 1. That Galileo's doctrine was actually condemned as a heresy; and 2. That the Inquisition, which condemned him, claims infallibility for its decrees. In proof of the first he cites at length what he asserts is the *sentence* of the Inquisition. But as he does not tell us whence he obtained this document or where it may be found, and as he cites it in English; not in the original Latin, it is not admissible testimony. That in the sentence of the Inquisition the doctrine of the earth's motion is declared to be a *heresy*, we have not denied, and do not now deny. But this is the language of the theological *qualifiers* who examined the case in 1616, and is merely recited in the sentence in 1633. In 1616, the case, at the request of Galileo and his friends, was sent to the Inquisition, and the theological qualifiers to whom it was committed qualified the doctrine as heresy; but, in consequence of Galileo's promise to refrain from teaching the doctrine, no final action was had on the subject, and the fact whether the doctrine was or was not a heresy was not decided, but remained as the report of the qualifiers. In 1633, when Galileo was finally condemned, the question did not turn on the point whether his doctrine was or was not heretical, but on the point whether he *had* actually taught the doctrine after he had been forbidden to teach it. The Inquisition merely cites the report of the *qualifiers*, without passing upon the question of the heretical character of the doctrine itself, and condemned Galileo not because his doctrine was a heresy, but because he had continued to teach it in contempt of authority. The fact, then, that the Inquisition employs the terms *heresy* and *heretical* does not prove that it adjudged the doctrine itself to be heretical. In order that it should prove this, the character of the doctrine should have been the precise question before the court. Any lawyer will inform the Reviewer that the court decides only the precise point or points before it. What else it may allege is an *obiter dictum*, or the mere private opinion of the judge, and without authority. The terms *heresy* and

*heretical* also prove nothing, because they are the mere *stylus curiæ*, and are frequently adopted by the Inquisition where it is manifest the offence is not, strictly speaking, heresy. That Galileo was condemned for teaching, or rather, for the manner in which he taught, the doctrine of the earth's motion, we did not deny ; but that the doctrine itself was condemned as heretical we did, and do still, deny. We quoted, in proof of our denial, the words of the Pontiff under whose reign he was condemned, and of Galileo himself. We also showed that the reigning Pontiff was himself favorable to the doctrine, and that at the very moment of the condemnation of Galileo it was publicly taught in Rome by the professor of astronomy in the Pope's own college. It is idle, then, to pretend that it was condemned as a heresy.

The doctrine of the motion of the earth as a scientific hypothesis had long been promulgated at Rome, and Galileo might have taught it undisturbed, if he had chosen to observe certain very proper restrictions. The difficulty was in the fact, not to be denied, that the doctrine of the earth's motion is repugnant, or apparently repugnant, to the literal sense of the Holy Scriptures. It was never held that the literal sense of Scripture might not be set aside on competent authority, and a less literal construction adopted. But this can never be done to make way for a conjecture or a hypothesis. Science and revelation can never be in contradiction ; but what you allege as science must be science, must be absolutely demonstrated, before it can be taken into the account in the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. Now, in the time of Galileo, the doctrine of the earth's motion was not demonstrated, was at best a mere hypothesis ; and therefore to have undertaken to explain the texts which seemed to contradict it, and which, as they had hitherto been understood, did contradict it, so as to make them conform to it, was, to say the least, rash, and implied a heretical disposition on the part of him who should so undertake. Here was the rock on which Galileo split. He undertook to explain the Scriptures in accordance with his theory, and treated the Scriptural objections with a degree of levity and contempt incompatible with a becoming respect for the language of the inspired writings. Had he followed the direction of Cardinal Bellarmine, who suggested that it would be time enough to take into consideration the interpretation of the texts which seemed to oppose the theory after the theory should be prov-

ed to be demonstrated, no one would ever have disturbed him.\*

As to the second point, we would remind the Reviewer, that, while we accept his authority on any question of the constitution of the Methodist society, we do not recognize it where he assumes to speak as a Catholic doctor. We told him, and we tell him again, that the Inquisition is not an institution of which Catholics predicate infallibility. It is no essential part of the Church, and its decrees have been and may be set aside by a higher authority. "It is sufficient for us to know," says the Reviewer, "that the decrees of that court claim to be infallible, and are enacted with that claim with the Pope's knowledge and approbation, and the condemnation of heretical books and persons by the holy officer are as much the act of the Church of Rome as any act of the supreme Pontiff."—p. 477. Here are many things jumbled together that should be kept distinct. We have no time or space to disentangle them. The Inquisition without the Pope is evidently not infallible, according to Catholic principles. Admit its decrees, when formally approved by the Pope, and thus made his, are to be held by Catholics as infallible, it still will not affect the case before us; for the approbation of the Pope was not thus given to the condemnation of the doctrine in 1616, and in 1633 it was not, as we have seen, in question. The act which received the Pope's approbation was the condemnation of Galileo in 1633, when the question turned not on the doctrine, but on Galileo's contempt of authority.

"And whatever Mr. B. may say, this has been the opinion of abler and better informed Roman Catholics than himself."—p. 477. If the Reviewer means that it is the opinion of abler and better informed Roman Catholics that the Inquisition is an institution of which Catholics predicate infallibility, we deny it, and challenge him to prove his assertion. If he means simply that some Catholics as well as Protestants have taken a different view of the condemnation of Galileo from the one we have given, we do not deny it, and have no wish to deny it, for Catholics are not infallible, and may err in their version of historical facts.

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\* For a full discussion of the subject, and references to the proper authorities, we refer our readers to the article on *Galileo and the Inquisition*, in the eighth number of the *Dublin Review*, from which we have drawn pretty much all the materials of our former and our present reply, and which is our authority for what we advanced then and have repeated now.

“ And in the preface of the Jesuits’ edition of Newton’s *Principia*, we have the clearest evidence that the editors supposed his system under ban of the Church. This is the language :— ‘ Newton in his third book supposes the motion of the earth. We could not explain the author’s propositions otherwise than by making the same supposition. We are therefore forced to sustain a character not our own ; but we profess to pay the obsequious reverence which is due to the decrees pronounced by the supreme pontiffs against the motion of the earth.’ ” — p. 477. This would seem to be conclusive ; but, unhappily for the Reviewer, this Jesuits’ edition of Newton’s *Principia* is a pure fiction. The Jesuits never published such an edition, and the language quoted never was written by a Jesuit. The language betrays at a single glance its origin. There are no decrees, and there never were any decrees, pronounced by the supreme Pontiffs against the motion of the earth. The Jesuits never published an edition of Newton’s *Principia*, except the edition by Father Boscovich, and that is not the edition referred to. The edition cited was got up by a couple of infidel editors, in France, we believe, and was palmed off as an edition of the Jesuits. The extract the Reviewer quotes from the preface bears the living impress of the French infidel of the last century. No Jesuit could ever have spoken thus ironically of what he held to be a decision of the sovereign Pontiff. It would be even more out of character than for the Reviewer to invoke the Blessed Virgin, or to officiate at High Mass.

We here take our leave of the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, by simply reminding the editor that he is not qualified to be our biographer. His assertion, that there “ are hundreds of living witnesses who heard our atheistical lectures in the city of Boston,” is absolutely and unqualifiedly false ; for we never gave an atheistical lecture in the city of Boston or elsewhere in our life. We never were, properly speaking, an atheist, a Transcendentalist, or a pantheist, the assertion of the Reviewer to the contrary notwithstanding. For a few months, some years ago, we had, it is true, some doubts as to the existence of God ; but, since the latter part of the year 1830, we are not conscious of having had, even for a moment, a single doubt cross our mind of the existence or the providence of God. It is true that we fell unconsciously into some speculations which had a Transcendental and pantheistic tendency ; but, the moment we discovered that they had that tendency, we renounced them, and for the very reason, that they had it.



We have been, ever since we resided in Boston, or for the last ten years, constantly writing and publishing against both Transcendentalism and pantheism. We have had errors enough, without having laid to our charge errors we have never entertained. There are few people living who can write our biography, and if journalists would confine themselves to the discussion of our writings, and let the personal life and history of the writer go, they would show their good sense and discretion. The *Methodist Quarterly* has always been unfortunate in its attempts to enlighten the public concerning us personally. Will it not learn wisdom from experience?

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ART. V. — *The Roman Church and Modern Society.*

Translated from the French of PROFESSOR E. QUINET, of the College of France. Edited by C. EDWARDS LESTER. New York : Gates and Stedman. 1845. pp. 198.

THIS work purports to be a publication of M. Quinet's course of lectures on the present state of the Catholic Church. Its design may be gathered from the following extract, taken from the preface, written we presume by its American editor.

"In France, where a strong religious feeling is springing up of late years, a feeling which the Jesuits have endeavoured to avail themselves of for their own purposes, this work has exerted a most salutary influence. By delineating the Roman Church as it actually is, by showing the spirit which actuates it and the hands that direct it, and by the contrast he draws between these and the true spirit of Christianity, the true Catholicism, M. Quinet has rendered a service to the cause of religion in France which cannot be estimated too highly.

"But it is not in France and Italy alone that this work is destined to have an influence. The depth and comprehensiveness of the author's views, the vast scope of his thought, the extent and minute accuracy of his historical researches, and the consummate skill with which he applies the whole of history to his subject, render it a work of universal interest and importance.

"We see here clearly pointed out the elements of the greatness of the Roman Catholic Church in former times, and the causes which have led to its present state of decadence,—the means it has

employed in all ages to accomplish its designs of universal dominion, and the reasons of their failure, — the agencies it is bringing to bear upon modern society, and the course it is necessary to pursue in order to baffle its designs.

“We see also in what respects it is the antagonist of LIBERTY, though scrupling not to make use of that sacred name, whenever it can subserve its purposes of despotic authority. We see how, instead of sympathizing in that spirit of progress which is the life of modern society, it is ever struggling to preserve that state of utter immobility, or rather to bring about that retrograde movement, which leads to spiritual death. Have not these things an importance and an interest for us on this side of the Atlantic, as well as for Europeans?”

“Moreover, this is not an affair of the Roman Catholic Church alone. Every church, every sect of Christendom, may here learn a lesson; a lesson of Christian toleration and brotherly kindness, — a lesson of moderation in the midst of zeal, — a lesson of perpetual progress.

“The effects of this discussion in Europe are already apparent. The Jesuits, that powerful association, whose malign influence rested like an incubus upon the clergy, and through them upon the people of France, have already been compelled to abandon her soil. The mode also of their departure is remarkable, as differing entirely from their usual manner of proceeding. They have not waited to be expelled by the government, but they have voluntarily retired. They have given up the contest in France. They have felt that public opinion was too strong for them.

“This result is in a great measure to be attributed to the labors of M. Quinet, and of his friend and colleague, M. Michelet. The work of which this is a translation, and the joint work of both these eminent men upon the Jesuits, have, by enlightening the public as to their real character, been mainly instrumental in relieving France from their presence.” — pp. v. – viii.

The first question which naturally arises, on reading this, is, What is “the true spirit of Christianity, the true Catholicism,” with which M. Quinet contrasts the Catholic Church? We cannot well determine the value or importance of an author’s judgments, till we know the point of view from which he writes, and the standard by which he judges. Happily, we have not to seek far in order to answer this question. M. Quinet published some time since a work entitled *Ahasuerus*, from which we translate a few pages, which we find quoted with approbation by M. Pierre Leroux, in the article *Bonheur* in his *Encyclopédie Nouvelle*. They are from the Third Day, entitled *Death*. The scene is laid in the Cathedral of Strasburg.

The dead are represented as coming out of their tombs, and bitterly complaining that our blessed Saviour has deceived them ; for they have not found that heaven he promised them, and in which they had placed all their hopes of happiness.

“ CHORUS OF DEAD KINGS.

“ O Christ ! O Christ ! why hast thou deceived us ? O Christ ! why hast thou lied to us ? For a thousand years we have rolled in our tombs, beneath our chiselled slabs, trying to find the gate of thy heaven ; — we find only the web which the spider spins above our heads. Where, then, are the sounds of the viols of thy angels ? We hear only the sharp saw of the worm that eats our tombs. Where is the bread with which thou wast to nourish us ? We have only our tears for our drink. Where is thy Father’s house ? where his starry canopy ? Is it the dry fountain we have hollowed out with our nails ? Is it this polished slab against which we strike our heads day and night ? Where is the flower of thy vine which was to heal the wound of our hearts ? We have found only the lizard that crawls over our marble slabs, and we have seen only the snakes which spit their venom on our lips. O Christ ! why hast thou deceived us ?

“ CHORUS OF WOMEN.

“ O Virgin Mary ! why have you deceived us ? On awaking, we have sought by our sides our children, our little ones, our darlings, who should smile upon us from their azure nests ; we have found only brambles, dead mallows, and nettles, sinking their roots over our heads.

“ CHORUS OF CHILDREN.

“ How dark it is in this stone cradle here ! How hard is my cradle ! Where is my mother, to take me up ? Where is my father, to rock me ? Where are the angels, to give me my robe, my beautiful robe of light ? Father, mother, where are you ? I am afraid, I’m afraid here in my stone cradle.

“ THE EMPEROR CHARLEMAGNE.

“ Christ ! Christ ! since you have deceived me, give me back my hundred monasteries concealed in the Ardennes ; give me back the golden bells baptized in my name, my shrines and *chappelles*, my banners spun on the wheel of Bertha, my ciboriums, and my people kneeling from Roncevaux to the Black Forest.

“ CHORUS OF WOMEN.

“ Give us back our sighs and tears.

“ CHORUS OF CHILDREN.

“ Give us back our crowns of flowers and baskets of roses

which we have strewed along the path of the priests on Corpus Christi.

“POPE GREGORY. /

“And what avail me now my double cross and triple crown? The dead gather around me, that I may give to each his portion of nothingness. Woe is me! Heaven, hell, purgatory, these were all in my own soul; the hilt and blade of the archangel’s sword flamed only in my own breast; the infinite heavens are naught but those my own genius rolled together or spread out as a tent to shelter itself in the desert. But may be the hour is about to strike when the gate of Christ will turn on its hinges. No, no, I have waited long enough. My feet are dried up, kicking against these marble slabs; my eyes have fallen from their sockets, in looking into the dust of my tomb; my tongue is worn out, in calling Christ, Christ; and my hands are empty, always empty. Look, look, my good lords, it is the truth. Let not the dead show me their sores, let the martyrs hide their wounds. *I can heal no one.* I give but the spider’s web in return to those who have given their crowns to Christ, and I bring in the hollow of my hand but a pinch of ashes for those who have looked for a kingdom of stars in the ocean of the firmament.”

This is tolerably explicit; but if any doubts remain in the minds of our readers, the following from the work before us will dispel them.

“I follow with my eyes, during forty years, the reign of a man who is the sole spiritual director, not of his country, but of his epoch. From the retirement of his chamber, he governs the kingdom of minds; intelligences regulate themselves every day by his; a word written by his hand in a moment overruns all Europe. Princes love, kings fear him; they do not feel sure of their kingdoms, if he is not with them. Peoples, on their part, adopt without discussion, and repeat with eagerness, every syllable that falls from his pen. Who exercises this incredible power, that had been nowhere witnessed since the Middle Ages? Is it another Gregory the Seventh? Is it a Pope? No, it is Voltaire.

“He shakes with a terrible laugh the gates of the Church, which, placed by St. Peter, were opened for the Borgias. It is the laugh of the universal spirit, which disdains all *particular forms* as so many deformities; it is the ideal which sports with the real. In the name of the mute generations whom the Church was bound to console, he arms himself with all the blood she has shed, all the stakes, all the scaffolds she has raised, and which must sooner or later be turned against her. This irony, mingled with wrath, belongs not merely to one individual or one question; then mingles

there the laugh of all the abused generations, of all the tortured dead, who, recollecting that they found on earth violence instead of gentleness, the wolf in place of the paschal lamb, stir themselves, and mock in their turn, even in the depths of the sepulchre.

"That which makes the *wrath* of Voltaire a great *act* of Providence is, that he strikes, ridicules, overwhelms the infidel Church with the arms of the Christian spirit. Humanity, charity, fraternity, — are not these the sentiments revealed in the Gospel? He turns them with irresistible force against the violences of the false teachers of the Gospel. The angel of wrath, in the Bible, pours out at once upon the condemned cities sulphur and bitumen, in the midst of the blowing of the winds; so the spirit of Voltaire walks over the face of the divine city; he strikes at once with the lightning, the glaive, the sarcasm. He pours out gall, irony, and ashes. When he is weary, a voice awakens him and cries, Continue! Then he begins again; he becomes furious; he strikes where he has already struck; he shakes what he has already shaken; he breaks what he has already broken. For a work so long, never interrupted, and always successful, is not merely the affair of an individual; it is the vengeance of a deceived God, who has taken the irony of man as an instrument of wrath.

"No, this man does not belong to himself; he is led by a superior power. At the same time that he overturns with one hand, he founds with the other; and there lies the marvel of his destiny. He employs all his faculties of raillery to overthrow the banners of particular churches, but there is another man in him; this man, full of fervor, establishes upon their ruins the orthodoxy of common sense.

"He feels in every fibre the false, the lie, the injustice, not only in a moment of time, but in each of the pulsations of the human race. Particular churches had founded the Christian law, but for themselves. Voltaire makes the Christian law the common law of humanity. Before his time, they called themselves universal; and this universality stopped at the threshold of a communion, of a particular church; whoever did not make a part of it was out of the evangelical law. Voltaire envelopes the whole earth in the law of the Gospel.

"What is this, I ask, if it is not the *Christian spirit itself*, the universal spirit of union, fraternity, vigilance, which lives, feels, suffers, and remains in intimate communion with all humanity, present and past? This is the reason why the earth proclaimed this man as the living speech of humanity in the eighteenth century. Men have not been deceived by appearances; he tears in pieces the letter; but he makes the universal spirit shine forth. For this reason we proclaim him still.



"In good faith, what have they opposed to him? What adversary has entered into the strife against him? In the camp of the past, where has there appeared the combatant who, to conquer Voltaire, would have need to show himself more vigilant than he, more fervent than he, more universal than he, in the cause of justice against force and violence?

"In the precipitate movement of our age, the dust has been raised to heaven over the steps of our generations; some persons have exclaimed with joy, — Voltaire has disappeared; he has perished in the gulf, with all his renown. But this was one of the artifices of true glory; the small men alone were the dupes of it. The dust falls again; the spirit of light, whom they thought extinct, reappears; he laughs at the false joy of the darkness. Like one resuscitated, he shines with a purer brilliancy; and the age, which had begun by rejecting him, ends by confirming in all his immortal part.

"The work of Voltaire is in necessary relation with Catholicism; even in attacking it, he strikes with its own weapon, history. It was necessary, in order that the tradition of the eighteenth century should be the source of the future world, that there should be found a man who, springing out of Protestantism, should represent in the new work the genius of the dissenting churches. This man is Rousseau.

"In him, the genius of the religious revolution of the sixteenth century mingles itself with the ferments of France. To take away from the movement of the eighteenth century every appearance of sectarianism, that it might not be a solely Catholic and Roman revolution, this stranger Rousseau must issue from the fold of Luther, and bring among us something of the spirit of the Doctor of Wittenberg. His arms are those of the Reformation, not history, but logic, reason, individual authority, and eloquence always. Through him, the soul of the revolution of the sixteenth century passes into the French Revolution; more even than Voltaire, he renders Rome irreconcilable with France.

"In the skepticism of the Savoyard vicar I discover no trace of grief. It is a skepticism of hope rather than of disappointment. He confesses himself very frankly, he explains, unveils himself. In this doubt I perceive a great commencement of faith; the Savoyard vicar trusts to the times to come to unveil what remains obscure to him. Properly speaking, he officiates at the altar of the *unknown God*! It is the first stone of a new society.

"*Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, triple crown of that new Papacy that France has shown to the earth.* From the height of the modern Vatican it speaks truly to the city and the world, *urbi et orbi*. It does not address itself merely to the Roman race, it

invites all the races of humanity ; and the schismatics whom the papacy had not been able to overcome, I mean the Germanic, Greek, Slavonic nations, as well as the Latins, the emperors and kings of peoples, as well as the kings of the intellect, the Guelphs, as well as the Ghibelines, if any remain, submit to this orthodoxy of the universal spirit. Those whom Gregory the Seventh had not been able to curb, the successors of the emperors, the Great Frederic, Catherine, Joseph the Second, bend the knee ! They have discovered a superior power, which gives or takes away their crowns ! Like those first kings who came out of barbarism, they have recognized the supreme seal of the spiritual power !” — pp. 142 – 149.

We think there can now be no mistake as to what, according to M. Quinet and his American editor, is “the true spirit of Christianity, true Catholicism.” It is, when divested of a few fine phrases, which mean nothing, simple old-fashioned infidelity, the bald deism of the English deists ; or, at most, English deism mixed with the pantheism of Spinoza, the atheism of D’Holbach, and the *Sans-culottism* of Marat and Robespierre. Voltaire, inspired by Luther, assisted by Montesquieu, and reinforced by Rousseau, is avowedly its purest and most faithful representative. The contrast, then, which the author draws is, in simple terms, a contrast between Catholicity and Voltairism. That this contrast is striking, we admit ; that Catholicity and Voltairism are natural enemies, and that there is and must be war between them till one or the other is exterminated, we are not disposed to question ; but is it certain that this is to the discredit of Catholicity ? Are our Protestant friends, in their hatred of the Church, prepared to join hands with the followers of Voltaire, and to republish, after the example of the late Abner Kneeland, the *Dictionnaire Philosophique* as the *Family Bible* ?

Nevertheless, the book before us is an instructive one to those who know how to read it. There can be no question that Voltaire is the legitimate successor of Luther, and that the English Deists and French Philosophers are simply the complement of the Reformers. This is admitted by the more advanced minds among the Protestants themselves, and a slight history of Protestantism abundantly proves it. The best commentary on principles is furnished in their historical developments. The Reformers in the sixteenth century began by making war on the authority of the Church. “They did not perceive,” to borrow the language of a French Catholic writer of the last century, “that they were

making a breach through which all sorts of errors would soon find an entrance, — that, in order to overturn successively the dogmas and even the foundations of the Christian faith, it would only be necessary to follow the path they were marking out. In point of fact, adopting their method, the Socinians very soon rejected all the doctrines which seemed to them to be incomprehensible, and summoned to the tribunal of reason the very oracles of the divine word. The deists, instructed by their example, refused to admit any revelation at all, and called in question many truths of natural religion. At length, armed with their arguments, materialism dared raise aloft its head, and deny the existence of God himself. Struck by the shock of these conflicting systems, the skeptics conclude that nothing is certain, that as regards religion and morals the philosopher must hold himself in a state of absolute doubt. Hence is born *indifference* to all opinions, disguised under the name of *Toleration*. The human mind in the excess of its folly and madness can go no further.

“ This progression is clearly marked by the epochs of the individuals who have been at the head of the different parties, and by the date of their respective works. Luther began to dogmatize in 1517 ; Calvin, in 1532 ; Lelie, Soelinus, and Gentilis, towards 1550 ; Viret, one of the Reformers, speaks of the first deists in his *Christian Instruction* in 1563 ; Vani-ni, a decided atheist, was executed in 1619 ; Spinoza appeared only forty years later ; La Motte le Veyer and Bayle, both skeptics, wrote at the close of the same century ; Montaigne had preceded them.

“ In England, the progress of incredulity has been the same. After various combats among the different Protestant and Socinian sects, deism has its proselytes. Lord Herbert of Cherbury, the first English author who reduced it to a system, published his book, *De Veritate*, in 1624 ; Hobbes, Toland, Blount, Shaftesbury, Tindal, Morgan, Chubb, Collins, Woolston, Bolingbroke, have followed in his train. This last, as Hobbes and Toland in theirs, has sowed in his works the principles of atheism ; and David Hume has subsequently avowed skepticism in his.

“ Our French infidels, who speak now so boldly, are only the echoes and copyists of the English. This is a fact easily verified. They have begun by teaching deism ; insensibly they have come to pure materialism ; to complete the degradation, absolute Pyrrhonism now shows itself openly in the greater part of their works. . . .

"This phenomenon constantly renewed cannot be the effect of chance. It had already been remarked, among the ancient philosophers, three hundred years before our era. The dogmas of natural religion and morality had been too feebly established by Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, who preceded that epoch, and who mingled many errors with their essential truths. The Epicureans and Cynics, who then appeared, attacked, some the existence of God, at least, his providence, and others the laws of morality. These aberrations were replaced by the hypotheses of Pyrrho and his descendants, who would admit no truth at all.

"It needs only right reason to be convinced not only of the necessity of a revelation, but also of a visible authority to guide us in matters of religion. One of these truths flows necessarily from the other. The author of the article *Unitaire* in the *Encyclopédie* shows very clearly what is the progression a reasoner must make, when once he has leaped the barrier of authority." \*

We are aware that the philosophy of the nineteenth century professes to be a revolt against that of the eighteenth. M. Cousin, and some of the Germans, as also the Transcendentalists in this country, profess to have arrived at results less repugnant to religious faith than those which M. Bergier shows to be the legitimate results of Protestantism. But this is not the fact. The new philosophy, as it is called, though differing in its method and its terminology from that of the eighteenth century, is yet substantially the same, as M. Quinet ably establishes. We quote a few paragraphs on this point.

"Thus ends, under the terror of the Church, the outbreak of philosophy in the sixteenth century. The spirit of Machiavel, on its knees, strikes its bosom, and whispers a prayer; this prayer lasts yet.

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\* *Traité Historique et Dogmatique de la Vraie Religion, avec la Réfutation des Erreurs qui lui ont été opposées dans différens Siècles.* Par M. l'Abbé Bergier. Introduction, §§ viii., ix. We regret that our limits do not permit us to extend this extract through the following three sections of the masterly Introduction to the *Treatise on True Religion*, by the Abbé Bergier, a writer who followed Voltaire and his associates step by step, and triumphantly refuted every one of their charges and arguments against the Catholic Church and religion. The particular treatise from which we quote, republished at Paris in 1827, in ten volumes, 16mo., is a work which we should be glad to see placed within the reach of our American public generally; for, as we have heretofore intimated or asserted, the great moral disease of our times is want of faith in the supernatural.

"If the French philosophy of the eighteenth century had again entered upon this ambiguous path, it would doubtless have experienced the same fate; the world would not have been moved by it; happily, it took quite the contrary course. How so? It showed the world an idea superior to that of the Church; and at the same moment, the Church felt itself struck by weapons it no longer possessed. It found itself face to face with a power which, while denying all forms, all sects, all particular churches, and, in some sort, visible Christianity, still retained what is most vital in Christianity, — its spirit.

"As long as there had been set up in opposition to the Roman Church another church, whether Protestant, Greek, or Jansenist, the former had been able to take hold of its adversary, and resist its blows; they were forces of the same nature; there was for that a tradition of controversies which might last indefinitely. If she was attacked, she had, on the other hand, a hold upon an enemy of the same family. It was a conflict between two churches; they disputed about their forms. But here was a totally different adversary, — the very fruit of Christianity, the spirit, the soul of it, which, developed, and divested of forms, turns against the very principle of forms; the body of Christianity is on one side, the spirit on the other. Jacob is assailed in the darkness by the invisible, invincible, impalpable wrestler. It is the combat between the Church and philosophy in the eighteenth century.

"But this era is the era of impiety, doubt, skepticism, genius of the void, of sensation, and what not! It is easy, from the height of a laborious orthodoxy, to hurl these anathemas against this epoch. It remains to be seen what foundation there is for this interdiction.

"The future is always skeptical in regard to the past, since it separates from it. Evidently the eighteenth century has ceased believing in many things; but it is equally certain that the foundation of this age is a universal faith in *what is most important in the heritage of Christianity*, — I mean, in the power of the invisible, *of the thought*. By this are united all the men of this time; the remembrance of one almost necessarily recalls another.

"They believe to such an extent in thought, that they are persuaded that all the rest is nothing, — that an idea is sufficient to renovate, to nourish the world, — *that humanity possesses energy enough in itself to throw off the whole burden of the times, and reconstruct, at a given moment, a new world upon a new ideal*. Are these materialists? Are these skeptics, who believe that *our soul* can create a new universe? And yet they would cut off from the living tradition of French philosophy



these men, who will always be the focus of it. Because they could not find in Jean Jacques Rousseau an array of school formulas, I have seen the time when they refused him the title of Philosopher; without reflecting that one may all his life handle and make a parade of formulas, without having the least particle of a philosophic spirit, which is truly the spirit of creation.

“Yes, let us return to the intelligence of this great age, and not allow ourselves to be amused by words. Whoever does not see a philosophy proclaim spiritualism accuses it of having only comprehended matter; let us enter more deeply into things.

“It is not enough for a philosophy to murmur externally a form of idealism, of heroism, in order to belong truly to the kingdom of the spirit. One may be very materialist, while all the time talking of the idea. And on the other hand, an age which makes no public pretension to idealism, but which puts it in practice, and makes it pass into the life, this is truly an idealist age,—it makes spiritualism a reality. By this test, show me an epoch in all the past which has had *more faith in the soul*, which has shown more of it, which, to obtain the victory, has had less need of the physical forces. It is the moment when speech, till then buried in mystery, becomes life, reality. In a political point of view, France is crushed by the enemy; to judge her only by the eyes of the body, you would think her powerless. It is, on the contrary, the moment when she reigns, with an uncontested power, over the universe; her arms are tied, but she commands the world. What is this, then, but the reign of the spirit? Because it has become visible, do you no longer see it?

“When it formerly dwelt in the Church, and was veiled, you supposed it present. It quits the Church, and passes into the age; because it comes nearer to you, do you not recognize it?

“Ah! we have sinned against this age; and in saying so, I accuse no one in particular; but I am in accordance with the highest philosophic authority of our times. While, in our own country, every man who pretends to philosophy thinks it proper and in good taste to begin by repudiating this eminently French age, is it not extraordinary that the great master of abstraction, *par excellence*, a foreigner, Hegel, salutes it, on the contrary, as the fundamental era of thought? \* The only enthusiastic page, perhaps, that this great mind has written, marks the spiritualist genius of our eighteenth century. After this, will any one have the courage to see in this heroic season of the human mind nothing but what the schools call the doctrine of sensation? †

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\* Das Geistreich selbst.

† In Italy, Romini continues this war of train-bands long after it is at an end.

“At the moment when it was in good taste in France to abjure Voltaire, it was with Goethe that he found a shelter. Goethe received this great exile; he learned from him the magic gift to communicate life, electricity, to multitudes. He translated Diderot. Lord Byron made himself the disciple of J. J. Rousseau; he attempted to unite together the soul of the author of the *Confessions* and that of the old man of Ferney. With the vast horizon that it opens, the Profession of Faith of the Savoyard vicar reappears in other terms in that philosophic theology which extends from Kant to Schleiermacher. The vast labors of the greatest critic of the present time, M. de Wette, do they not very often seem commentaries upon opinions hazarded by Voltaire?”

“Thus, after immense labors, men returned to the results perceived by the eighteenth century. Hegel proclaimed its metaphysical foundation, Goethe its literature, as the source of life; De Wette confirmed its criticism; so that one may say that the whole contemporary movement is a new development, a new power of the spirit of that same age. We were abjuring it among ourselves at the very moment when it remained victorious.”— pp. 132–142.

It being evident that Protestantism receives its complement in infidelity, or the rejection of all authority and with it all revealed religion, the Protestant world are compelled to take one of two alternatives, namely,—either to avow themselves infidels, or to assume that infidelity is really and truly Christianity. They can maintain their right to the Christian name and character only by maintaining that the true spirit of Christianity, Christianity freed from the false views of its advocates, the formulas of the schools which obscure and pervert it, is substantially what all the world has hitherto agreed to regard as infidelity. Infidelity, according to our author, is the spirit of Christianity warring against its body, or the dead forms in which its misguided and selfish friends have sought to imprison it. We beg our readers to bear this in mind. It is the key to much which they will find in what is sometimes called the “movement party,” the “party of progress,” the “party of liberty,” or the “party of the future.” The new school of the nineteenth century is professedly Christian; but M. Quinet is right in regarding it as identical in substance, in spirit, with the Voltairan school of the eighteenth century. The only difference is, that the one school calls that Christian which the other believed to be the rejection of Christianity. The new school is the old under a new name. It does not convert infidelity to Christianity, but Christianity to infidelity; and its

Christianity consists solely in denouncing whatever is anti-infidél as anti-Christian. Here is the key to the whole teachings of the Progressist, the St. Simonian, Fourierist or Societary, Rationalistic, and Mythic Schools of modern Europe and America. And here is the significance of those numerous younglings starting up in our day and seeking to obtain the direction of affairs, — such as “young Italy,” “young Switzerland,” “young Germany,” “young France,” “young Spain,” “young Ireland,” and “young America.” “Young England” forms, we believe, a partial exception, and, though characterized by many of the follies we expect in youngsters, has, upon the whole, it would seem, a tendency in an opposite direction. But, with the single exception of “young England,” all the *younglings* of the day are really infidél at heart and in doctrine. They all denounce whatever the Christian believes which is distinguishable from what is approved by the infidél.

The great mass of those who reject the authority of the Church will accept, substantially, the doctrine of M. Quinet, which, we have seen, is nothing but the old French infidelity under a new name and a new disguise. The more advanced portion of the Protestant world, those who have pushed the Protestant principle farthest, have no more affection for dogmatic Protestantism than they have for Catholicity. Old-fashioned Lutheranism or Calvinism is as hateful to them as is the Church; and not a few of them openly say, If we must have a church and a creed, let us by all means have the Catholic. This is not without significance, and is worthy of the serious consideration of all who are not prepared to sink to the lowest depths of incredulity and irreligion.

A close examination of the extracts we have made from the book before us will leave us in no doubt as to the doctrine of this new school. The author is defending the old French school against the charge of materialism. He wishes to prove that they were spiritualists, and even religious, in the higher and truer sense of the term. On what facts does he rely? They believed, forsooth, “in the power of the invisible, of thought,” “that humanity possesses energy enough in itself to throw off the whole burden of the times, and reconstruct, at a given moment, a new world upon a new ideal,” and “that our soul can create a new universe.” — p. 135. “Show me an epoch in all the past which has had more faith in the *SOUL*.” — p. 137. Human thought, humanity, the human soul, these are the highest

objects of which it is pretended they conceived. These, too, are evidently the highest forces, the highest authority, recognized by our author and the new school. The providence of which he speaks is nothing but the instincts or natural tendencies of humanity, or, more simply, human nature. The energy that is to reconstruct the world is simply the energy of human nature, and the greater good that is hoped for is to be created by the human soul. And men are to be accounted great, noble, *religious*, because they are able to confine their views to humanity, and look for nothing which surpasses the power of the soul! "The true spirit of Christianity, the true Catholicism," is to exclude God from our faith, and to place all our dependence on the innate energy or irrepressible instincts of man!

We see here in full bloom, or rather, come to full maturity, the seeds of error sown in the early age of the Church by the British heresiarch, Pelagius. Man is raised above God, and the Creator is lost in the effort to save the creature. "What do you preach?" said we some time since to one of the leaders of "the movement." "The religion of humanity." This it is. The religion of humanity takes the place of the religion of God; and instead of the oracles of God, we are to consult the instincts and tendencies of humanity! The revelation of God's will is assumed to be made to us in humanity. Humanity is God's word, the inspired volume from which we are to collect the true Catholic faith and worship. We speak literally. The doctrine, that humanity is inspired, and that God reveals himself from age to age in the tendencies of the masses, and that this is his highest revelation, is expressly taught by the chiefs of the school. This is the doctrine of the book before us. Would you know God's will, ascertain what in your age and country is the popular tendency. That to which at any given time or place the race seems tending is what God wills, is his law, — what you must not resist, but are bound to obey. These chiefs boldly tell us that we have the right, and are bound, to affirm of humanity all that the Evangelists affirm of Jesus Christ. This is the real significance of Christianity. The Gospel is a sublime myth. Jesus Christ symbolizes the divinity of human nature, and the humanity of the divine nature. God and man are one and the same nature, and the Incarnation is a myth intended to represent the belief of the early Christians in one nature in two persons, and not two natures in one person, as theologians have believed. Thus hu-

manity is God, or God is humanity, no matter which. For us there is no God beyond humanity. The dark background of being on which man is traced by an invisible pencil is to us as if it were not, for, as Hegel teaches, it arrives at self-consciousness only in man. These chiefs must assuredly be great men, or how else could they beget such huge absurdities or utter such big blasphemies? But all this shows that the age is humanitarian; that it takes literally the maxim, *Vox populi, vox Dei*; and erects its temples and its altars to human nature. Very religious!

Assuming that humanity is divine, inspired, God incarnate, and that her will is always supreme, M. Quinet arraigns the Church for not countenancing what he calls "the party of the Future." There is now, he contends, throughout all Christendom, an obvious tendency to what are called social ameliorations. This tendency is the new life, the spirit of the age. Everywhere we see a party opposed to the existing social order, warring against authority, zealous for liberty, and calling aloud for a redress of grievances. This party is assumed to represent humanity. Its voice is her voice; its authority is her authority; and through it she speaks out from her own mighty heart for REFORM, for PROGRESS, for LIBERTY, for the elevation of her oppressed and down-trodden children. Whoso does not rally under the banners of this party is wedded to the dead past, is a friend of abuses, a minion of despotism, an enemy to light, to science, to truth, to freedom, to the onward march of the masses to the fulfilment of the glorious destiny of humanity.

The party of the future, it is assumed, is the Christian party. Did not Jesus Christ come to be the father of a new age, to introduce a new order, which in its progress and development was to swallow up the old world, whether Jewish or Pagan? Did he not promise his followers a good they had not as yet attained to, and bid them aspire to a glory hereafter to be revealed? What, then, was he but a reformer, an innovator, one who sought to destroy the order he found existing, and, in spite of its opposition, to introduce a new and more advanced order? And what is it to be a Christian but to imitate Christ, to seek to do as he did, and like him to be reformers, innovators, revolutionists, choosing rather to die on the cross than to submit to the established order of things? In order to be his disciples, it is not incumbent on us to believe what he taught and to do what he commanded, as professed Christians



have generally held, but to do for our age what he did for his. The Christian party was the movement party, the progressive party, and he — we shudder to write it — was the leading infidel of his age and country. Now the Church can be true to him only on condition of making common cause with the movement party of our times, — the party that resists authority and clamors for change and innovation under the specious guise of social amelioration. But the Church does not make common cause with this party ; she even sides with its enemies, and exerts herself to sustain existing institutions, and to uphold legal authority. Then she is opposed to reform, to progress, to liberty ; at war with the sacred instincts of humanity, with the *Welt-Geist*, or spirit of the age, and *therefore* with Christ himself. Then the spirit of Christ commands us to resist the Church, to overturn its authority, and free ourselves from its thralldom.

We assure our Christian readers that we are not caricaturing the views of the movement party. All we say its chiefs have said in sober earnest, and the spirit which says it is common to all its members, whether calling themselves Protestants or Catholics ; for many who should be Catholics are of the party. Let the Church denounce Young Ireland, and Young Ireland — not old Ireland, thank God — is prepared to denounce the Church. One of our papers castigates, without mercy, the *Dublin Review* for its able exposition of the madness of Young Italy in attempting to revolutionize the Italian States, and thus, unintentionally, we presume, joins hands with the *Christian Alliance*. In France and Spain there is, as well as in Germany and America, the same spirit. The movement party is placed above religion, and made the criterion by which to determine the Christianity of the Church. The Church is allowed to be Christian only in proportion as she is believed to be on the side of those who are seeking to renew the horrors of the French Revolution, under pretence of social amelioration.

Yet this same party, with a consistency peculiarly its own, denounces the Church, whenever it attempts to emancipate itself from dependence on the civil powers. A great question arises in France ; the Church takes the side of liberty against the government, and M. Quinet and his whole pack are loose upon her. In this country, the standing objection to the Catholic Church is, in substance, that she holds herself independent of the civil authority ; just as if she could aid the cause of freedom, when subjected to the civil tyrant !

We cannot, in the brief space now at our command, undertake to clear up all the questions which are involved in these views. That the Church does not make common cause in all cases with the movement party we very cheerfully admit. She holds herself answerable to God for her conduct, not to the self-styled representatives of humanity. She has not received her commission from humanity, but from humanity's Maker and sovereign Lord. It is for humanity to obey her, not for her to obey humanity. Her teachings, not the instincts or tendencies of human nature, are the law, the measure of right and wrong, of good and evil. Your big words, your appeals to the mighty heart of humanity, to the new life, the spirit of the age, all your fine phrases about liberty, progress, social amelioration, and all that, are of no avail. Where the Church condemns you, you are wrong, not she.

Yet it is false to say that the Church ever opposes light, science, liberty, or social progress. Does she oppose liberty in Poland, where she is the unhappy Pole's only protector? Did she oppose it in Belgium? Does she oppose it in France, where she stands firm against the government for the liberty guarantied by the charter? Does she oppose it in Ireland, where her whole influence is on the side of social amelioration? She opposes not liberty, but license. She unquestionably does oppose the modern revolutionary spirit; but when she finds men, like O'Connell, who seek liberty and social amelioration only by peaceful and legal means, she does not oppose them, but blesses them, and makes their cause sacred. As for light, science, and all that, it does not become you to speak. She undoubtedly does not accept all your theories, all your mad speculations and airy dreams; but you have no light she rejects, — have made no discovery in science she does not accept. But you talk of your light, as if you were the lights of the age, — of science, as if you had amassed an amount too vast to be compressed within the narrow inclosure of the Church. Quite a mistake, Gentlemen. If you set aside your guesses, your dreams, your mere theories, your unsupported speculations, and reserve only what you have really established, what may be said to be demonstrated, you have nothing not known to the Church long ages before you were born. The Church accepts all your light, and can find room to stow away all your truth; but she has no fondness for your darkness, and no space for your error and falsehood. With your doctrines and speculations she is quite familiar, for

they are nothing but old errors and heresies, which she discarded and condemned many ages ago, and which the real movement party has long since outgrown. You are no creators, no inventors. With all your genius, you cannot even invent a new blasphemy. You remind us of the little girl who stood watching the western sky as the sun went down. The sun went down, the twilight came ; and, as the darkness deepened, the evening star became visible. " Father, father, see there, God has made a star ! " So when you see here and there a feeble star, which the darkness gathering over your mental heavens makes visible, you fancy, in an ecstasy of delight, that it is a new creation, or at least a new discovery. Him who is enamoured of his own intellectual progress we may always safely set down as one who has yet to learn that he is — a fool. The Church does not oppose progress, but she may, we own, oppose your *doctrine* of progress ; for she has never yet seen a man lift himself up by his own waistbands, or motion without something fixed and immovable to communicate it. Your doctrine of progress assumes that man without going out of himself can make himself more than he is, the imperfect is able to perfect itself, the possible to make itself real, nothing to make itself something, and that there can be motion without rest. Really, Gentlemen, you are profound philosophers. You can move the world, and without *the where* to stand deemed so indispensable by old Archimedes ! It is no wonder that you regard the Church as behind the age.

Progress there may be, but not without a power foreign to the subject of progress. The error of the movement party is not in demanding progress, but in demanding it of man alone, and where it is suicidal to demand it. The condition of progress is fixed, permanent, and immovable religious and political institutions. The movement party overlook this fact, and demand progress in institutions themselves. They seek to set the institutions themselves afloat, and thus loosen every thing ; which superinduces a state in which all progress is impossible. The grand error is here. The party kills, as in the fable, the goose that lays the golden egg, in the hope of getting more than one egg a day, and thus cuts off the source of golden eggs altogether. It is only this madness which wars upon the established order, and seeks to destroy, for the sake of progress, the condition of all progress, that the Church opposes.

But it may be asked, if institutions are not or may not be progressive. In themselves considered, no. Religious insti-

tutions may be improved or perfected miraculously by the supernatural providence of God, or without a miracle, by transplanting the institutions of one country to those of another, by missions, colonization, or conquest ; and civil institutions also by colonization, conquest, or the aid of religious institutions already established and in their vigor ; but not otherwise. This is philosophically demonstrable, and historically verifiable. There is no such thing as self-perfecting institutions. Without one, or another, or all of the efficient causes we have mentioned, improvement in religious or civil institutions is absolutely impossible ; for the simple reason, that the imperfect can never without the aid of a foreign power become perfect, nothing can make itself more than it is ; or, as we say, there is no motion without rest, — no man can lift himself up by his own waistbands.

If we turn to history, we shall find that institutions, though they may decline, are never progressive. There is no instance on record of a spontaneous civilization, — no instance of a savage people emerging of itself from the savage state. The earliest period of all civil and political institutions is their purest and best period. The history of all states is a history of decline, corruption, deterioration of their institutions. The struggle of nations is always for lost rights, lost privileges. Magna Charta is but an attempt to stay the progress of corruption, and to preserve a portion of what had been enjoyed from time immemorial. The earliest of the pyramids is the most perfect as a work of art. The *Cloaca Maxima* of Rome was built before the epoch of authentic history. The traditions of every people point to a state of society in the past superior to that which is at present enjoyed. The wisest and most salutary laws of all modern nations, save such as are derived from Christianity, have their origin in the night of ages, — have existed and been in force from time immemorial, for a time so long that “the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.” Never expect from institutions a worth or adaptedness they do not possess in their origin.

The historian of modern society can trace a progress of civilization effected by Christianity, but no progress in institutions, properly so called. Improvements in administration may have been introduced, though even this, if taken absolutely, may be questioned ; but in all cases where change, innovation, has struck at fundamental institutions, it has been a corruption, the sign of decay, and the precursor, if not the cause, of evil.

England has suffered from every change in her old constitution. France by her changes was brought to the very brink of ruin ; she owes the preservation of her nationality to the mercy or the policy of her conquerors, and it has only been in proportion as she has restored the old order that she has begun to resume her rank among the nations. Spain lies bleeding at every pore ; her whole energy is relaxed ; and she seems almost on the verge of dissolution. What has brought her to her present deplorable condition ? *The party of progress, the innovators, the lovers of change, the madmen who would improve her institutions.* There is of old a curse pronounced against all who remove “the ancient landmarks” ; and Sallust, when he would brand a man with infamy, designates him as one who is *rerum novarum cupidus*.

We admit the Church does not take sides with the mad dreamers, and we assure the revolutionists that she will never be their accomplice. They may rail as they will, they may appeal to the “irrepressible instincts of humanity,” talk largely of liberty (meaning thereby license), of progress, of science, of light, and in the excess of their philanthropic zeal convulse the nations, and turn the ruthless hordes of their myrmidons against her, sack her temples, desecrate her altars, violate her virgins, massacre her priests, imprison her sovereign Pontiff, as they did in the memorable French Revolution ; but they will never seduce or drive her from her fidelity to her heavenly Spouse. She will remain immovable while all around her is in commotion, and her calm, unalterable voice will make itself heard above the confused roar of maddened millions, command the strife to cease, and *be obeyed*. That she does not do what she is asked to do by these men greedy of new things is among the proofs that she is from God, and that he continues to fulfil his promise to be always with her unto the consummation of the world. If these men want progress, let them learn submission, let them obey the Church and be counselled by her, and not undertake to counsel her. She has received the authority to teach ; they have received only the command TO OBEY. The progress they should seek is progress in obedience, in meekness, in humility, in patience, resignation ; for with their present tempers there is, and can be, no good for them.

Our space will not permit us to discuss now the question M. Quinet raises in its bearing on nationalities. He praises Voltaire for his universality, and condemns the Church because



she is not, in his view, as broad as humanity. Yet he wishes her to league with nationalities, be Gallican in France, Spanish in Spain, German in Germany, English in England, Italian in Italy, American in America. A singularly consistent view of Catholicity this. The Church knows no distinction of races or of nations. She deals with all as simple human beings, and seeks to bring all into the unity of one fold, to make all hearts one, in the unity of the same faith, the same hope, and the same charity. To her the soul of the Flathead Indian is as precious as the soul of a professor in the College of France. If civil governments receive her law, and serve her, it is well and good ; she accepts their service, and they do their duty ; if they refuse to do so, she leaves them to take their own course, and proceeds on without them in her work of love and mercy. She holds her authority not from them ; and she will continue to maintain and teach that the law of God is paramount to theirs. They may rebel, they may conspire against her, and seek her destruction ; but He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at their folly, in his hot displeasure shall chastise them with his rod of iron, and break them in pieces as a potter's vessel. It is for them to fear, not for her. It is idle to summon up national prejudices against her. She disdains them. Before her, as the Irish proverb says, " Man is man the world over, — nothing less, nothing more."

The danger of Catholicity to liberty is an idle dream. You can have no true liberty without her, and the only liberty that is endangered by her is the liberty of those who desire no law but their own will, no restraint but their own caprice. If this is against her, so be it. Be willing to love God and do your duty, and you will have nothing to fear from the Church.

#### ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *La Reforme contre la Reforme ; ou Retour à l'Unité Catholique, par la Voie du Protestantisme.* Traduit de l'Allemand de HOENINGHAUS. Par MM. W. et S., précédé d'une Introduction par M. AUDIN. 2 vol. 8vo.

THE German title of this work is, "Das Resultat meiner Wanderungen durch das Gebiet der Protestantischen Literatur : oder, die Nothwen-

digkeit der Rückkehr zur Katolischen Kirche, ausschliesslich durch die einigen Eingeständnisse Protestantischer Theologen und Philosophen, dargethan; von Dr. Julius v. Höninghaus. Aschaffenburg. 1837." We have not ourselves as yet read this work, but we have seen a very able and interesting review of it in the *Dublin Review*, which Messrs. Casserly and Sons have done well to republish in their valuable little volume, entitled *The Bible Question fairly Tested*; New York, 1844. The author was, we believe, a distinguished Protestant minister of Berlin, but is now a member of the Catholic Church. This work was the result of his inquiries as a Protestant, and, though an able defence of Catholicity, is taken, with the exception of the brief analysis which the author places at the head of each chapter, entirely from Protestant writers. We translate the following brief but interesting notice of the work from the *Ami de la Religion*, Sept. 2, 1845.

Catholics eminent for their knowledge and penetration comprehended and announced, from the very origin of the Reformation, that the principle of free inquiry, which serves as the foundation of the Protestant edifice, would in its inevitable consequences end in the total denial and ruin of all revealed religion. This truth, which was perceived in the beginning only by the more advanced minds, has at length become manifest to all, and at this moment is a fact evident in the highest degree to minds of the least penetration. To become so, it only needed to leave it to time to bring about the development of the erroneous principle which the schism of the sixteenth century assumed as its point of departure. Often already had Catholic writers, following the footsteps of the immortal author of the *Variations*, pointed out in the writings or in the situation of the dissident churches a tendency, more or less striking, to an early dissolution; but we own we were scarcely prepared to find a Protestant writer, grave and earnest, weeping in the sorrow of his heart over the anarchy which everywhere afflicts the dispersed and isolated Protestant churches, coming forward to unveil before the Christian world the scandal of these intestine dissensions, and to expose the death with which for the most part they are already struck. Never before has the Reformation been so vigorously attacked as in this work of Höninghaus. He has laid under contribution the most distinguished and best known among Protestant writers. It is their confessions, their declarations, which he extracts and combines in a speaking picture, as it were, that accuse the schism of Luther of the evil it has done to Christian unity, and the deplorable ravages it has made since that fatal epoch. It is deeply interesting to see a partisan of the Reformation, an adept, establishing, clearly demonstrating, from the writings of Protestants themselves, that Protestantism never had the capacity to found a veritable church; that the evil it has done it is impotent to repair; that it ought never to have abandoned tradition; that the faith taught by the Catholic Church reaches back to apostolic times; that there is no possible salvation but in returning to the Catholic Church, &c.

M. Audin, so honorably known in the religious world by his learned and conscientious researches on Luther and Calvin, crowned with a well-merited success, and who seems to have received from heaven the mission and the gift to denude the wounds of Protestantism, and at the same time to apply the remedy, has not contented himself with simply making known to us the remarkable work of Höninghaus by a French edition and translation, but has in some sort identified himself with the author, and so appropriated to himself the subject treated by the German as

to give us a clear and detailed analysis of it. This analysis forms the introduction to the book ; it is a complete summary of its contents, and its perusal will fully initiate the reader into the plan and labors of the author.

The work is comprised in eleven chapters. The author begins by depicting the actual state of Protestantism in the different countries which have embraced the Reformation ; and from this he arrives easily and naturally to the conclusion, that Protestantism does not form a veritable church ; that it nowhere offers unity of doctrine ; that it resembles a worm cut up into pieces, each of which moves and writhes so long as there remains something of the original vital impulse, but which gradually loses even that remnant of mutilated life. It is only an aggregation of a multitude of churches of different opinions, with nothing external or internal to unite them in one communion. And, in fact, there can be no union among them, for they everywhere hold different dogmas and principles.

Having enumerated the divers sects scattered over Europe, the author continues : —

“ The population of America is broken up into innumerable religious fractions. Besides the Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Calvinists, Baptists, Quakers, Swedenborgians, Universalists, Unitarians, Tunkers, &c., there is a multitude of minor sects flowing from these as from their source, and of which each has its own distinct hierarchy. The Catholics alone have been able to avoid these internal divisions. . . . Protestant missionaries sent among idolatrous nations help effectually to spread disunion. One instructs them in the spirit of the Baptists ; another teaches them Methodism ; a third makes of them *Hernhutters* ; a fourth, Quakers ; a fifth, Calvinists ; a sixth, rigid Lutherans ; a seventh makes the souls confided to his care learn by rote the Thirty-nine Articles of Anglicanism, — each acting always in the spirit of his sect.”

The doctors of the Protestant churches contradict each other on the most important points of religion (they are Protestant authors only who speak in Höninghaus). Thus, one will declare that original sin is a fundamental article of faith, inseparably connected with doctrines absolutely essential to the very preservation of faith, such as the doctrine of grace, the doctrine of the necessity of works, of revelation, and of redemption ; another will teach that in the progressive spirit of the Evangelical Church the dogma of original sin is left behind, as unsupported by Scripture, and as repugnant to the development of the Christian spirit. The most essential Christian dogmas, such as the Holy Trinity, the Resurrection of the Body, the Last Judgment, the Eternal Pains of Hell, — are admitted by some, rejected by others.

In the fourth chapter the author proves that the only remedy for the evils to which Protestantism is the prey would be to return to the Catholic system of the infallibility of authority. And, in fact, revelation once admitted, the Bible once received, if in religion you start from a supernatural principle, you must necessarily acknowledge that the Divinity who has deigned to grant us a revelation must take care that its sense be not abandoned to the arbitrary judgment of men. The very enunciation of doctrines which are to remain above the province of reason suffices to preclude the possibility of their being left to the arbitrary interpretation of the human mind. For, if God has really revealed those doctrines as truths indispensable to salvation, their interpretation can belong

only to a body of teachers always guided by the assistance of the Holy Ghost. Scripture alone, without an authority which determines their true sense, cannot be a sure and infallible guide, because it is susceptible of as many different interpretations as there are interpreters. In support of this, Höninghaus cites several passages from Protestant authors as positive as any thing which could be said by Catholic theologians themselves. One of them says, — "The Protestant Church is only a stump, and will ever remain a stump." "We are," says another, "only a broken link of the Catholic Church." And again: — "Nothing in the world is more respectable than the decision of a truly œcumenical council. . . . If Christ is during every age with his Church, he cannot permit a decision contrary to faith ever to be made in such assemblies. THE WORK OF THE VENERABLE FATHERS ASSEMBLED AT TRENT IS THE CONSECRATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH DRAWN FROM THE HOLY SCRIPTURES AND APOSTOLIC TRADITION."

One of the most interesting chapters is the seventh, in which the author gives the history of the Reformation. The curious revelations to which these not suspicious testimonies give a degree of credit wholly irrecusable the better enable us to comprehend the rapidity of the astonishing success which followed the first efforts of the Reformation, — to see how the passions of princes and of the people found in it free and full scope for their satisfaction, without experiencing any obstacle. M. Audin willingly enlarges, in his Introduction, on this part of the work. He doubtless felt that these details deal a mortal blow at Protestantism. We cite a few paragraphs, which will enable our readers to judge of the interest which Höninghaus throws over his subject.

"The historians whom the author analyzes," says M. Audin, "seem, in reciting the triumphs of the Reformation in Germany, to have had always before their eyes this saying of Luther, — 'THE GOLDEN RAYS OF OUR MONSTRANCES MAKE MORE CONVERTS THAN OUR SERMONS.' The goods of the clergy offered to the Electors a rich prey. The secularization of a convent brought them lands, pastures, vineyards, forests, abbatial menses, libraries, tombs, often garnished with precious stones. If you travel over Germany, you are astonished to find in the museums of certain Evangelical princes chasubles intertissued with silk, precious chalices, and golden ciboriums. To become possessors of these treasures, it was necessary only to pronounce these four words, — I believe in Luther. The *credo* of St. Athanasius gave heaven to the Christians of the time of Arius; the Wittenbergian *credo* in the time of Luther gave abbeys to the Saxon Electors. . . .

"In England the Reformation warred first against the dead. England was the land of tombs, and of tombs covered with precious stones; and the minions of Henry the Eighth, says the historian, would have plundered the tomb of the Redeemer, if they had been sure of finding in it a few grains of gilded dust. They began at Canterbury, where two splendid tombs, those of Austin and Thomas à Becket, attracted these birds of prey. Austin had established Christianity in England; Thomas à Becket had dared, under the reign of Henry the Second, to resist the king who strove to oppress the Church. The tombs were plundered. It required eight men to roll to the gates of the temple the two boxes filled with gold and silver taken from the sepulchre of Becket. Austin was suffered to keep his heavenly crown as confessor of Christ, but Thomas à Becket, by the royal order, lost his, and could no longer be invoked as a saint. His name was erased from the calendar. The same royal hand, which was shortly after to sign the death-warrant of Thomas More, drew a black line in the prayer-book over the name of Thomas à Becket. Thanks to that blot of ink, no Englishman may any



longer say, 'St. Thomas à Becket, pray for me.' After the tombs came the convents. Not a kneeling-stool was left. We read in a document cited by the historian, — '*Item*, handed over to his Majesty four chalices of gold with their four patens, and one golden spoon, the whole weighing one hundred and seventy ounces. Received, Henry, king.' The autograph is in London.

"In Sweden, the Reformation could not fail of success, for the state was bankrupt, and Gustavus Wasa loved money. The king, therefore, says Menzel, eagerly embraced doctrines which allowed him to appropriate to himself the immense wealth of the clergy. . . . Denmark was subjected to Christiern the Second, an ambitious prince, avaricious, cruel, the cowardly assassin of the patriots whom he feared. He was himself the slave of Duweke, a Flemish girl of base extraction. The mistress of the king had taken a fancy for the doctrines of Luther. Confession was somewhat onerous to this chaste lady. She succeeded easily in *converting* her royal lover."

It must be confessed, that, if Protestantism contented itself with the dry narrative of these apostasies, which too frequently remind us of the question of Judas, *What will you give me, and I will deliver him to you?* the recital would become a little wearisome; but by the side of these modern Judases, the author has, in the interest of truth, placed the noble examples of firmness and Christian faith exhibited by the Catholic clergy. The bishops in his narration appear radiant with majesty. They are despoiled, they protest; they are cast into prison, they are silent; they are led to death, they chant their hymns of triumph.

Whilst the power of the new church is consolidating itself in Germany, whilst the Reformation gains numerous partisans in Bohemia, Poland, and Hungary, whilst it finds a powerful support in France in the nobles, whilst in the Low Countries the revolutionary spirit of the people seizes with avidity on this element of revolt, Catholicity receives from a man poor and without science an aid far more efficacious than the victorious arms of the Emperor or the treasures of the New World. Ignatius Loyola was then founding the Company of Jesus. The author here hesitates not to make the most beautiful eulogium of this Company, and cites in proof a long passage from the historian Menzel. Another Protestant says, that "The Order of the Jesuits has unquestionably contributed more than all others to the preservation of the Roman Catholic faith in those countries which had not as yet embraced Protestantism."

In another chapter the author compares the Protestant institutions with the Catholic, and everywhere assigns the superiority to the latter. He enlarges on Bible societies and Protestant missions. He carries his readers with these missions over the four quarters of the globe, and even to the centre of Oceanica, and makes them see the sterility of their works in contrast with the fruitfulness of the Catholic missions, marching from victory to victory.

Such is this work of Höninghaus, composed of pages selected from Protestant books not heretofore translated into French. In reading them, it is easy to perceive that the dissident writer, while making the defence of our faith, retains somewhat of the old leaven of sectarianism. But if all traces of this kind were effaced from the work, it would be entirely a Catholic book. It is well that at certain turns of thought, at certain epithets, we are reminded that the historian or the theologian does not belong to our communion.

There is, in these two volumes published by M. Audin, a great number of pages very pleasing and attractive. They are marked by a vast erudition; perhaps they are too erudite, and demand too much applica-



tion and effort on the part of the reader to be properly appreciated. The author has not treated separately each subject which he announces, and given it by aid of his citations a suitable development; but he has preferred to arrange and connect in consecutive order the citations themselves, and to make them form the very groundwork and body of his history. It surely was not to spare himself labor and pains, to attempt to reduce to order, to harmonize, so to speak, the thoughts of so many different authors; to make such a multitude speak on the same subject, and to fetch from so many mouths the same echo of approbation of the Catholic Church. This advantage, so conducive to the triumph of truth, will certainly compensate for the efforts of application certain passages in this book would appear to exact of the reader. However, this work, we are sure, is destined to find its merit acknowledged by all, especially by the serious and reflecting.

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2. — *A History of Ireland, from its first Settlement to the present Time; including a particular Account of its Literature, Music, Architecture, and Natural Resources, with upwards of Two Hundred Biographical Sketches of its most eminent Men; interspersed with a great Number of Irish Melodies, original and selected, arranged for Musical Instruments, and illustrated with many Portraits of celebrated Irishmen, and a series of Architectural Views.* By THOMAS MOONEY, late of the City of Dublin. Boston: By the Author. 1845. 12mo. pp. 1651.

THE subject of this history is one to which no American should be indifferent. There is not a more remarkable people on the globe than the Irish, and none whose history is more worthy of an attentive and profound study. During several centuries of our era, Ireland was the instructress of the European nations, and, in nearly every age since, her scholars have honorably distinguished themselves, especially in poetry and eloquence. No inconsiderable portion of English literature, if we may be pardoned the bull, is Irish. It suffices to mention the names of Swift, Berkeley, Steele, Goldsmith, Sheridan, and Burke. But to us Ireland is more especially interesting for her misfortunes; the unheard of wrongs which she has for so many ages endured; her firm attachment to the Catholic faith under every privation, and amid every temptation; and her recent patriotic efforts to resume her rank among the nations of the earth. The Irish, wherever scattered abroad, are the enemies of oppression, and the ardent — perhaps too ardent — friends of liberty; and we cannot but hope that the time is not far distant when oppression shall cease in their own native isle, and Tara's harp be restrung, and Tara's halls once more resound with the songs of national freedom. We, as a people, have a warm sympathy with Ireland. We remember her generous sympathy with us in our own struggle for independence; that she has furnished a large portion of our own population, and no inconsiderable number of those we delight to honor; and through all our borders ascends the fervent prayer for her deliverance.

Of the merits of Mr. Mooney's work we are but imperfectly qualified to speak. The late day at which we received a copy has not given us time to read it with the care requisite to enable us to pronounce a final

judgment. Moreover, we are not familiar enough with Irish history, ancient or modern, to be able to judge of the merits of the work regarded simply as authentic history. So far as we have read, without vouching for the accuracy of all its details, and reserving to ourselves the right to question, in some instances, both its facts and its theories, we may say that we have found it exceedingly interesting. The author, or rather compiler, has brought together a great mass of valuable information; and if he has not given us a complete history of his nation, he has at least given us a series of highly interesting and instructive lectures on its history. The work is well printed, and its illustrations are creditably executed. It is written in a free, easy, attractive style, which at times rises into a high order of eloquence; and its author is evidently not only a warm-hearted Irish patriot, but a writer of commendable industry and no inconsiderable literary merit. Some may question his taste in several matters of minor importance, and especially the method he takes of bringing his work to the notice of the public; but we trust nothing of this kind will lead any one to underrate his ability, or tend to prejudice any one against the work itself, which those who have read it with more attention than we have, who are altogether more familiar with Irish history than we are or can pretend to be, and whose judgments in any case we should prefer to our own, assure us is really the most complete and readable history of Ireland easily accessible. We hope it will be extensively read; and if it contribute somewhat to a juster appreciation of the Irish character, and tend to create a deeper interest in Ireland's struggle for a redress of grievances, not in vain will it have been written and read.

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3. — *Puritanism, or a Churchman's Defence against its Aspersions, by an Appeal to its History.* By THOMAS W. COIT, D. D. New York. Appleton & Co. 1845. 12mo. pp. 527.

THE Puritans certainly have their faults, and we allow ourselves at times to speak of them in no complimentary terms; but somehow or other, we rarely, if ever, read an attack upon them by others, without being strongly moved to take up the cudgels in their defence. Our old Puritan blood warms in our veins, and we are ready for the fight. Especially is this the case, when we find them attacked by an Episcopalian. We recognize no right in the Episcopalians to call our ancestors hard names. If we ourselves sometimes do so, that is all in the family; but an Episcopalian is a stranger, and has no right to interfere in our family quarrels. In a religious or an ecclesiastical point of view, the Puritan has no occasion to hang his head before an Anglican. Both claim to belong to the Church, and with equal reason, for one is as far from it as the other; both usurp rights which belong only to the Church of Christ; both favor religious establishments, and claim the right to punish heretics and dissenters; both persecute; but the persecutions of the Puritan are as a drop in the bucket, compared with those of the Anglican. Neither has any virtues except those which receive their reward in this life, and in these the Puritan excels. The only real difference between them is, that the Puritan is the more consistent of the two. Both are dissenters, only the Puritan is a dissenter from a dissenter. The Anglican is in this the worse of the

two; for he dissents from the Church which has authority from Christ; the Puritan dissents from a church which has, at best, authority only from the state. We would rather be a Puritan than an Anglican, though we thank God, that, through his great mercy, we are no longer either.

As to the book before us, it is crude, declamatory, and destitute of all literary merit. Dr. Coit is a scholar and a man of ability. He appears to have had the facts before him, and might have given us a good history of Puritanism. He ought to be ashamed of having sent out so hasty, confused, and ill-digested a work; and we will not pardon him, till he revises it, compresses it at least three fourths, reduces his ample materials to order, and relates his facts in a straightforward manner, so that one can get them from his book, even in case he should not happen to be previously familiar with them.

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4. — *History of the Variations of the Protestant Churches.* By JAMES BENIGN BOSSUET, Bishop of Meaux. From the French. New York: J. & D. Sadlier. 1845. 2 vols. 12mo.

WE welcome right heartily an American edition of this valuable work by the celebrated Bossuet. Every Catholic who is likely to come in contact with his Protestant neighbours should own and study it; and every Protestant who would appreciate his own religion, and ascertain the sandy foundation on which he is building, should also make himself familiar with it. We thank the Messrs. Sadlier for their enterprise in bringing it out, and trust they will find their interest in having done so.

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5. — *I Promessi Sposi. The Betrothed.* By ALESSANDRO MANZONI. New York: Appleton & Co. 2 vols. 12mo.

WE have experienced too much romance in real life, and seen too much of the effects of romance and novel-reading on those very dear to us, to be able to recommend the reading of novels and romances. It is not well to waste over scenes of fictitious woe the tears and sympathy due to the real miseries of life. Yet we can recommend this romance by Manzoni, which, by the by, is too well known, and too highly appreciated wherever known, to stand in any need of our recommendation. So far as we are acquainted, it is deserving to rank first among the first romances in any language. It is the production of true genius, and breathes a spirit and inculcates a moral that one is the better for being familiar with.

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6. — *The Catholic Keepsake.* Edited by PROFESSOR WALTER. Philadelphia: Fithian. 1845. 12mo. pp. 252.

THE paper, printing, and binding of this new Catholic annual are very beautiful, and do the publisher great credit. The illustrations are not so



happy. They will be better hereafter. We have read the volume with much pleasure; and if we had not read it at all, from the known taste and ability of its accomplished editor, we should not hesitate a moment to recommend it to our readers. We are glad to see the efforts our Catholic publishers are making to furnish our Catholic public with a good stock of Catholic literature, and especially to witness the improved style in which they are sending out their publications. There was a time when Catholic publications in this country were sent out in quite a shabby dress. This time is passing away. Messrs. Dunigan and Sadlier, New York, Fithian and Cunningham, Philadelphia, Murphy, and the conductors of the Metropolitan Press, Baltimore, and Donahoe, of this city, deserve honorable mention for the general typographical neatness and beauty of their publications. We must not let heresy have the advantage in typography. The edition of the Holy Bible recently issued by Messrs. Sadlier, and especially that issued by Mr. Dunigan, of New York, are both very beautiful, and deserving, as they no doubt receive, the liberal patronage of the Catholic public.

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7. — *The Christian's Guide to Heaven, or a Manual of Spiritual Exercises, with the Evening Office of the Church in Latin and English, and a Selection of Pious Hymns.* Boston: Donahoe. 1845. 16mo. pp. 288.

THIS is a very good little manual of piety, and, though not superior to many others in common use, will yet be very acceptable to the devout Christian. The addition of the Ordinary of the Mass we think would be an improvement. The Hymns are selected with judgment and taste. The size is very convenient, and the book presents a very beautiful specimen of typography.

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3. — *The Jesuits.* Translated from the French of MM. MICHELET and QUINET, Professors in the College of France. Edited by C. EDWARDS LESTER. New York: Gates & Stedman. Boston: Haliburton & Co. 1845. 12mo. pp. 225.

THIS work was received too late to be noticed at length in our present number. All we can say of it now is, that it is not unworthy of its two infidel authors, nor of its American editor.

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\* \* \* THIS number commences the third volume of our Review, the second of the Catholic series. The work properly begins with the second volume, of which we can, to a limited extent, furnish new subscribers with the numbers. The general character of this Journal is now well known, and we can appeal with confidence to the American Catholic public for its support. Such a work, it is believed, is needed, and it is evident that it must rely almost exclusively on the Catholic public for patronage.

We cannot expect a large number of Protestants to continue to take and pay for a work devoted to a cause against which they protest. The Review is decidedly and exclusively Catholic, and must be supported by Catholics henceforth or not at all.—We have no reason to complain of the liberality of the Catholic public for the past year, and none to distrust its continuance. The bishops and clergy have, we believe, very generally approved our labors, and to their liberal encouragement and support we are deeply indebted. On them we must depend for the success of the work, and against their wish we should be sorry to have it succeed, if it could. It is only through them we can receive or are willing to receive the support of the Catholic public for any publication.

We have aimed to deserve the liberal support we have received; but we are deeply sensible of the imperfection of our labors, and are pained to think how far short our Review falls of what a Catholic review should be. But, novice as we are in the Catholic faith, we have done the best we could. We have aimed to be true to the Church, and to be at least sound in the faith. We have not wished to put forth any crotchets of our own, or to attempt to *improve* the doctrines taught us. The Catholic Church, faith, and worship, as they are, always have been, and always will be till the end of time, is what we have embraced, what we love, what we seek to defend,—not relying on our own private judgment, but receiving the truth in humility from those Almighty God has commissioned to teach us, and whom he has commanded us to obey.

We cannot promise to do better or otherwise for the future than we have done for the past. Having, however, set forth and defended the great questions between Catholics and Protestants, we may be able hereafter to give to our pages more variety, and introduce articles of a more popular character; thus adapting the work, if not to a better, at least to a wider, circle of readers. But the public must take it as it comes. Committing it to the care of Him without whose blessing nothing can prosper, we start on this new volume, grateful for the past, and with cheerful confidence in the future. It was confidently predicted a year ago that we should turn back to Protestantism before the year was out. The year is out, and we are still a Catholic, and much firmer in the faith than we were at its commencement. It is idle for our old friends to look for our return to the errors and speculations we have abandoned. We are satisfied with the Church. We have thus far found it all and more than we expected. The more we become acquainted with it, the more true and altogether lovely does it appear. We have experienced during the year a peace, a serenity of mind, a joy and consolation in the midst of many afflictions, that we never knew before, or believed it possible for any one to experience in this life. We have found what we sought, and we ask for this life no greater boon than to be permitted to labor to refute the errors we formerly taught, and to promote the cause of Catholicity among our countrymen. With these remarks we send out this first number of a new volume, with the wish of "A HAPPY NEW YEAR" to all our friends and readers, Protestant as well as Catholic.